[Ill 


1 


1 


IBS  IN 


UK 


I   i  '•  »  il  Mi  ' 

I  I    I 

- 

II  mm 


I  ! 


i  I 


■ 


,i! 


1 


SHUIII! 


III  II 


-t.es> 


Ci- ' 

REESE    LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY    OF   CALIFORNIA. 

Received...           ^r&*<ju      ,      Zyc 
Accessions     >■     2~S~/3  0—'   Shelf  Ni 
C* 


A  REVIEW  OF  EDWARDS'S 

"INQUIRY 

INTO    THE 

FREEDOM    OF    THE    WILL.*' 

CONTAINING 

I.    STATEMENT  OF  EDWARDS'S  SYSTEM. 
II.    THE  LEGITIMATE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THIS  SYSTEM. 
III.    AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  A  SELF- 
DETERMINING  WILL. 

BY  HENRY  PHILIP  TAPPAN. 


I  am  afraid  th«lf  Edwards's  book  (however  wett  rivKanl,)  has  done  much 
harm  in  Enjland/as  it  ha3  secured  a  favourable  hearing  to  the  same  doc- 
trincs,  which,  sihca^tha,  time  of  Clarke,  had  been  generally  ranked  among 
the  most  dangerous  errocs  of  Hobbes  and  his  disciples."  —  Dugald  Stewart. 


NEW-YORK  : 
JOHN   S.   TAYLOR, 

THEOLOGICAL   PUBLISHER  AND  BOOKSELLER, 
BRICK  CHURCH  CHAPEL, 

1839. 


Entered  according  to  the  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  yoar  1839,  by 

HENRY    PHILIP    TAPPAN, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  tho  District  Court  of  the  United  States,  for  the 

Southern  District  of  New-York. 

2  sr/3  *- 


Q,  F.  Hopkine,  Printer,  2  Ann-street. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Discussions  respecting  the  will,  have,  unhappily, 
been  confounded  with  theological  opinions,  and 
hence  have  led  to  theological  controversies,  where 
predilections  for  a  particular  school  or  sect,  have 
generally  prejudged  the  conclusions  of  philosophy. 
As  a  part  of  the  mental  constitution,  the  will  must 
be  subjected  to  the  legitimate  methods  of  psycho- 
logical investigation,  and  must  abide  the  result. 
If  we  enter  the  field  of  human  consciousness  in 
the  free,  fearless,  and  honest  spirit  of  Baconian 
observation  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  laws  of  the 
reason  or  the  imagination,  what  should  prevent 
us  from  pursuing  the  same  enlightened  course  in 
reference  to  the  will  I 

Is  it  because  responsibility  and  the  duties  of 
morality  and  religion  are  more  immediately  con- 


IV  INTRODUCTION. 

nectcd  with  the  will  ?  This,  indeed,  throws  so- 
lemnity around  our  investigations,  and  warns  us 
of  caution ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  so  far  from  re- 
pressing investigation,  it  affords  the  highest  reason 
why  we  should  press  it  to  the  utmost  limit  of  con- 
sciousness. Nothing  surely  can  serve  more  to 
fix  our  impressions  of  moral  obligation,  or  to  open 
our  eye  to  the  imperishable  truth  and  excellency 
of  religion,  than  a  clear  and  ripe  knowledge  of 
that,  which  makes  us  the  subjects  of  duty.  As 
a  believer  in  philosophy,  I  claim  unbounded  liberty 
of  thought,  and  by  thinking  I  hope  to  arrive  at 
truth.  As  a  believer  in  the  Bible  I  always  antici- 
pate that  the  truths  to  which  philosophy  leads 
me,  will  harmonize  with  its  facts  and  doctrines. 
If  in  the  result  there  should  appear  to  be  a  colli- 
sion, it  imposes  upon  me  the  duty  of  re-examining 
both  my  philosophy  and  my  interpretation  of  the 
text.  In  this  way  I  may  in  the  end  remove  the 
difficulty,  and  not  only  so,  but  even  gain  from  the 
temporary  and  apparent  collision,  a  deeper  insight 
into  both  philosophy  and  religion.     If  the  difficul- 


INTRODUCTION.  V 

ty  cannot  be  removed,  then  it  remains  a  vexed 
point.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  I  must 
either  renounce  the  philosophical  conclusion,  or 
remove  the  text. 

If  the  whole  of  philosophy  or  its  leading  truths 
were  in  opposition  to  the  whole  of  revelation  or 
its  leading  truths,  we  should  then  evidently  be 
placed  on  the  alternative  of  denying  one  or  the 
other ;  but  as  the  denial  of  philosophy  would  be 
the  destruction  of  reason,  there  would  no  longer 
remain  in  our  being  any  principle  on  which  a  re- 
velation could  be  received.  Such  a  collision 
would  therefore  disprove  the  claims  of  any  sys- 
tem to  be  from  Heaven.  But  let  us  suppose,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  with  every  advance  of  phi- 
losophy the  facts  of  the  Bible  are  borne  aloft,  and 
their  divine  authority  and  their  truth  made  more 
manifest,  have  we  not  reason  to  bless  the  re- 
searches which  have  enabled  us  to  perceive  more 
clearly  the  light  from  Heaven?  A  system  of 
truth  does  not  fear,  it  courts  philosophical  scruti- 
ny.    Its   excellency   will    be    most  resplendent 

1* 


VI  INTRODUCTION. 

when  it  lias  had  the  most  fiery  trial  of  thought. 
Nothing  would  so  weaken  my  faith  in  the  Bible 
as  the  fact  of  being  compelled  to  tremble  for  its 
safety  whenever  I  claimed  and  exercised  the  pre- 
rogative of  reason.  And  what  I  say  of  it  as  a 
whole,  I  say  of  doctrines  claiming  to  be  derived 
from  it. 

Theologists  are  liable  to  impose  upon  them- 
selves when  they  argue  from  the  truths  of  the 
Bible  to  the  truths  of  their  philosophy  ;  either  un- 
der the  view  that  the  last  are  deducible  from  the 
former,  or  that  they  serve  to  account  for  and 
confirm  the  former.  How  often  is  their  philoso- 
phy drawn  from  some  other  source,  or  handed 
down  by  old  authority,  and  rendered  venerable 
by  associations  arbitrary  and  accidental ;  and  in- 
stead of  sustaining  the  simplicity  of  the  Bible,  the 
doctrine  is  perhaps  cast  into  the  mould  of  the 
philosophy. 

It  is  a  maxim  commended  by  reason  and  con- 
firmed by  experience,  that  in  pursuing  our  inves- 
tigations in  any  particular  science  we  are  to  con- 


INTRODUCTION.  Vll 


fine  ourselves  rigorously  to  its  subjects  and  meth- 
ods, neither  seeking  nor  fearing  collision  with  any 
other  science.  We  may  feel  confident  that  ulti- 
mately science  will  be  found  to  link  with  science, 
forming  a  universal  and  harmonious  system  of 
truth  ;  but  this  can  by  no  means  form  the  princi- 
ple of  our  particular  investigations.  The  appli- 
cation of  this  maxim  is  no  less  just  and  necessary 
where  a  philosophy  or  science  holds  a  relation  to 
revelation.  It  js  a  matter  of  the  highest  interest 
that  in  the  developements  of  such  philosophy  or 
science,  it  should  be  found  to  harmonize  with  the 
revelation  ;  but  nevertheless  this  cannot  be  re- 
ceived as  the  principle  on  which  we  shall  aim  to 
develope  it.  If  there  is  a  harmony,  it  must  be 
discovered  ;  it  cannot  be  invented  and  made. 

The  Cardinals  determined  upon  the  authority 
of  Scripture,  as  they  imagined,  what  the  science 
of  astronomy  must  be,  and  compelled  the  old 
man  Gallileo  to  give  the  lie  to  his  reason ;  and 
since  then,  the  science  of  geology  has  been  at- 
tempted, if  not  to  be  settled,  at  least  to  be  limited 


VIU  INTRODUCTION. 

in  its  researches  in  the  same  way.  Science, 
however,  has  pursued  her  steady  course  resistless- 
ly,  settling  her  own  bounds  and  methods,  and  se- 
lecting her  own  fields,  and  giving  to  the  world 
her  own  discoveries.  And  is  the  truth  of  the  Bi- 
ble unsettled  ?  No.  The  memory  of  Gallileo 
and  of  Cuvicr  is  blessed  by  the  same  lips  which 
name  the  name  of  Christ. 

Now  we  ask  the  same  independence  of  research 
in  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind,  and  no  less 
with  respect  to  the  Will  than  with  respect  to  any 
other  faculty.  We  wish  to  make  this  purely  a 
psychological  question.  Let  us  not  ask  what  phi- 
losophy is  demanded  by  Calvinism  in  opposition 
to  Pelagianism  and  Arminianism,  or  by  the  lat- 
ter in  opposition  to  the  former ;  let  us  ask  simply 
for  the  laws  of  our  being.  In  the  end  we  may 
present  another  instance  of  truth  honestly  and 
fearlessly  sought  in  the  legitimate  exercise  of  our 
natural  reason,  harmonizing  with  truths  revealed. 

One  thing  is  certain  ;  the  Bible  no  more  pro- 
fesses to  be  a  system  of  formal  mental  philoso- 


INTRODUCTION.  IX 

phy,  than  it  professes  to  contain  the  sciences  of 
astronomy  and  geology.  If  mental  philosophy  is 
given  there,  it  is  given  in  facts  of  history,  indi- 
vidual and  national,  in  poetry,  prophecy,  law,  and 
ethics  :  and  as  thus  given,  must  be  collected  into 
a  system  by  observation  and  philosophical  criti- 
cism. 

But  observations  upon  these  external  facts  could 
not  possibly  be  made  independently  of  observations 
upon  internal  facts  —  the  facts  of  the  conscious- 
ness ;  and  the  principles  of  philosophical  criticism 
can  be  obtained  only  in  the  same  way.  To  him 
who  looks  not  within  himself,  poetry,  history,  law, 
ethics,  and  the  distinctions  of  character  and  con- 
duct, would  necessarily  be  unintelligible.  No 
one  therefore  can  search  the  Bible  for  its  philoso- 
phy, who  has  not  already  read  philosophy  in  his 
own  being.  We  shall  find  this  amply  confirmed 
in  the  whole  history  of  theological  opinion.  Eve- 
ry interpreter  of  the  Bible,  every  author  of  a  creed, 
every  founder  of  a  sect,  plainly  enough  reveals 
both  the  principles  of  his  philosophy  and  their  in- 


*  INTRODUCTION. 

flucnce  upon  himself.  Every  man  who  reflects 
and  aims  to  explain,  is  necessarily  a  philosopher, 
and  has  his  philosophy.  Instead  therefore  of  pro- 
fessing to  oppose  the  Bible  to  philosophy,  or  in- 
stead of  the  pretence  of  deducing  our  philosophy 
solely  and  directly  from  the  Bible,  let  us  openly 
declare  that  we  do  not  discard  philosophy,  but 
seek  it  in  its  own  native  fields  ;  and  that  inasmuch 
as  it  has  a  being  and  a  use,  and  is  related  to  all  that 
we  know  and  do,  we  are  therefore  determined  to 
pursue  it  in  a  pure,  truth-loving  spirit. 

I  am  aware,  however,  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
will  is  so  intimately  associated  with  great  and 
venerable  names,  and  has  so  long  worn  a  theo- 
logical complexion,  that  it  is  well  nigh  impossible 
to  disintegrate  it.  The  authority  of  great  and 
good  men,  and  theological  interests,  even  when 
we  are  disposed  to  be  candid,  impartial,  and  in- 
dependent, do  often  insensibly  influence  our  rea- 
sonings. 

It  is  out  of  respect  to  these  old  associations  and 
prejudices,  and  from  the  wish  to  avoid  all  unne- 


INTRODUCTION.  XI 

cessary  strangeness  of  manner  in  handling  an  old 
subject,  and  more  than  all,  to  meet  what  are  re- 
garded by  many  as  the  weightiest  and  most  con- 
clusive reasonings  on  this  subject,  that  I  open  this 
discussion  with  a  review  of  M  Edwards's  Inquiry 
into  the  Freedom  of  the  Will."  There  is  no  work 
of  higher  authority  among  those  who  deny  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will ;  and  none 
which  on  this  subject  has  called  forth  more  gene- 
ral admiration  for  acuteness  of  thought  and  logi- 
cal subtelty.  I  believe  ttiere  is  a  prevailing  im- 
pression that  Edwards  must  be  fairly  met  in  order 
to  make  any  advance  in  an  opposite  argument.  I 
propose  no  less  than  this  attempt,  presumptuous 
though  it  may  seem,  yet  honest  and  made  for 
truth's  sake.  Truth  is  greater  and  more  venera- 
ble than  the  names  of  great  and  venerable  men, 
or  of  great  and  venerable  sects:  and  I  cannot  be- 
lieve that  I  seek  truth  with  a  proper  love  and 
veneration,  unless  I  seek  her,  confiding  in  herself 
alone,  neither  asking  the  authority  of  men  in  her 
support,  nor  fearing  a  collision  with  them,  how- 


ill  INTRODUCTION. 

ever  great  their  authority  may  be.  It  is  my  inter- 
est to  think  and  believe  aright,  no  less  than  to  act 
aright :  and  as  right  action  is  meritorious  not 
when  compelled  and  accidental,  but  when  free 
and  made  under  the  perception  and  conviction  of 
right  principles;  so  also  right  thinking  and  believ- 
ing are  meritorious,  either  in  an  intellectual  or 
moral  point  of  view,  when  thinking  and  believing 
are  something  more  than  gulping  down  dogmas 
because  Austin,  or  Calvin,  or  Arminius,  presents 
the  cup. 

Facts  of  history  or  of  description  are  legitimate- 
ly received  on  testimony,  but  truths  of  our  moral 
and  spiritual  being  can  be  received  only  on  the 
evidence  of  consciousness,  unless  the  testimony  be 
from  God  himself;  and  even  in  this  case  we  ex- 
pect that  the  testimony,  although  it  may  tran- 
scend consciousness,  shall  not  contradict  it.  The 
internal  evidence  of  the  Bible  under  the  highest 
point  of  view,  lies  in  this  :  that  although  there  be 
revelations  of  that  which  transcends  conscious- 
ness, yet  wherever  the  truths  come  within  the 


INTRODUCTION.  XI11 

sphere  of  consciousness,  there  is  a  perfect  harmo- 
ny between  the  decisions  of  developed  reason 
and  the  revelation. 

Now  in  the  application  of  these  principles,  if 
Edwards  have  given  us  a  true  psychology  in  re- 
lation to  the  will,  we  have  the  means  of  knowing 
it.  In  the  consciousness,  and  in  the  conscious- 
ness alone,  can  a  doctrine  of  the  will  be  ultimate- 
ly and  adequately  tested.  Nor  must  we  be  in- 
timidated from  making  this  test  by  the  assump- 
tion that  the  theory  of  Edwards  alone  sustains 
moral  responsibility  and  evangelical  religion.  Mor- 
al responsibility  and  evangelical  religion,  if  sus- 
tained and  illustrated  by  philosophy,  must  take  a 
philosophy  which  has  already  on  its  own  grounds 
proved  itself  a  true  philosophy.  Moral  responsi- 
bility and  evangelical  religion  can  derive  no  sup- 
port from  a  philosophy  which  they  are  taken  first 
to  prove. 

But  although  I  intend  to  conduct  my  argu- 
ment rigidly  on  psychological  principles,  I  shall 
endeavour  in  the  end  to  show  that  moral  respon- 
2 


XIV  INTRODUCTION. 

sibility  is  really  sustained  by  this  exposition  of 
the  will;  and  that  I  have  not,  to  say  the  least, 
weakened  one  of  the  supports  of  evangelical  reli- 
gion, nor  shorn  it  of  one  of  its  glories. 

The  plan  of  my  undertaking  embraces  the  fol- 
lowing particulars : 

I.  A  statement  of  Edwards's  system. 

II.  The  legitimate  consequences  of  this  sys- 
tem. 

III.  An  examination  of  the  arguments  against 
a  self-determining  will. 

IV.  The  doctrine  of  the  will  determined  by 
an  appeal  to  consciousness. 

V.  This  doctrine  viewed  in  connexion  with 
moral  agency  and  responsibility. 

VI.  This  doctrine  viewed  in  connexion  with 
the  truths  and  precepts  of  the  Bible. 

The  first  three  complete  the  review  of  Edwards, 
and  make  up  the  present  volume.  Another  vol- 
ume is  in  the  course  of  preparation. 


A  STATEMENT  OF  EDWARDS'S  SYSTEM. 

Edwards's  System,  or,  in  other  words,  his  Philo- 
sophy of  the  Will,  is  contained  in  part  I.  of  his 
"  Inquiry  into  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.''  This 
part  comprises  five  sections,  which  I  shall  give 
with  their  titles  in  his  own  order.  My  object  is 
to  arrive  at  truth.  I  shall  therefore  use  my  best 
endeavours  to  make  this  statement  with  the  ut- 
most clearness  and  fairness.  In  this  part  of  my 
work,  my  chief  anxiety  is  to  have  Edwards  per- 
fectly understood.  My  quotations  are  made  from 
the  edition  published  by  S.  Converse,  New-York, 
1829. 

"Sec  I. — Concerning  the  Nature  of  tub 
Will." 

Edwards  under  this  title  gives  his  definition  of 
the  will.  "TAe  will  is,  that  by  which  the  mind 
chooses  anything.  The  faculty  of  the  will,  is 
that  power,  or  principle  of  mind,  by  which  it  is 


i<T 


STATKMLMT   Ol 


capable  of  choosing:  an  act  of  the  uill  is  the 
same  as  an  act  of  choosing  or  choice"  (p.  15.) 

He  then  identifies  "choosing"  and  "refusing:" 
"  In  every  act  of  refusal  the  mind  chooses  the 
absence  of  the  thing  refused."  (p.  1G.) 

The  will  is  thus  the  faculty  of  choice.  Choice 
manifests  itself  either  in  relation  to  one  object  or 
several  objects.  Where  there  is  but  one  object, 
its  possession  or  non-possession  —  its  enjoyment 
or  non-enjoyment  —  its  presence  or  absence,  is 
chosen.  Where  there  are  several  objects,  and 
they  are  so  incompatible  that  the  possession,  en- 
joyment, or  presence  of  one,  involves  the  refusal 
of  the  others,  then  choice  manifests  itself  in  fixing 
upon  the  particular  object  to  be  retained,  and  the 
objects  to  be  set  aside. 

This  definition  is  given  on  the  ground  that  any 
object  being  regarded  as  positive,  may  be  con- 
trasted with  its  negative :  and  that  therefore  the 
refusing  a  negative  is  equivalent  to  choosing  a 
positive ;  and  the  choosing  a  negative,  equivalent 
to  refusing  a  positive,  and  vice  versa.  Thus  if 
the  presence  of  an  object  be  taken  as  positive,  its 
absence  is  negative.  To  refuse  the  presence  is 
therefore  to  choose  the  absence ;  and  to  choose 
the  presence,  to  refuse  the  absence  :  so  that  every 
act  of  choosing  involves  refusing,  and  every  act 


edwards's  system.  17 

of  refusing  involves  choosing ;    in  other  words, 
they  are  equivalents. 

Object  of  Will. 

The  object  in  respect  to  which  the  energy  of 
choice  is  manifested,  inducing  external  action,  or 
the  action  of  any  other  faculty  of  the  mind,  is  al- 
ways an  immediate  object.  Although  other  objects 
may  appear  desirable,  that  alone  is  the  object  of 
choice  which  is  the  occasion  of  present  action  — 
that  alone  is  chosen  as  the  subject  of  thought  on 
which  I  actually  think  —  that  alone  is  chosen  as 
the  object  of  muscular  exertion  respecting  which 
muscular  exertion  is  made.  That  is,  every  act  of 
choice  manifests  itself  by  producing  some  change 
or  effect  in  some  other  part  of  our  being.  "  The 
thing  next  chosen  or  preferred,  when  a  man  wills 
to  walk,  is  not  his  being  removed  to  such  a  place 
where  he  would  be,  but  such  an  exertion*and  mo- 
tion of  his  legs  and  feet,  &c.  in  order  to  it."  The 
same  principle  applies  to  any  mental  exertion. 

Will  and  Desire. 

Edwards  never  opposes  will  and  desire.     The 
only  distinction  that  can  possibly  be  made  is  that 
2* 


18  STATEMENT  OF 

of  genus  and  species.  They  are  the  same  in  kind. 
'•1  do  not  suppose  that  wUl  and  desire  are  words 
of  precisely  the  same  signification:  will  seems  to 
be  a  word  of  a  more  general  signification,  extend- 
ing to  things  present  and  absent.  Desire  respects 
something  absent.  But  yet  I  cannot  think  they 
are  so  entirely  distinct  that  they  can  ever  be  prop- 
erly said  to  run  counter.  A  man  never,  in  any  in- 
stance, wills  anything  contrary  to  his  desires,  or 
desires  anything  contrary  to  his  will.  The  thing 
which  he  wills,  the  very  same  he  desires ;  and  he 
does  not  will  a  thing  and  desire  the  contrary  in 
any  particular."  (p.  17.)  The  immediate  object 
of  will,  —  that  object,  in  respect  of  which  choice 
manifests  itself  by  producing  effects,  —  is  also  the 
object  of  desire ;  that  is,  of  supreme  desire,  at  that 
moment :  so  that,  the  object  chosen  is  the  object 
which  appears  most  desirable ;  and  the  object 
which  appears  most  desirable  is  always  the  object 
chosen.  *To  produce  an  act  of  choice,  therefore, 
we  have  only  to  awaken  a  preponderating  desire.  * 
Now  it  is  plain,  that  desire  cannot  be  distinguished 
from  passion.  That  which  we  love,  we  desire  to 
be  present,  to  possess,  to  enjoy :  that  which  we 
hate,  we  desire  to  be  absent,  or  to  be  affected  in 
some  way.  The  loving  an  object,  and  the  desir- 
ing its  enjoyment,  arc  identical :  the  hating  it,  and 


X 


edwards's  system.  19 

desiring  its  absence  or  destruction,  or  any  similar 
affection  of  it,  are  likewise  identical.  The  will, 
therefore,  is  not  to  be  distinguished,  at  least  in 
hind,  from  the  emotions  and  passions  :  this  will  ap- 
pear abundantly  as  we  proceed.  In  other  works 
he  expressly  identifies  them  :  "  I  humbly  conceive, 
that  the  affections  of  the  soul  are  not  properly  dis- 
tinguishable from  the  will ;  as  though  they  were 
two  faculties  of  soul."  (Revival  of  Religion  in  New 
England,  part  I.) 

"  God  has  endued  the  soul  with  two  faculties : 
one  is  that  by  which  it  is  capable  of  perception 
and  speculation,  or  by  which  it  discerns,  and 
views,  and  judges  of  things;  which  is  called  the 
understanding.  The  other  faculty  is  that  by 
which  the  soul  does  not  merely  perceive  and  view 
things,  but  is  in  some  way  inclined  with  respect 
to  the  things  it  views  or  considers;  either  is  in- 
clined to  then,  or  is  disinclined  or  averse  from 
them.  This  faculty  is  called  by  various  names : 
it  is  sometimes  called  inclination  ;  and  as  it  has 
respect  to  the  actions  that  are  determined  or  gov- 
erned by  it,  is  called  will.  The  will  and  the 
affections  of  the  soul  are  not  two  faculties :  the 
affections  are  not  essentially  distinct  from  the 
will,  nor  do  they  differ  from  the  mere  actings  of 
the  will  and  inclination  of  the  soul,  but  only  in 


TS 


20  STATEMENT   OP 

the  liveliness  and  scnsiblcncss  of  exercise."  (Tlie 
Nature  of  the  Affections,  part  I.)  That  Edwards 
makes  but  two  faculties  of  the  mind,  the  under- 
standing and  the  will,  as  well  as  identifies  the 
will  and  the  passions,  is  fully  settled  by  the  above 
quotation. 

"  Sec.  II. — Concerning  the  Determination 
of  Will." 

Meaning  of  the  term. 

"By  determining  the  will,  if  the  phrase  be 
used  with  any  meaning,  must  be  intended,  caus- 
ing that  the  act  of  the  will  or  choice  should  be 
thus  and  not  otherwise ;  and  the  will  is  said  to 
be  determined,  when  in  consequence  of  some  ac- 
tion or  influence,  its  choice  is  directed  to,  and 
fixed  upon,  some  particular  object.  As  when  we 
speak  of  the  determination  of  motion,  we  mean 
causing  the  motion  of  the  body  to  be  in  such  a 
direction,  rather  than  in  another.  The  determi- 
nation of  the  will  supposes  an  effect,  which  must 
have  a  cause.  If  the  will  be  determined,  there 
is  a  determiner." 

Now  the  causation  of  choice  and  the  determi- 
nation of  the  will  are  here  intended  to  be  distin- 


EDWAKDS'S   SYSTEM.  21 

wuished,  no  more  than  the  causation  of  motion 
and  the  determination  of  the  moving  body.  The 
cause  setting  a  body  in  motion,  likewise  gives  it 
a  direction  ;  and  where  there  are  several  causes, 
a  composition  of  the  forces  takes  place,  and  de- 
termines both  the  extent  and  direction  of  the  mo- 
tion. So  also  the  cause  acting  upon  the  will  or 
the  faculty  of  choice,  in  producing  a  choice  deter- 
mines its  direction  ;  indeed,  choice  cannot  be  con- 
ceived of,  without  also  conceiving  of  something 
chosen,  and  where  something  is  chosen,  the  direc- 
tion of  the  choice  is  determined,  that  is,  the  will 
is  determined.  And  where  there  are  several 
causes  acting  upon  the  will,  there  is  here  like- 
wise a  composition  of  the  mental  forces,  and  the 
choice  or  the  determination  of  the  will  takes  place 
accordingly.  (See  p.  23.)  Choice  or  volition  then 
being  an  effect  must  have  a  cause.  What  is  this 
cause  ? 

Motive. 

The  cause  of  volition  or  choice  is  called  motive. 
A  cause  setting  a  body  in  motion  is  properly  called 
the  motive  of  the  body ;  hence,  analogously,  a 
cause  exciting  the  will  to  choice  is  called  the  mo- 
tive of  the  will.     By  long  usage  the  proper  sense 


22  STATEMENT   OP 

of  motive  is  laid  aside,  and  it  lias  come  now  to  ex- 
press only  the  cause  or  reason  of  volition.  "By 
motive  I  mean  the  whole  of  that  which  moves, 
excites,  or  invites  the  mind  to  volition,  whether 
that  be  one  thing  singly,  or  many  things  conjointly- 
And  when  I  speak  of  the  strongest  motive,  I  have 
respect  to  the  strength  of  the  whole  that  operates 
to  induce  a  particular  act  of  volition,  whether  that 
be  the  strength  of  one  thing  alone,  or  of  many  to- 
gether." And  "  that  motive  which,  as  it  stands  in 
view  of  the  mind,  is  the  strongest,  determines  the 
will."  (p.  19.)  This  is  general,  and  means  no- 
thing more  than —  1.  the  cause  of  volition  is  called 
motive  ;  2.  that  where  there  are  several  causes  or 
motives  of  volition,  the  strongest  cause  prevails ; 
3.  the  cause  is  often  complex  ;  4.  in  estimating  the 
strength  of  the  cause,  if  it  be  complex,  all  the  par- 
ticulars must  be  considered  in  their  co-operation ; 
and,  5.  the  strength  of  the  motive  "stands  in  view 
of  the  mind,"  that  is,  it  is  something  which  the 
mind  knows  or  is  sensible  of. 

What  constitutes  the  strength  of  Motive  ? 

"  Everything  that  is  properly  called  a  motive, 
excitement,  or  inducement,  to  a  perceiving,  wil- 
ling agent,  has  some  sort  and  degree  of  tendency 


edwards's  system.  23 

or  advantage  to  move  or  excite  the  will,  previous 
to  the  effect,  or  to  the  act  of  will  excited.  This 
previous  tendency  of  the  motive  is  what  1  call  the 
strength  of  the  motive."  When  different  objects 
are  presented  to  the  mind,  they  awaken  certain 
emotions,  and  appear  more  or  less  "inviting." 
(p.  20.)  In  the  impression  thus  at  once  produced, 
we  perceive  their  "  tendency  or  advantage  to 
move  or  excite  the  will."  It  is  a  preference  or 
choice  anticipated,  an  instantaneous  perception  of 
a  quality  in  the  object  which  we  feel  would  deter- 
mine our  choice,  if  we  were  called  upon  to  make 
a  choice.  The  object  is  felt  to  be  adapted  to  the 
state  of  the  mind,  and  the  state  of  the  mind  to  the 
object.     They  are  felt  to  be  reciprocal. 

\Yliat  is  this  quality  which  makes  tip  the  previous 
tendency  ? 

"  Whatever  is  perceived  or  apprehended  by  an 
intelligent  and  voluntary  agent,  which  has  the  na- 
ture and  influence  of  a  motive  to  volition  or  choice, 
is  considered  or  viewed  as  good ;  nor  has  it  any 
tendency  to  engage  the  election  of  the  soul  in  any 
further  degree  than  it  appears  such."  Now,  as 
the  will  is  determined  by  the  strongest  motive  ; 
and  as  the  strength  of  motive  lies  in  the  previous 


21  STATEMENT  OP 

tendency;  and  as  the  previous  tendency  is  made 
up  of  the  quality  of  goodness  ;  and  as  the  highest 
degree  of  this  quality  in  any  given  case  makes  the 
strongest  motive  ;  therefore,  it  follows  that  the 
"  will  is  always  as  the  greatest  apparent  good 
is"   (p.  20.) 

Tlie  sense  in  which  the  term  "good"  is  used. 

"I  use  the  term  'good'  as  of  the  same  import 
with  'agreeable.'  To  appear  good  to  the  mind,  as 
I  use  the  phrase,  is  the  same  as  to  appear  agree- 
able, or  seem  pleasing  to  the  mind.  If  it  tends  to 
draw  the  inclination  and  move  the  will,  it  must 
be  under  the  notion  of  that  which  suits  the  mind. 
And  therefore  that  must  have  the  greatest  ten- 
dency to  attract  and  engage  it.  which,  as  it  stands 
in  the  mind's  view,  suits  it  best,  and  pleases  it 
most ;  and  in  that  sense  is  the  greatest  apparent 
good.  The  word  good  in  this  sense  includes  the 
avoiding  of  evil,  or  of  that  which  is  disagreeable 
and  uneasy.''  (p.  20.) 

It  follows  then  that  the  will  is  always  deter- 
mined by  that  which  see?tis  jnost  p>lcasing  or  ap- 
pears most  agreeable  to  the  mind. 

This  conclusion  is  in  perfect  accordance  with 
the  position  with  which  Edwards  set  out:  that 


edwards's  system.  25 

will  is  always  as  the  preponderating  desire  ;  in- 
deed, that  the  will  is  the  same  in  kind  with  de- 
sire, or  with  the  affections  ;  and  an  act  of  will  or 
choice,  nothing  more  than  the  strongest  desire  in 
reference  to  an  immediate  object,  and  a  desire 
producing  an  effect  in  our  mental  or  physical  be- 
ing. The  determination  of  will  is  the  strongest 
excitement  of  passion.  That  which  determines 
will  is  the  cause  of  passion.  The  strength  of  the 
cause  lies  in  its  perceived  tendency  to  excite  the 
passions  and  afford  enjoyment.  As  possessing 
this  tendency,  it  is  called  good,  or  pleasing,  or 
agreeable ;  that  is,  suiting  the  state  of  the  mind 
or  the  condition  of  the  affections. 

The  "good"  which  forms  the  characteristic  of 
a  cause  or  motive  is  an  immediate  good,  or  a  good 
"  in  the  present  view  of  the  mind."  (p.  21.)  Thus 
a  drunkard,  before  he  drinks,  maybe  supposed  to 
weigh  against  each  other  the  present  pleasure  of 
drinking  and  the  remote  painful  consequences: 
and  the  painful  consequences  may  appear  to  him 
to  be  greater  than  the  present  pleasure.  But 
still  the  question  truly  in  his  mind,  when  he  comes 
to  drink,  respects  the  present  act  of  drinking  only  ; 
and  if  this  seems  to  him  most  pleasing,  then  he 
drinks.  "  If  he  wills  to  drink,  then  drinking  is  the 
proper  object  of  the  act  of  his  will ;  and  drink- 
3 


2G  STATEMENT   OF 

ing,  on  some  account  or  other,  now  appears  most 
agreeable  to  him,  and  suits  him  best.  If  he 
chooses  to  refrain,  then  refraining  is  the  imme- 
diate object  of  his  will,  and  is  most  pleasing  to 
Ipiii."  The  reasoning  is,  that  when  the  drunkard 
drinks,  we  are  not  to  conclude  that  he  has  chosen 
future  misery  over  future  good,  but  that  the  act 
of  drinking,  in  itself,  is  the  object  of  choice  ;  so 
that,  in  the  view  he  has  taken  of  it,  it  is  to  him 
the  greatest  apparent  good.  In  general  we  may 
say,  in  accordance  with  this  principle,  that  when- 
ever the  act  of  choice  takes  place,  the  object  of 
that  act  comes  up  before  the  mind  in  such  a  way 
as  to  seem  most  pleasing  to  the  mind  ;  it  is  at  the 
moment,  and  in  the  immediate  relation,  the  great- 
est apparent  good.  The  man  thus  never  chooses 
what  is  disagreeable,  but  always  what  is  agree- 
able to  him. 

Proper  use  of  the  term  most  agreeable,  in 
relation  to  the  Will. 

"I  have  chosen  rather  to  express  myself  thus, 
that  the  will  always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent 
good,  or  as  what  appears  most  agreeable,  than  to 
say  the  will  is  determined  by  the  greatest  appa- 
rent good,  or  by  what  seems  most  agreeable  ;  be- 


Edwards's  system.  -~ 

cause  an  appearing  most  agreeable  to  the  mind, 
and  the  mind's  preferring,  seem  scarcely  distinct. 
If  strict  propriety  of  speech  be  insisted  on,  it  may 
more  properly  be  said,  that  the  voluntary  action, 
which  is  the  immediate  consequence  of  the  mind's 
choice,  is  determined  by  that  which  appears  most 
agreeable,  than  the  choice  itself."  (p.  21,  22.) 
Here  the  perception  or  sense  of  the  ?nost  agreeable 
is  identified  in  express  terms  with  volition  or 
choice.  "  The  will  is  as  the  most  agreeable," — 
that  is,  the  determination  of  icill,  which  means  its 
actual  choice,  as  a  fact  of  the  consciousness  is  em- 
braced in  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable ;  and  as 
the  voluntary  action,  or  the  action,  or  change,  or 
effect,  following  volition,  in  any  part  of  our  be- 
ing,—  as  to  walk,  or  talk,  or  read,  or  think,  —  has 
its  cause  in  the  volition,  or  the  "  mind's  choice," — 
so  it  is  entirely  proper  to  say,  either  that  this 
voluntary  action  is  determined  by  the  voli- 
tion or  that  it  is  determined  by  the  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable.  Edwards's  meaning  plain- 
ly is,  that  the  terms  are  convertible  :  volition  may 
be  called  the  cause  of  voluntary  action,  or  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  may  be  called  the 
cause.  This  is  still  a  carrying  out  of  the  position, 
that  the  icill  is  as  the  desire.  "  The  greatest 
apparent  good"  being  identical  with  "the  most 


28  STATEMENT  OF 

agreeable,"  and  this  again  being  identical  with 
the  most  desirable,  it  must  follow,  that  whenever, 
in  relation  to  any  object,  the  mind  is  affected  with 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  it  presents  the 
phenomenon  of  "volition"  or  "choice;"'  and  still 
farther,  that  which  is  chosen  is  the  most  agreea- 
ble object,  and  is  known  to  be  such  by  the  sim- 
ple fact  that  it  is  chosen ;  for  its  being  chosen, 
means  nothing  more  than  that  it  affects  the  mind 
with  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  —  and  the 
most  agreeable  is  that  which  is  chosen,  and  can- 
not be  otherwise  than  chosen ;  for  its  being  most 
agreeable,  means  nothing  more  than  that  it  is  the 
object  of  the  mind's  choice  or  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable.  The  object,  and  the  mind  regarded 
as  a  sensitive  or  willing  power,  are  correlatives, 
and  choice  is  the  unition  of  both  :  so  that  if  we 
regard  choice  as  characterizing  the  object,  then 
the  object  is  affirmed  to  be  the  most  agreeable  ; 
and  if,  on  the  other  side,  we  regard  choice  as 
characterizing  the  mind,  then  the  mind  is  affirmed 
to  be  affected  with  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able. 

Cause  of  Choice,  or  of  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable. 

"Volition  itself  is  always  determined  by  that 


EDWARDS'S   SYSTEM. 

in  or  about  the  mind's  view  of  the  object,  which 
causes  it  to  appear  most  agreeable.  I  say  in  or 
about  the  ?nind's  viae  of  the  object ;  because  what 
has  influence  to  render  an  object  in  view  agreea- 
ble, is  not  only  what  appears  in  the  object  view- 
ed, but  also  the  manner  of  the  view,  and  the 
state  and  circumstances  of  the  mind  that  views." 
(p.  22.) 

Choice  being  the  unition  of  the  mind's  sensi- 
tivity and  the  object,  —  that  is,  being  an  affection 
of  the  sensitivity,  by  reason  of  its  perfect  agree- 
ment and  correlation  with  the  object,  and  of 
course  of  the  perfect  agreement  and  correlation 
of  the  object  with  the  sensitivity,  —  in  determin- 
ing the  cause  of  choice,  we  must  necessarily  look 
both  to  the  mind  and  the  object.  Edwards  ac- 
cordingly gives  several  particulars  in  relation  to 
each. 

I.  In  relation  to  the  object,  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable,  or  choice,  will  depend  upon, — 

1.  The  beauty  of  the  object,  "viewing  it  as  it 
is  in  itself,"  independently  of  circumstances. 

2.  "  The  apparent  degree  of  pleasure  or  trouble 
attending  the  object,  or  the  consequence  of  it,"  or 
the  object  taken  with  its  "concomitants"  and  con- 
sequences. 

3.  "  The  apparent  state  of  the  pleasure  or  trou- 

3* 


80  STATEMENT  OP 

blc  that  appears  with  respect  to  distance  of  time. 
It  is  a  thing  in  itself  agreeable  to  the  mind,  to 
have  pleasure  speedily ;  and  disagreeable  to  have 
it  delayed."    (p.  22.) 

II.  In  relation  to  mind,  the  sense  of  agreeable- 
ness  will  depend,  first,  upon  the  manner  of  the 
mind's  view  ;  secondly,  upon  the  state  of  mind. 
Edwards,  under  the  first,  speaks  of  the  object 
as  connected  with  future  pleasure.  Here  the 
manner  of  the  mind's  view  will  have  influence  in 
two  respects  : 

1.  The  certainty  or  uncertainty  which  the 
mind  judges  to  attach  to  the  pleasure  ; 

2.  The  liveliness  of  the  sense,  or  of  the  ima- 
gination, which  the  mind  has  of  it. 

Now  these  may  be  in  different  degrees,  com- 
pounded with  different  degrees  of  pleasure,  con- 
sidered in  itself;  and  "the  agreeableness  of  a 
proposed  object  of  choice  will  be  in  a  degree  some 
way  compounded  of  the  degree  of  good  supposed 
by  the  judgement,  the  degree  of  apparent  proba- 
bility or  certainty  of  that  good,  and  the  degree  of 
liveliness  of  the  idea  the  mind  has  of  that  good." 
(p.  23.) 

Secondly  :  In  reference  to  objects  generally, 
whether  connected  with  present  or  future  pleas- 
ure, the  sense  of  agreeableness  will  depend  also 


edvvards's  system.  31 

upon  "  the  state  of  the  mind  which  views  a  pro- 
posed object  of  choice."  (p.  24.)  Here  we  have 
to  consider  U  the  particular  temper  which  the 
mind  has  by  nature,  or  that  has  been  introduced 
or  established  by  education,  example,  custom,  or 
some  other  means  ;  or  the  frame  or  state  that  the 
mind  is  in  on  a  particular  occasion."    (ibid.) 

Edwards  here  suggests,  that  it  may  be  unneces- 
sary to  consider  the  state  of  the  mind  as  a  ground 
of  agreeableness  distinct  from  the  two  already 
mentioned  :  viz.  —  the  nature  and  circumstances 
of  the  object,  and  the  manner  of  the  view.  "Per- 
haps, if  we  strictly  consider  the  matter,"  he  re-  v- 
marks,  "  the  different  temper  and  state  of  the 
mind  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  agreeableness 
of  objects  in  any  other  way,  than  as  it  makes  the 
objects  themselves  appear  differently,  beautiful  or 
deformed,  having  apparent  pleasure  or  pain  at- 
tending them  ;  and  as  it  occasions  the  manner  of 
the  view  to  be  different,  causes  the  idea  of  beauty 
or  deformity,  pleasure  or  uneasiness,  to  be  more 
or  less  lively."  (ibid.)  In  this  remark,  Edwards 
shows  plainly  how  completely  he  makes  mind  and  \j 
object  to  run  together  in  choice,  or  how  perfect  a 
unition  of  the  two,  choice  is.  The  state  of  the 
mind  is  manifested  only  in  relation  to  the  nature 
and  circumstances  of  the  object ;  and  the  sense  of 


;{>_'  STATKMEN'T   or 

agrccablcness  being  in  the  correlation  of  the  two, 
(In  st  nse  of  tie  most  agn  <  able  or  choice  is  such  a 
perfect  unition  of  tiie  two,  that,  having  described 
the  object  in  its  nature  and  circumstances  in  re- 
lation to  the  most  agreeable,  we  have  compre- 
hended in  this  the  state  of  mind.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  object, 
in  relation  to  the  most  agreeable,  can  be  known 
only  by  the  state  of  mind  produced  by  the  pres- 
ence of  the  object  and  its  circumstances.  To 
give  an  example,  —  let  a  rose  be  the  object. 
When  I  describe  the  beauty  and  agreeableness  of 
this  object,  I  describe  the  state  of  mind  in  rela- 
tion to  it ;  for  its  beauty  and  agreeableness  are 
identical  with  the  sensations  and  emotions  which 
I  experience,  —  hence,  in  philosophical  language, 
called  the  secondary  qualities  of  the  object :  and 
so,  on  the  other  hand,  if  I  describe  my  sensations 
and  emotions  in  the  presence  of  the  rose,  I  do  in 
fact  describe  its  beauty  and  agreeableness.  The 
mind  and  object  are  thus  united  in  the  sense  of 
agreeableness.  I  could  not  have  this  sense  of 
agreeableness  without  an  object ;  but  when  the 
object  is  presented  to  my  mind,  they  are  so  made 
for  each  other,  that  they  seem  to  melt  together  in 
the  pleasurable  emotion.  The  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable  or  choice  maybe  illustrated  in  the  same 


EDWAIlDS's   SYSTEM.  33 

way.  The  only  difference  between  the  agreea- 
ble simply  and  the  most  agreeable  is  this :  the 
agreeable  refers  merely  to  an  emotion  awakened 
on  the  immediate  presentation  of  an  object,  with- 
out any  comparison  or  competition.  The  most 
agreeable  takes  place  where  there  is  comparison 
and  competition.  Thus,  to  prefer  or  choose  a 
rose  above  a  violet  is  a  sense  of  the  most  agreea- 
ble of  the  two.  In  some  cases,  however,  that 
which  is  refused  is  positively  disagreeable.  The 
choice,  in  strictness  of  speech,  in  these  cases,  is 
only  a  sense  of  the  agreeable.  As,  however,  in 
every  instance  of  choosing,  there  are  two  terms 
formed  by  contemplating  the  act  of  choosing  itself 
in  the  contrast  of  positive  and  negative,  the  phrase 
most  agreeable  or  greatest  apparent  good  is  con- 
venient for  general  use,  and  sufficiently  precise  to 
express  every  case  which  comes  up. 

It  may  be  well  here  to  remark,  that  in  the  sys- 
tem we  are  thus  endeavouring  to  state  and  to  illus- 
trate, the  word  choice  is  properly  used  to  express 
the  action  of  will,  when  that  action  is  viewed  in 
relation  to  its  immediate  effects, —  as  when  I  say, 
I  choose  to  walk.  The  sense  of  the  most  agreea- 
ble, is  properly  used  to  express  the  same  action, 
when  the  action  is  viewed  in  relation  to  its  own 
cause.  Choice  and  volition  are  the  words  in  com- 


34  \ti:ment  of 

nion  use,  because  men  at  large  only  think  of  choice 
and  volition  in  reference  to  effects.  But  when  the 
cause  of  choice  is  sought  after  by  a  philosophic 
mind,  and  is  supposed  to  lie  in  the  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances of  mind  and  object,  then  the  sense  of 
(he  most  agreeable  becomes  the  most  appropriate 
form  of  expression. 

Edwards  concludes  his  discussion  of  the  cause 
yj  of  the  most  agreeable,  by  remarking:  "However, 
I  think  so  much  is  certain,  —  that  volition,  in  no 
one  instance  that  can  be  mentioned,  is  otherwise 
than  the  greatest  apparent  good  is,  in  the  manner 
which  has  been  explained."  This  is  the  great 
principle  of  his  system  ;  and,  a  few  sentences  af- 
ter, he  states  it  as  an  axiom,  or  a  generally  admit- 
ted truth  :  "  There  is  scarcely  a  plainer  and  more 
universal  dictate  of  the  sense  and  experience  of 
mankind,  than  that  when  men  act  voluntarily  and 
do  what  they  please,  then  they  do  what  suits  them 
best,  or  what  is  most  agreeable  to  them."  In- 
deed, Edwards  cannot  be  considered  as  having 
attempted  to  prove  this  ;  he  has  only  explained  it, 
and  therefore  it  is  only  the  explanation  of  a  sup- 
posed axiom  that  we  have  been  following  out. 

This  supposed  axiom  is  really  announced  in  the 
first  section  :  "  Will  and  desire  do  not  run  coun- 
ter at  all :  the  thing  which  he  wills,  the  very  same 


edwards's  system.  35 

he  desires  ;"  that  is,  a  man  wills  as  he  desires,  and 
of  course  wills  what  is  most  agreeable  to  him. 
It  is  to  be  noticed,  also,  that  the  title  of  part  I. 
runs  as  follows :  "  Wherein  are  explained  and 
stated  various  terms  and  things,  &c."  Receiving 
it,  therefore,  as  a  generally  admitted  truth,  "  that 
choice  or  volition  is  always  as  the  most  agreea- 
ble," and  is  itself  only  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able, what  is  the  explanation  given  ? 

1.  That  will,  or  the  faculty  of  choice,  is  not  a 
faculty  distinct  from  the  affections  or  passions,  or 
that  part  of  our  being  which  philosophers  some- 
times call  the  sensitivity. 

2.  That  volition,  or  choice,  or  preference,  being 
at  any  given  moment  and  under  any  given  cir- 
cumstances the  strongest  inclination,  or  the  strong- 
est affection  and  desire  with  regard  to  an  imme- 
diate object,  appears  in  the  constitution  of  our  be- 
ing as  the  antecedent  of  effects  in  the  mind  itself, 
or  in  the  body ;  which  effects  are  called  volunta- 
ry actions,  —  as  acts  of  attention,  or  of  talking,  or 
walking. 

3.  To  say  that  volition  is  as  the  desire,  is  equiv- 
alent to  saying  that  volition  is  as  the  "greatest 
apparent  good,"  which  again  means  only  the  most 
agreeable, —  so  that  the  volition  becomes  again 
the  sense  or  feeling  of  the  greatest  apparent  good. 


36 


STATEMENT   OF 


There  is  in  all  this  only  a  variety  of  expressions 
tor  the  same  affection  of  the  sensitivity. 

i.  Determination  of  will  is  actual  choice,  or 
the  production  in  the  mind  of  volition,  or  choice, 
or  the  strongest  affection,  or  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable,  or  of  the  greatest  apparent  good.  It  is 
therefore  an  effect,  and  must  have  a  determiner 
or  cause. 

5.  This  determiner  or  cause  is  called  motive. 
In  explaining  what  constitutes  the  motive,  we 
must  take  into  view  both  mind  and  object.  The 
object  must  be  perceived  by  the  mind  as  some- 
thing existent.  This  perception,  however,  is  only 
preliminary,  or  a  mere  introduction  of  the  object 
to  the  mind.  Now,  in  order  that  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable,  or  choice,  may  take  place,  the 
mind  and  object  must  be  suited  to  each  other ; 
they  must  be  correlatives.  The  object  must  pos- 
sess qualities  of  beauty  and  agreeableness  to  the 
mind.  The  mind  must  possess  a  susceptibility 
agreeable  to  the  qualities  of  the  object.  But  to 
say  that  the  object  possesses  qualities  of  beauty 
and  agreeableness  to  the  mind,  is  in  fact  to  affirm 
that  the  mind  has  the  requisite  susceptibility;  for 
these  qualities  of  the  object  have  a  being,  and  are 
what  they  are  only  in  relation  to  mind.  Choice, 
or  the  sense  of  agreeableness,  may  therefore  be 
called  the  unition  of  the  sensitivity  and  the  object. 


edwards's  system.  37 

Choice  is  thus,  like  any  emotion  or  passion,  a  fact 
perpetually  appearing  in  the  consciousness ;  and, 
like  emotion  or  passion  ;  and,  indeed,  being  a 
mere  form  of  emotion  and  passion,  must  ultimate- 
ly be  accounted  for  by  referring  it  to  the  consti- 
tution of  our  being.  But  inasmuch  as  the  consti- 
tution of  our  being  manifests  itself  in  relation  to 
objects  and  circumstances,  we  do  commonly  ac- 
count for  its  manifestations  by  referring  them  to 
the  objects  and  circumstances  in  connexion  with 
which  they  take  place,  and  without  which  they 
would  not  take  place  ;  and  thus,  as  we  say,  the 
cause  of  passion  is  the  object  of  passion  :  so  we 
say  also,  in  common  parlance,  the  cause  of  choice  is 
the  object  of  choice  ;  and  assigning  the  affections 
of  the  mind  springing  up  in  the  presence  of  the 
object,  to  the  object,  as  descriptive  of  its  qualities, 
we  say  that  choice  is  always  as  the  most  beauti- 
ful and  agreeable  ;  that  is,  as  the  greatest  appa- 
rent good.  This  greatest  apparent  good,  thus  ob- 
jectively described,  is  the  motive,  or  determiner, 
or  cause  of  volition. 

In  what  sense  the  Will  follows  the  last  dictate 
of  the  Understanding. 

"It  appears  from  these  things,  that  in  some 
4 


38  STATEMENT  OF 

sense  the  will  always  follows  ih<  Inst  dictate  of  the 
understanding.  But  then  the  understanding  must 
be  taken  in  a  large  sense,  as  including  the  whole 
faculty  of  perception  or  apprehension,  and  not 
merely  what  is  called  reason  or  judgement.  If  by 
the  dictate  of  the  understanding  is  meant  what 
reason  declares  to  be  best,  or  most  for  the  per- 
son's happiness,  taking  in  the  whole  of  its  dura- 
tion, it  is  not  true  that  the  will  always  follows  the 
last  dictate  of  the  understanding.  Such  a  dictate 
of  reason  is  quite  a  different  matter  from  things 
appearing  now  most  agreeable,  all  things  being 
put  together  which  relates  to  the  mind's  present 
perceptions  in  any  respect."  (p.  25.)  The  "  large 
sense  "  in  which  Edwards  takes  the  understand- 
ing, embraces  the  whole  intellectual  and  sensitive 
being.  In  the  production  of  choice,  or  the  sense 
of  the  most  agreeable,  the  suggestions  of  reason 
may  have  their  influence,  and  may  work  in  with 
other  particulars  to  bring  about  the  result ;  but 
then  they  are  subject  to  the  same  condition  with 
the  other  particulars,  —  they  must  appear,  at  the 
moment  and  in  the  immediate  circumstances,  the 
most  agreeable.  It  is  not  enough  that  they  come 
from  reason,  and  are  true  and  right ;  they  must 
likewise  suit  the  state  of  the  mind,  —  for  as  choice 
is  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  that  only  as  an 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTEM.  311 

object  can  tend  to  awaken  this  sense,  which  is 
properly  and  agreeably  related  to  the  feelings  of 
the  subject.  Where  the  suggestions  of  reason  are 
not  agreeably  related,  "  the  act  of  the  will  is  de- 
termined in  opposition  to  it."    (ibid.) 

"  Sec.  III.  —  Concerning  the  meaning  of  the 
terms    Necessity,    Impossibility,    Inability, 

&C   AND  OF  CoNTINGENCE." 

After  having  settled  his  definition  of  choice  or 
volition,  and  explained  the  cause  of  the  same,  Ed- 
wards takes  up  the  nature  of  the  connexion  be- 
tween this  cause  and  effect :  viz.  motive  and  vo- 
lition.    Is  this  connexion  a  necessary  connexion  ? 

In  order  to  determine  this  point,  and  to  explain 
his  view  of  it,  he  proceeds  to  discuss  the  meaning 
of  the  terms  contained  in  the  above  title.  This 
section  is  entirely  occupied  with  this  preliminary 
discussion. 

Edwards  makes  two  kinds  of  necessity  :  1.  Ne- 
cessity as  understood  in  the  common  or  vulgar 
use  ;  2.  Necessity  as  understood  in  the  philosoph- 
ical or  metaphysical  use. 

1.  In  common  use,  necessity  "is  a  relative  term, 
and  relates  to  some  supposed  opposition  made  to 
the  existence   of  a  thing, —  which  opposition  is 


40  STATEMENT  OF 

overcome  or  proves  insufficient  to  hinder  or  alter 
it.  The  word  impossible  is  manifestly  a  relative 
term,  and  has  reference  to  supposed  power  exert- 
ed to  bring  a  thing  to  pass  which  is  insufficient 
for  the  effect.  The  word  unable  is  relative,  and 
has  relation  to  ability,  or  endeavour,  which  is  in- 
sufficient. The  word  irresistible  is  relative,  and 
has  reference  to  resistance  which  is  made,  or  may 
be  made,  to  some  force  or  power  tending  to  an 
effect,  and  is  insufficient  to  withstand  the  power 
or  hinder  the  effect.  The  common  notion  of  ne- 
cessity and  impossibility  implies  something  that 
frustrates  endeavour  or  desire." 

He  then  distinguishes  this  necessity  into  gene- 
ral and  particular.  "Things  are  necessary  in 
general,  which  are  or  will  be,  notwithstanding 
any  supposable  opposition,  from  whatever  quar- 
ter :M  e.  g.  that  God  will  judge  the  world. 

"  Things  are  necessary  to  us  which  are  or  will 
be,  notwithstanding  all  opposition  supposable  in 
the  case  from  us."  This  is  particular  necessity: 
e.  g.  any  event  which  /  cannot  hinder.  In  the 
discussions  "  about  liberty  and  moral  agency,"  the 
word  is  used  especially  in  a  particular  sense,  be- 
cause we  are  concerned  in  these  discussions  as 
individuals. 

According  to  this  common  use  of  necessity  in 


edwards's  system.  41 

the  particular  sense,  "When  we  speak  of  any 
thing  necessary  to  us,  it  is  with  relation  to  some 
supposable  opposition  to  our  wills  ;"  and  "  a  thing 
is  said  to  be  necessary"  in  this  sense  "when  we 
cannot  help  it,  do  what  ice  will."  So  also  a  thing 
is  said  to  be  impossible  to  us  when  we  cannot  do 
it,  although  we  make  the  attempt,  —  that  is,  put 
forth  the  volition  ;  and  irresistible  to  us,  which, 
when  we  put  forth  a  volition  to  hinder  it,  over- 
comes the  opposition  :  and  we  are  unable  to  do  a 
thing  "  when  our  supposable  desires  and  endeav- 
ours are  insufficient,"  —  are  not  followed  by  any 
effect.  In  the  common  or  vulgar  use  of  these 
terms,  we  are  not  considering  volition  in  relation 
to  its  own  cause  ;  but  we  are  considering  volition 
as  itself  a  cause  in  relation  to  its  own  effects  : 
e.  g.  suppose  a  question  be  raised,  whether  a  cer- 
tain man  can  raise  a  certain  weight,  —  if  it  be  af- 
firmed that  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  raise  it,  that 
he  has  not  the  ability  to  raise  it,  and  that  the 
weight  will  necessarily  keep  its  position,  —  no  ref- 
erence whatever  is  made  to  the  production  of  a 
volition  or  choice  to  raise  it,  but  solely  to  the  con- 
nexion between  the  volition  and  the  raising  of  the 
weight.  Now  Edwards  remarks,  that  this  com- 
mon use  of  the  term  necessity  and  its  cognates 
being  habitual,  is  likely  to  enter  into  and  confound 
4* 


42  STATi:.Mi..vr  or 

our  reasonings  on  subjects  where  it  is  inadmissi- 
ble from  the  nature  of  the  case.  We  must  there- 
fore be  careful  to  discriminate,    (p.  27.) 

2.  In  metaphysical  or  philosophical  use,  neces- 
sity is  not  a  relative,  but  an  absolute  term.  In  this 
use  necessity  applies  "  in  cases  wherein  no  insuf- 
ficient will  is  supposed,  or  can  be  supposed ;  but 
the  very  nature  of  the  supposed  case  itself  ex- 
cludes any  opposition,  will,  or  endeavour."  (ibid.) 
Thus  it  is  used  "  with  respect  to  God's  existence 
before  the  creation  of  the  world,  when  there  was 
no  other  being."  "  Metaphysical  or  philosophical 
necessity  is  nothing  different  from  certainty,  — 
not  the  certainty  of  knowledge,  but  the  certainty 
of  things  in  themselves,  which  is  the  foundation  of 
the  certainty  of  knowledge,  or  that  wherein  lies 
the  ground  of  the  infallibility  of  the  proposition 
which  affirms  them.  Philosophical  necessity  is 
really  nothing  else  than  the  full  and  fixed  connex- 
ion between  the  things  signified  by  the  subject 
and  predicate  of  a  proposition  which  affirms  some- 
thing to  be  true  ;  and  in  this  sense  I  use  the  word 
necessity,  in  the  following  discourse,  when  I  en- 
deavour to  prove  that  necessity  is  not  inconsistent 
with  liberty"    (p.  27,  28,  29.) 

"The  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition 
which  affirms  the   existence  of  something,  mav 


^ 


ib. 


UlTIVEESIl 

edwards's  system.     V^  Oa  .    48 

have  a  full,  fixed,  and  certain  connexion,  in  seve 
ral  ways."' 

"  ] .  They  may  have  a  full  and  perfect  connex- 
ion in  and  of  themselves.  So  God's  infinity  and 
other  attributes  are  necessary.  So  it  is  neces- 
sary, in  its  own  nature,  that  two  and  two  should 
be  four." 

2,  The  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition, 
affirming  the  existence  of  something  which  is  al- 
ready come  to  pass,  are  fixed  and  certain. 

3.  The  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition 
may  be  fixed  and  certain  consequentially,  —  and 
so  the  existence  of  the  things  affirmed  may  be 
"  consequentially  necessary."  "  Things  which  are 
perfectly  connected  with  the  things  that  are  neces- 
sary, are  necessary  themselves,  by  a  necessity  of 
consequence."     This  is  logical  necessity. 

"  And  here  it  may  be  observed,  that  all  things 
which  are  future,  or  which  will  hereafter  begin  to 
be,  which  can  be  said  to  be  necessary,  are  neces- 
sary only  in  this  last  way," — that  is,  "by  a  cou- 
nt >  ion  with  something  that  is  necessary  in  its 
own  nature,  or  something  that  already  is  or  has 
been.  This  is  the  necessity  which  especially  be- 
longs to  controversies  about  acts  of  the  will." 
(p.  30.) 

Philosophical  necessity  is  general  and  particu- 


44  BTATBMBHT  OP 

far.  1.  "The  existence  of  a  thing  may  be  said 
to  be  necessary  with  a  general  necessity,  when 
all  things  considered  there  is  a  foundation  for  the 
certainty  ofits  existence."  This  is  unconditional 
necessity  in  the  strictest  s<  nse. 

2.  Particular  necessity  refers  to  "  things  that 
happen  to  particular  persons,  in  the  existence  of 
which  no  will  of  theirs  has  any  concern,  at  least 
at  that  time  ;  which,  whether  they  are  necessary 
or  not  with  regard  to  things  in  general,  yet  are 
necessary  to  them,  and  with  regard  to  any  voli- 
tion of  theirs  at  that  time,  as  they  prevent  all 
acts  of  the  will  about  the  affair."  (p.  31.)  This 
particular  necessity  is  absolute  to  the  individual, 
because  his  will  has  nothing  to  do  with  it  — 
whether  it  be  absolute  or  not  in  the  general  sense, 
does  not  affect  his  case. 

"  What  has  been  said  to  show  the  meaning  of 
terms  necessary  and  necessity,  may  be  sufficient 
for  the  explaining  of  the  opposite  terms  impossible 
and  impossibility.  For  there  is  no  difference,  but 
only  the  latter  are  negative  and  the  former  posi- 
tive." (ibid.) 

Inability  and  Unable. 
"  It  has  been  observed  that  these  terms  in  their 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTEM. 


45 


original  and  common  use,  have  relation  to  will 
and  endeavour,  as  supposable  in  the  case."  That 
is  have  relation  to  the  connexion  of  volition  with 
effects.  "  But  as  these  terms  are  often  used  by 
philosophers  and  divines,  especially  writers  on 
controversies  about  free  will,  they  are  used  in 
a  quite  different  and  far  more  extensive  sense, 
and  are  applied  to  many  cases  wherein  no  will  or 
endeavour  for  the  bringing  of  the  thing  to  pass  is 
or  can  be  supposed  :"  e.  g.  The  connexion  be- 
tween volitions  and  their  causes  or  motives. 

Contingent  and  Contingency. 

"  Any  thing  is  said  to  be  contingent,  or  to  come 
to  pass  by  chance  or  accident,  in  the  original 
meaning  of  such  words,  when  its  connexion  with 
its  causes  or  antecedents,  according  to  the  estab- 
lished course  of  things,  is  not  discerned  ;  and  so  is 
what  we  have  no  means  of  foreseeing.  But  the 
word,  contingent,  is  abundantly  used  in  a  very 
different  sense  ;  not  for  that,  whose  connexion 
with  the  series  of  things  we  cannot  discern  so  as 
to  foresee  the  event,  but  for  something  which  has 
absolutely  no  previous  ground  or  reason,  with 
which  its  existence  has  any  fixed  connexion." 
(p.  31.  32.) 


W  STATEMENT  OF 

Contingency  and  chance  Edwards  uses  as  eqai 
valent  terms.  In  common  use,  contingency  and 
chance  arc  relative  to  our  knowledge  —  implying 
that  we  discern  no  cause.  In  another  use,  —  the 
use  of  a  certain  philosophical  school, —  he  affirms 
that  contingency  is  used  to  express  absolutely  no 
cause  ;  or,  that  some  events  are  represented  as 
existing  without  any  cause  or  ground  of  their  ex- 
istence. This  will  be  examined  in  its  proper 
place.  I  am  now  only  stating  Edwards's  opinions, 
not  discussing  them. 


Sec  IV.     Of  the  Distinction  of  natural  and 
moiial  Necessity  and  Inability. 

We  now  return  to  the  question  :  —  Is  the  con- 
nexion between  motive  and  volition  necessary? 

The  term  necessary,  in  its  common  or  vulgar 
use,  does  not  relate  to  this  question,  for  in  that 
use  as  we  have  seen,  it  refers  to  the  connexion 
between  volition  considered  as  a  cause,  and  its 
effects.  In  this  question,  we  are  considering  voli- 
tion as  an  effect  in  relation  to  its  cause  or  the 
motive.  If  the  connexion  then  of  motive  and  vo- 
lition be  necessary,  it  must  be  necessary  in  the 
philosophical  or  metaphysical  sense  of  the  term. 


ED\VARDS?S  SYSTEM.  47 

Now  this  philosophical  necessity  Edwards  docs 
hold  to  characterize  the  connexion  of  motive  and 
volition.  This  section  opens  with  the  following 
distinction  of  philosophical  necessity:  "  That  ne- 
cessity which  has  been  explained,  consisting  in 
an  infallible  connexion  of  the  things  signified  by 
the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition,  as  in- 
telligent beings  are  the  subjects  of  it,  is  distin- 
guished into  moral  and  natural  necessity."  He 
then  appropriates  moral  philosophical  necessity  to 
express  the  nature  of  the  connexion  between  mo- 
tive and  volition:  "And  sometimes  by  moral  ne- 
cessity is  meant  that  necessity  of  connexion  and 
consequence  which  arises  from  moral  causes,  as 
the  strength  of  inclination,  or  motives,  and  the 
connexion  which  there  is  in  many  cases  between 
these,  and  such  certain  volitions  and  actions. 
And  it  is  in  this  sense  that  I  use  the  phrase  moral 
necessity  in  the  following  discourse."  (p.  32.) 
Natural  jihilosophical  necessity  as  distinguished 
from  this,  he  employs  to  characterize  the  connexion 
between  natural  causes  and  phenomena  of  our 
being,  as  the  connexion  of  external  objects  with 
our  various  sensations,  and  the  connexion  between 
truth  and  our  assent  or  belief,  (p.  33.) 

In    employing  the    term    moral,   however,    he 
does  not  intend  to  intimate  that  it  affects  at  all 


48  STATEMENT   of 

the  absoluteness  of  the  necessity  which  it  distin- 
guishes ;  on  the  contrary,  he  affirms  that  "moral 
necessity  may  be  as  absolute  as  natural  necessity. 
That  is,  the  effect  may  be  as  perfectly  connected 
with  its  moral  cause,  as  a  natural  necessary  effect  is 
with  its  natural  cause.  It  must  be  allowed  that 
there  maybe  such  a  thing  as  a  sure  and  perfect  con- 
nexion between  moral  causes  and  effects  ;  so  this 
only  (i.  e.  the  sure  and  perfect  connexion.)  is  what 
I  call  by  the  name  of  moral  necessity"  (p.  33.) 

Nor  does  he  intend  "  that  when  a  moral  habit 
or  motive  is  so  strong  that  the  act  of  the  will  in- 
fallibly follows,  this  is  not  owing  to  the  nature  of 
things"  But  these  terms,  moral  and  natural,  are 
convenient  to  express  a  difference  which  really 
exists;  a  difference,  however,  which  "does  not 
lie  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the  connexion  as  in 
the  two  terms  connected. ."  Indeed,  he  soon  after 
admits  "  that  choice  in  meiny  cases  arises  from  na- 
ture, as  truly  as  other  events."  His  sentiment  is 
plainly  this  —  choice  lies  in  the  great  system  and 
chain  of  nature  as  truly  as  any  other  phenomenon, 
arising  from  its  antecedent  and  having  its  conse- 
quents or  effects :  but  we  have  appropriated  na- 
ture to  express  the  chain  of  causes  and  effects, 
which  lie  without  us,  and  which  are  most  obvious 
to  us ;  and  choice  being,  "  as  it  were,  a  new  prin- 


edwards's  system.  19 

ciple  of  motion  and  action,"  lying  within  us,  and 
often  interrupting  or  altering  the  external  course 
of  nature,  seems  to  demand  a  peculiar  designa- 
tion,   (p.  34.) 

Edwards  closes  his  remarks  on  moral  necessity 
by  justifying  his  reduction  of  motive  and  volition 
under  philosophical  necessity.  "  It  must  be  ob- 
served, that  in  what  has  been  explained,  as  signi- 
fied by  the  name  of  moral  necessity,  the  word  ne- 
cessity is  not  used  according  to  the  original  design 
and  meaning  of  the  word ;  for,  as  was  observed 
before,  such  terms,  necessary,  impossible,  irresisti- 
ble, &c.  in  common  speech,  and  their  most  proper 
sense,  are  always  relative,  having  reference  to 
some  supposable  voluntary  opposition  or  endea- 
vour, that  is  insufficient.  But  no  such  opposi- 
tion, or  contrary  will  and  endeavour,  is  supposa- 
ble in  the  case  of  moral  necessity ;  which  is  a 
certainty  of  the  inclination  and  will  itself;  which 
does  not  admit  of  the  supposition  of  a  will  to  op- 
pose and  resist  it.  For  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  the 
same  individual  will  to  oppose  itself  in  its  present 
act ;  or  the  present  choice  to  be  opposite  to,  and 
resisting  present  choice  :  as  absurd  as  it  is  to  talk 
of  two  contrary  motions  in  the  same  moving  body 
at  the  same  time.  And  therefore  the  very  case 
supposed  never  admits  of  any  trial,  whether  an 
5 


.">()  -  i  \  TEW  \  C  of 

opposing  or  resisting  will  can  overcome  tliis  nc- 
'y."  (p.  :::..) 
This  passage  is  clear  and  full.  Common  ne- 
cessity, or  necessity  in  the  original  use  of  the 
word,  refers  to  the  connexion  between  volition 
and  its  effects ;  for  here  an  opposition  to  will  is 
supposablc.  I  may  choose  or  will  to  raise  a 
weight ;  but  the  gravity  opposed  to  my  endea- 
vour overcomes  it,  and  I  find  it  impossible  for 
me  to  raise  it,  and  the  weight  nccessaj-ily  remains 
in  its  place.  In  this  common  use  of  these  terms, 
the  impossibility  and  the  necessity  are  relative  to 
my  volition  ;  but  in  the  production  of  choice  itself, 
or  volition,  or  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable, 
there  is  no  reference  to  voluntary  endeavour. 
Choice  is  not  the  cause  of  itself:  it  cannot  be 
conceived  of  as  struggling  with  itself  in  its  own 
production.  The  cause  of  volition  does  not  lie 
within  the  sphere  of  volition  itself;  if  any  opposi- 
tion, therefore,  were  made  to  the  production  of  a 
volition,  it  could  not  be  made  by  a  volition.  The 
mind,  with  given  susceptibilities  and  habits,  is 
supposed  to  be  placed  within  the  influence  of 
objects  and  their  circumstances,  and  the  choice 
takes  place  in  the  correlation  of  the  two,  as  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable.  Now  choice  cannot 
exist  before  its  cause,  and  so  there  can  be  no 


edwards's  system.  51 

choice  in  the  act  of  its  causation.  It  comes  into 
existence,  therefore,  by  no  necessity  relating  to 
voluntary  endeavour ;  it  comes  into  existence  by 
a  philosophical  and  absolute  necessity  of  cause 
and  effect.  It  is  necessary  as  the  falling  of  a 
stone  which  is  thrown  into  the  air ;  as  the  freez- 
ing or  boiling  of  water  at  given  temperatures  ;  as 
sensations  of  sight,  sound,  smell,  taste,  and  feel- 
ing, when  the  organs  of  sense  and  the  objects  of 
sense  are  brought  together.  The  application  of 
the  epithet  moral  to  the  necessity  of  volition,  evi- 
dently does  not  alter  in  the  least  the  character  of 
that  necessity.  It  is  still  philosophical  and  abso- 
lute necessity,  and  as  sure  and  perfect  as  natural 
necessity.  This  we  have  seen  he  expressly  ad- 
mits, (p.  33 ;)  affirming,  (p.  34,)  that  the  differ- 
ence between  a  moral  and  natural  necessity  is  a 
mere  difference  in  the  "two  terms  connected,"' 
and  not  a  difference  "  in  the  nature  of  the  con- 
nexion." 

Natural  and  moral  Inability. 

"  What  has  been  said  of  natural  and  moral  ne- 
cessity, may  serve  to  explain  what  is  intended  by 
natural  and  moral  inability.  We  are  said  to  be 
naturally  unable  to  do  a  thing,  when  we  cannot 


52  STATEMENT  OF 

do  it  if  we  will,  because  what  is  most  commonly 
called  nature  does  not  allow  of  it,  or  because  of 
some  impeding  defect  or  obstacle  that  is  extrinsic 
to  the  will  ;  either  in  the  faculty  of  the  understand- 
ing, constitution  of  body,  or  external  objects."  (p. 
35.)  We  may  make  a  voluntary  endeavour  to 
know  something,  and  may  find  ourselves  unable, 
through  a  defect  of  the  understanding.  We  may 
make  a  voluntary  effort  to  do  something  by  the 
instrumentality  of  our  hand,  and  may  find  our- 
selves unable  through  a  defect  of  the  bodily  con- 
stitution ;  or  external  objects  may  be  regarded  as 
presenting  such  a  counter  force  as  to  overcome 
the  force  we  exert.  This  is  natural  inability ;  this 
is  all  we  mean  by  it.  It  must  be  remarked  too, 
that  this  is  inability  not  metaphysically  or  jjJiiloso- 
phically  considered,  and  therefore  not  absolute  in- 
ability ;  but  only  inability  in  the  common  and  vul- 
gar acceptation  of  the  term  —  a  relative  inability, 
relative  to  volition  or  choice  —  an  inability  to  do, 
although  we  will  to  do. 

What  is  moral  inability  ?  "  Moral  inability 
consists  not  in  any  of  these  things ;  but  either  in 
the  want  of  inclination,  or  the  strength  of  a  con- 
trary inclination,  or  the  want  of  sufficient  motives 
in  view,  to  induce  and  excite  the  act  of  will,  or 
the  strength  of  apparent  motives  to  the  contrary- 


edwards's  system.  58 

Or  both  these  may  be  resolved  into  one ;  and  it 
may  be  said,  in  one  word,  that  moral  inability  con- 
sists in  the  opposition  or  want  of  inclination.  For 
when  a  person  is  unable  to  will  or  choose  such  a 
thing,  through  a  defect  of  motives,  or  prevalence 
of  contrary  motives,  it  is  the  same  thing  as  his 
being  unable  through  the  want  of  an  inclination, 
or  the  prevalence  of  a  contrary  inclination,  in 
such  circumstances  and  under  the  influence  of 
such  views.'"    (ibid.) 

The  inability  in  this  case  does  not  relate  to  the 
connexion  between  volition  and  its  consequents 
and  effects ;  but  to  the  production  of  the  volition 
itself.  Now  the  inability  to  the  production  of  a 
volition,  cannot  be  affirmed  of  the  volition,  because 
it  is  not  yet  supposed  to  exist,  and  as  an  effect 
cannot  be  conceived  of  as  producing  itself.  The 
inability,  therefore,  must  belong  to  the  causes  of 
volition,  or  to  the  motive.  But  motive,  as  we 
have  seen,  lies  in  the  state  of  the  mind,  and  in  the 
nature  and  circumstances  of  the  object ;  and  choice 
or  volition  exists  when,  in  the  correlation  of  mind 
and  object,  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  is  pro- 
duced. Now  what  reason  can  exist,  in  any  given 
case,  why  the  volition  or  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able is  not  produced  ?  Why  simply  this,  that  there 
is  not  such  a  correlation  of  mind  and  object  as  to 
•v 


54  STATEMENT   OF 

produce  this  sense  or  choice.  But  wherein  lies 
the  deficiency?  We  may  say  generally,  that  it 
lies  in  both  mind  and  object  —  that  they  are  not 
suited  to  each  other.  The  mind  is  not  in  a  state 
to  be  agreeably  impressed  by  the  object,  and  the 
object  does  not  possess  qualities  of  beauty  and 
agreeablencss  to  the  mind.  On  the  part  of  the 
mind,  there  is  either  a  want  of  inclination  to  the 
object,  or  a  stronger  inclination  towards  another 
object :  on  the  part  of  the  object,  there  is  a  want 
of  interesting  and  agreeable  qualities  to  the  par- 
ticular state  of  mind  in  question,  or  a  suitableness 
to  a  different  state  of  mind :  and  this  constitutes 
"  the  want  of  sufficient  motives  in  viewr,  to  induce 
and  excite  the  act  of  will,  or  the  strength  of  appa- 
rent motives  to  the  contrary."  And  both  these 
may  clearly  be  resolved  into  one,  that  above  men- 
tioned, viz.  a  want  of  inclination  on  the  part  of 
the  mind  to  the  object,  and  a  stronger  inclination 
towards  another  object ;  or,  as  Edwards  expresses 
it,  "  the  opposition  or  want  of  inclination."'  For  a 
want  of  inclination  to  one  object,  implying  a 
stronger  inclination  to  another  object,  expresses 
that  the  state  of  the  mind,  and  the  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  one  object,  are  not  correlated  ; 
but  that  the  state  of  mind,  and  the  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  other  object,  are  correlated. 


edwards's  system.  55 

The  first,  is  a  "  want  of  sufficient  motives ;"  the 
second,  stronger  "  motives  to  the  contrary."  Mo- 
ral inability  lies  entirely  out  of  the  sphere  of  voli- 
tion; volition,  therefore,  cannot  produce  or  relieve 
it,  for  this  would  suppose  an  effect  to  modify  its 
cause,  and  that  too  before  the  effect  itself  has  any 
existence.  Moral  inability  is  a  metaphysical  ina- 
bility :  it  is  the  perfect  and  fixed  impossibility  of 
certain  laws  and  principles  of  being,  leading  to 
certain  volitions  ;  and  is  contrasted  with  physical 
inability,  which  is  the  established  impossibility  of 
a  certain  volition,  producing  a  certain  effect.  So 
we  may  say,  that  moral  ability  is  the  certain  and 
fixed  connexion  between  certain  laws  and  prin- 
ciples of  being,  and  volitions ;  and  is  contrasted 
with  natural  ability,  which  is  the  established  con- 
nexion between  certain  volitions  and  certain  ef- 
fects. 

Moral  inability,  although  transcending  the  sphere 
of  volition,  is  a  real  inability.  Where  it  exists, 
there  is  the  absolute  impossibility  of  a  given  voli- 
tion,—  and  of  course  an  absolute  impossibility  of 
certain  effects  coming  to  pass  by  that  volition. 
The  impossibility  of  water  freezing  above  an  es- 
tablished temperature,  or  of  boiling  below  an  es- 
tablished temperature,  is  no  more  fixed  than  the 
impossibility  of  effects  coming  to  pa.ss  by  a  voli- 


56  STATEMENT  OF 

tion,  when  there  is  a  moral  inability  of  the  voli- 
tion. The  difference  between  the  two  cases  does 
not  lie  "  in  the  nature  of  the  connexion,"  but  "  in 
the  two  terms  connected." 

Edwards  gives  several  instances  in  illustration 
of  moral  inability. 

"  A  woman  of  great  honour  and  chastity  may 
have  a  moral  inability  to  prostitute  herself  to  her 
slave."  (ibid.)  There  is  no  correlation  between 
the  state  of  her  mind  and  the  act  which  forms  the 
object  contemplated,  —  of  course  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable  or  choice  cannot  take  place ;  and 
while  the  state  of  her  mind  remains  the  same,  and 
the  act  and  its  circumstances  remain  the  same, 
there  is,  on  the  principle  of  Edwards,  an  utter  in- 
ability to  the  choice,  and  of  course  to  the  conse- 
quents of  the  choice. 

"  A  child  of  great  love  and  duty  to  his  parents, 
may  be  thus  unable  to  kill  his  father."  (ibid.) 
This  case  is  similar  to  the  preceding. 

"A  very  lascivious  man,  in  case  of  certain  op- 
portunities and  temptations,  and  in  the  absence  of 
such  and  such  restraints,  may  be  unable  to  for- 
bear gratifying  his  lust."  There  is  here  a  corre- 
lation between  the  state  of  mind  and  the  object,  in 
its  nature  and  circumstances,  —  and  of  course  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  or  choice  takes  place. 


edwards's  system.  57 

There  is  a  moral  ability  to  the  choice,  and  a  mor- 
al inability  to  forbear,  or  to  choose  the  opposite. 

"  A  drunkard,  under  such  and  such  circumstan- 
ces, may  be  unable  to  forbear  taking  strong 
drink."    (ibid.)     This  is  similar  to  the  last. 

"  A  very  malicious  man  may  be  unable  to  ex- 
ert benevolent  acts  to  an  enemy,  or  to  desire  his 
prosperity ;  yea,  some  may  be  so  under  the  pow- 
er of  a  vile  disposition,  that  they  may  be  unable 
to  love  those  who  are  most  worthy  of  their  es- 
teem and  affection."  (ibid.)  The  state  of  mind  is 
such,  —  that  is,  the  disposition  or  sensitivity,  —  as 
not  to  be  at  all  correlated  to  the  great  duty  of 
loving  one's  neighbour  as  one's  self,  —  or  to 
any  moral  excellency  in  another :  of  course  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  is  not  produced  ;  and 
in  this  state  of  mind  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
that  it  should  be  produced.  "  A  strong  habit  of 
virtue,  a  great  esteem  of  holiness,  mav  cause  a 
moral  inability  to  love  wickedness  in  general." 
(p.  3G.)  "  On  the  other  hand,  a  great  degree  of 
habitual  wickedness  may  lay  a  man  under  an  in- 
ability to  love  and  choose  holiness,  and  render 
him  utterly  unable  to  love  an  infinitely  Holy  Be- 
ing, or  to  choose  and  cleave  to  him  as  the  chief 
good."  (ibid.)  The  love  and  choice  of  holiness 
is  necessarily  produced  by  the  correlation  of  the 


58  STATEMENT  or 

mind  with  holiness;  and  the  love  and  choice  of 
holiness  is  utterly  impossible  when  this  correlation 
does  not  exist.  Where  a  moral  inability  to  evil 
exists,  nothing  can  be  more  sure  and  fixed  than 
this  inability.  The  individual  who  is  the  subject 
of  it  has  absolutely  no  power  to  alter  it.  If  he 
were  to  proceed  to  alter  it,  he  would  have  to  put 
forth  a  volition  to  this  effect ;  but  this  would  be 
an  evil  volition,  and  by  supposition  the  individual 
has  no  ability  to  evil  volitions. 

Where  a  moral  inability  to  good  exists,  nothing 
can  be  more  sure  and  fixed  than  this  inability. 
The  individual  who  is  the  subject  of  it,  has  abso- 
lutely no  power  to  alter  it.  If  he  were  to  pro- 
ceed to  alter  it,  he  would  have  to  put  forth  a  voli- 
tion to  this  effect ;  but  this  would  be  a  good  vo- 
lition, and  by  supposition  the  individual  has  no 
ability  to  good  volitions. 

General  and  habitual,  particular  and  occasional 
Inability. 

The  first  consists  "  in  a  fixed  and  habitual  in- 
clination, or  an  habitual  and  stated  defect  or 
want  of  a  certain  kind  of  inclination,     (p.  36.) 

The  second  is  "  an  inability  of  the  will  or  heart 
to  a  particular  act,  through  the  strength  or  defect 


EDWARDS  *   SYSTEM.  59 

of  present  motives,  or  of  inducements  presented 
to  the  view  of  the  understanding,  on  this  occa- 
sion."   (ibid.) 

An  habitual  drunkard,  and  a  man  habitually  so- 
ber, on  some  particular  occasion  getting  drunk, 
are  instances  of  general  and  particular  inability. 
In  the  first  instance,  the  slate  of  the  man's  mind 
has  become  correlated  to  the  object ;  under  all 
times  and  circumstances  it  is  fixed.  In  the  second 
instance,  the  state  of  the  man's  mind  is  correlated 
to  the  object  only  when  presented  on  certain  oc- 
casions and  under  certain  circumstances.  In  both 
instances,  however,  the  choice  is  necessary,  —  "it 
not  being  possible,  in  any  case,  that  the  will  should 
at  present  go  against  the  motive  which  has  now, 
all  things  considered,  the  greatest  advantage  to 
induce  it." 

"  Will  and  endeavour  against,  or  diverse  from 
present  acts  of  the  will,  are  in  no  case  supposa- 
ble,  whether  those  acts  be  occasional  or  habitual  ; 
for  that  would  be  to  suppose  the  will  at  present 
to  be  otherwise  than  at  present  it  is."    (ibid.) 

The  passage  which  follows  deserves  particular 
attention.  It  may  be  brought  up  under  the  fol- 
lowing question  : 

Although  will  cannot  be  exerted  against  pres- 
ent acts  of  the  will,  yet  can  present  acts  of  the 


60  STATEMENT   OF 

will  be  exerted  to  produce  future  acts  of  the  will, 
opposed  to  present  habitual  or  present  occasional 
acts  ? 

"  But  yet  there  may  be  will  and  endeavour 
against  future  acts  of  the  will,  or  volitions  that  are 
likely  to  take  place,  as  viewed  at  a  distance.  It 
is  no  contradiction,  to  suppose  that  the  acts  of  the 
will  at  one  time  may  be  against  the  act  of  the  will 
at  another  time  ;  and  there  may  be  desires  and 
endeavours  to  prevent  or  excite  future  acts  of  the 
will ;  but  such  desires  and  endeavours  arc  in 
many  cases  rendered  insufficient  and  vain  through 
fixedness  of  habit :  when  the  occasion  returns,  the 
strength  of  habit  overcomes  and  baffles  all  such 
opposition."     (p.  37.) 

Let  us  take  the  instance  of  the  drunkard.  The 
choice  or  volition  to  drink  is  the  fixed  correlation 
of  his  disposition  and  the  strong  drink.  But  we 
may  suppose  that  his  disposition  can  be  affected 
by  other  objects  likewise  :  as  the  consideration  of 
the  interest  and  happiness  of  his  wife  and  chil- 
dren, and  his  own  respectability  and  final  happi- 
ness. When  his  cups  are  removed,  and  he  has 
an  occasional  fit  of  satiety  and  loathing,  these  con- 
siderations may  awaken  at  the  time  the  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable,  and  lead  him  to  avoid  the  oc- 
casions of  drunkenness,  and  to  form  resolutions 
of  amendment;  but  when  the  appetite  and  longing 


edwards's  system.  61 

for  drink  returns,  and  he  comes  again  in  the  way 
of  indulgence,  then  these  considerations,  brought 
fairly  into  collision  with  his  habits,  are  overcome, 
and  drinking,  as  the  most  agreeable,  asserts  its 
supremacy. 

"  But  it  may  be  comparatively  easy  to  make  an 
alteration  with  respect  to  such  future  acts  as  are 
only  occasional  and  transient ;  because  the  occa- 
sional or  transient  cause,  if  foreseen,  may  often 
easily  be  prevented  or  avoided."    (ibid.) 

In  the  case  of  occasional  drunkenness,  for  in- 
stance, the  habitual  correlation  is  not  of  mind  and 
strong  drink,  but  of  mind  and  considerations  of 
honour,  prudence,  and  virtue.  But  strong  drink 
being  associated  on  some  occasion  with  objects 
which  are  correlated  to  the  mind,  —  as  hospitali- 
ty, friendship,  or  festive  celebrations,  —  may  ob- 
tain the  mastery  ;  and  in  this  case,  the  individual 
being  under  no  temptation  from  strong  drink  in 
itself  considered,  and  being  really  affected  with 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  in  relation  to  ob- 
jects which  are  opposed  to  drunkenness,  may 
take  care  that  strong  drink  shall  not  come  again 
into  circumstances  to  give  it  an  adventitious  ad- 
vantage. The  repetition  of  occasional  drunken- 
ness would  of  course  by  and  by  produce  a  change 
in  the  sensitivity,  and  establish  an  habitual  liking 

6 


69  STATEMENT   OF 

for  drink.  "  On  this  account,  the  moral  inability 
that  attends  fixed  habits,  especially  obtains  the 
name  of  inability.  And  then,  as  the  will  may  re- 
motely and  indirectly  resist  itself,  and  do  it  in  vain, 
in  the  case  of  strong  habits ;  so  reason  may  resist 
present  acts  of  the  will,  and  its  resistance  be  in- 
sufficient :  and  this  is  more  commonly  the  case, 
also,  when  the    acts   arise    from    strong   habit." 

^K^  In  every  act  of  the  will,  the  will  at  the  moment 
is  unable  to  act  otherwise  ;  it  is  in  the  strictest 
sense  true,  that  a  man,  at  the  moment  of  his  act- 
ing, must  act  as  he  does  act ;  but  as  we  usually 
characterize  men  by  the  habitual  state  of  their 
minds,  we  more  especially  speak  of  moral  inabil- 
ity in  relation  to  acts  which  are  known  to  have 
no  correlation  to  this  habitual  state.  This  habitu- 
al state  of  the  mind,  if  it  be  opposed  to  reason, 
overcomes  reason  ;  for  nothing,  not  even  reason 
itself,  can  be  the  strongest  motive,  unless  it  pro- 
duce the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  ;  and  this  it 
cannot  do,  where  the  habitual  disposition  or  sen- 
sitivity is  opposed  to  it. 

Common  usage  with  respect  to  the  phrase  want  of 
power  or  inability  to  act  in  a  certain  way. 

"  But  it  must  be  observed  concerning  moral  in- 


edwards's  system.  63 

ability,  in  each  kind  of  it,  that  the  word  inability 
is  used  in  a  sense  very  diverse  from  its  original 
import.  The  word  signifies  only  a  natural  inabil- 
ity, in  the  proper  use  of  it ;  and  is  applied  to  such 
cases  only  wherein  a  present  will  or  inclination  to 
the  thing,  with  respect  to  which  a  person  is  said 
to  be  unable,  is  supposable.  It  cannot  be  truly 
said,  according  to  the  ordinary  use  of  language, 
that  a  malicious  man,  let  him  be  never  so  malicious, 
cannot  hold  his  hand  from  striking,  or  that  he  is  not 
able  to  show  his  neighbour  a  kindness  ;  or  that  a 
drunkard,  let  his  appetite  be  never  so  strong,  can- 
not keep  the  cup  from  his  mouth.  In  the  strictest 
propriety  of  speedy  a  man  has  a  thing  in  his  pow- 
er if  he  has  it  in  liis  choice  or  at  his  election ;  and 
a  man  cannot  be  truly  said  to  he  unable  to  do  a 
thing,  when  he  can  do  it  if  he  will."    (ibid.) 

Men,  in  the  common  use  of  language,  and  in 
the  expression  of  their  common  and  generally  re- 
ceived sentiments,  affirm  that  an  individual  has 
any  thing  in  his  power  when  it  can  be  controlled 
by  volition.  Their  conception  of  power  does 
not  arise  from  the  connexion  of  volition  with  its 
cause,  but  from  the  connexion  of  volition  as  itself 
a  cause  with  its  effects.  Thus  the  hand  of  a  ma- 
licious man  when  moved  to  strike,  having  for  its 
antecedent  a  volition  ;  and  if  withheld  from  strik- 


(Jl  STATEMENT  OF 


ing,  having  for  its  antecedent  likewise  a  volition  ; 
according  to  the  common  usage  of  language,  he, 
as  the  subject  of  volition,  has  the  power  to  strike 
or  not  to  strike.  Now  as  it  is  "  improperly  said 
that  he  cannot  perform  those  external  voluntary 
actions  which  depend  on  the  will,  it  is  in  some  re- 
spects more  improperly  said,  that  he  is  unable  to 
exert  the  acts  of  the  will  themselves ;  because  it 
is  more  evidently  false,  with  respect  to  these,  that 
he  cannot  if  he  will  ;  for  to  say  so  is  a  downright 
contradiction  ;  it  is  to  say  he  cannot  will  if  he  docs 
will :  and,  in  this  case,  not  only  is  it  true  that  it  is 
easy  for  a  man  to  do  the  thing  if  he  will,  but  the 
very  willing  is  the  doing."     (ibid.) 

It  is  improper,  according  to  this,  to  say  that  a 
man  cannot  do  a  thing,  when  nothing  is  wanting 
but  an  act  of  volition  ;  for  that  is  within  our  pow- 
er, as  far  as  it  can  be  within  our  power,  which  is 
within  the  reach  of  our  volition. 

It  is  still  more  improper  to  say  that  a  man  is 
enable  to  exert  the  acts  of  the  will  themselves,  or 
uifable  to  produce  volitions.  To  say  that  a  man 
has  power  to  produce  volitions,  would  imply  that 
he  has  power  to  will  volitions  ;  but  this  would 
make  one  volition  the  cause  of  another,  which  is 
absurd.  But,  as  it  is  absurd  to  represent  the 
will  as  the  cause  of  its  own  volitions,  and  of  course 


edwards's  system.  65 

to  say  that  the  man  has  ability  to  produce  his 
volitions,  it  must  be  absurd  likewise  to  represent 
the  man  as  unable,  in  any  particular  case,  to  pro- 
duce volitions,  for  this  would  imply  that  in  other 
cases  he  is  able.  Nay,  the  very  language  is  self- 
contradictory.  If  a  man  produce  volitions,  he 
must  produce  them  by  volitions ;  and  if  in  any 
case  he  is  affirmed  to  be  unable  to  produce  voli- 
tions, then  this  inability  must  arise  from  a  want 
of  connexion  between  the  volition  by  which  the 
required  volition  is  aimed  to  be  produced,  and  the 
required  volition  itself.  So  that  to  affirm  that 
he  is  unable  to  will  is  equivalent  to  saying,  that 
he  cannot  will  if  he  will — a  proposition  which 
grants  the  very  point  it  assumes  to  deny.  "  The 
very  willing  is  the  doing,"'  which  is  required. 

Edwards  adopts  what  he  calls  the  "  original " 
and  u  proper,"  meaning  of  power,  and  ability,  as 
applied  to  human  agents,  and  appearing,  "  in  the 
ordinary  use  of  language,"  as  the  legitimate  and 
true  meaning.  In  this  use,  power,  as  we  have 
seen,  relates  only  to  die  connexion  of  volition  with 
its  consequents,  and  not  to  its  connexion  with 
its  antecedents  or  motives.  Hence,  in  reference 
to  the  human  agent,  "  to  ascribe  a  non-perform- 
ance to  the  want  of  power  or  ability,"  or  to  the 
want  of  motives,  (for  this  is  plainly  his  meaning,) 
6* 


GC  BTATEMBNT  OF 

u  is  not  just/'  "  because  the  thing  wanting/'  that 
is,  immediately  wanting,  and  wanting  so  far  as  thi. 
agent  himself  can  be  the  subject  of  remark  in 
respect  of  it,  "  is  not  a  being  able?  that  is,  a 
having  the  requisite  motives,  or  the  moral  ability, 
"but  a  being  willing,  or  the  act  of  volition,  itself. 
To  the  act  of  volition,  or  the  fact  of 'being  willing,'" 
there  is  no  faculty  of  mind  or  capacity  of  nature 
wanting,  but  only  a  disposition  or  state  of  mind 
adapted  to  the  act ;  but  with  this,  the  individual 
can  have  no  concern  in  reference  to  his  action, 
because  he  has  all  the  ability  which  can  be  pre- 
dicated of  him  legitimately,  when  he  can  do  the 
act,  if  he  will  to  do  it.  It  is  evident  that  there 
may  be  an  utter  moral  inability  to  do  a  thing  — that 
is  the  motive  may  be  wanting  which  causes  the 
volition,  which  is  the  immediate  antecedent  of  the 
thing  to  be  done  ;  but  still  if  it  is  true  that  there 
is  such  a  connexion  between  the  volition  and  the 
thing  to  be  done,  that  the  moment  the  volition 
takes  place  the  thing  is  done  ;  then,  according  to 
Edwards,  the  man  may  be  affirmed  to  be  able  to 
do  it  with  the  only  ability  that  can  be  affirmed  of 
him. 

We  can  exert  power  only  by  exerting  will,  that  is 
by  putting  forth  volitions, —  by  choosing,  of  course 
we  cannot  exert  power  over  those  motives  which 


edwards's  system.  67 

are  themselves  the  causes  of  our  volitions.  We 
are  not  unable  to  do  anything  in  the  proper  and 
original  and  legitimate  use  of  the  word  when,  for 
the  want  of  motive,  we  are  not  the  subjects  of  the 
volition  required  as  the  immediate  antecedent  of  the 
thing  to  be  done  ;  but  we  are  unable  in  this  use 
when,  although  the  volition  be  made  ;  still,  through 
some  impediment,  the  thing  is  not  done.  We  are 
conscious  of  power,  or  of  the  want  of  power  only 
in  the  connexion  between  our  actual  volitions  and 
their  objects. 


"  Sec.  V.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liber- 
ty, AND  OF  MORAL  AGENCY." 

What  is  liberty  ?  "  The  plain  and  obvious 
meaning  of  the  words  freedom  and  liberty,  in 
common  speech,  is  power,  opportunity,  or  advan- 
tage that  any  one  has  to  do  as  he  pleases.  Or,  in 
other  words,  his  being  free  from  hinderance,  or 
impediment  in  the  way  of  doing,  or  conducting 
in  any  way  as  he  wills.  And  the  contrary  to 
liberty,  whatever  name  we  call  it  by,  is  a  person's 
being  hindered  or  unable  to  conduct  as  he  will,  or 
being, necessitated  to  do  otherwise.''  (p.  38.)  Again, 
"  That  power  and  opportunity  for  one  to  do  and 
conduct  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his  choice,  is  all 


G8  STATEMENT  OF 

that  is  meant  by  it;  without  taking  into  the  meaning 
of  the  word,  anything  of  the  cause  of  that  choice, 
or  at  all  considering  how  the  person  came  to  have 
such  a  volition  ;  whether  it  was  caused  by  some 
external  motive,  or  internal  habitual  bias  ;  whether 
it  was  determined  by  some  internal  antecedent 
volition,  or  whether  it  happened  without  a  cause  ; 
whether  it  was  necessarily  connected  with  some- 
thing foregoing,  or  not  connected.  Let  the  person 
come  by  his  choice  any  how,  yet  if  he  is  able,  and 
there  is  nothing  in  the  way  to  hinder  his  pursuing 
and  executing  his  will,  the  man  is  perfectly  free, 
according  to  the  primary  and  common  notion  of 
freedom."     (p.  39.) 

This  is  Edwards's  definition  of  liberty,  and  he 
has  given  it  with  a  clearness,  a  precision,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  an  amplification,  which  renders  it 
impossible  to  mistake  his  meaning. 

Liberty  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  connexion 
between  volition  and  its  cause  or  motive.  Liberty 
relates  solely  to  the  connexion  between  the  voli- 
tion and  its  objects.  He  is  free  in  the  only  true 
and  proper  sense,  who,  when  he  wills,  finds  no 
impediment  between  the  volition  and  the  object, 
who  wills  and  it  is  done.  He  wills  to  walk,  and 
his  legs  obey  :  he  wills  to  talk,  and  his  intellect 
and  tongue  obey,  and  frame  and  express  sentences. 
If  his  legs  were  bound,  he  would  not  be  free.    If 


edwards's  system.  G9 

his  tongue  were  tied  with  a  thong,  or  his  mouth 
gagged,  he  would  not  be  free  ;  or  if  his  intellect 
were  paralysed  or  disordered,  he  would  not  be 
free.  If  there  should  be  anything  preventing  the 
volition  from  taking  effect,  he  would  not  be  free. 

Of  what   can    the    attribute   of  Liberty    be 
affirmed  ? 

From  the  definition  thus  given  Edwards  re- 
marks, "  It  will  follow,  that  in  propriety  of  speech, 
neither  liberty,  nor  its  contrary,  can  properly  be 
ascribed  to  any  being  or  thing,  but  that  which  has 
such  a  faculty,  power,  or  property,  as  is  called 
will.  For  that  which  is  possessed  of  no  will,  can- 
not have  any  power  or  opportunity  of  doing  ac- 
cording to  its  will,  nor  be  necessitated  to  act  con- 
trary to  its  will,  nor  be  restrained  from  acting 
agreeable  to  it.  And  therefore  to  talk  of  liberty, 
or  the  contrary,  as  belonging  to  the  very  ivill  itself, 
is  not  to  speak  good  sense  ;  for  the  will  itself,  is 
not  an  agent  that  has  a  will.  The  power  of 
choosing  itself,  has  not  a  power  of  choosing.  That 
which  has  the  power  of  volition  is  the  man,  or 
the  soul,  and  not  the  power  of  volition  itself.  And 
he  that  has  the  liberty,  is  the  agent  who  is  pos- 
sessed of  the  will ;  and  not  the  will  which  he  is 
possessed  of."     (p.  38.) 


70  stati:mi:nt  of 

Liberty  is  the  attribute  of  the  agent,  because 
the  agent  is  the  spiritual  essence  or  being  who  is 
the  subject  of  the  power  or  capacity  of  choice, 
and  \u<  liberty  consists  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
unimpeded  connexion  betwen  the  volitions  pro- 
duced in  him  and  the  objects  of  those  volitions. 
Hence,  free  will  is  an  objectionable  phrase.  Free 
agent  is  the  proper  phrase,  that  is,  an  agent 
having  the  power  of  choice  and  whose  choice 
reaches  effects. 

Moral  Agent. 

"  A  moral  agent  is  a  being  that  is  capable  of 
those  actions  that  have  a  moral  quality,  and 
which  can  properly  be  denominated  good  or  evil 
in  a  moral  sense,  virtuous  or  vicious,  commenda- 
ble or  faulty."  (p.  39.) 

In  what  lies  the  capability  of  actions  having  a 
moral  quality  ? 

"  To  moral  agency  belongs  a  moral  faculty,  or 
sense  of  moral  good  and  evil,  or  of  such  a  thing 
as  desert  or  worthiness,  of  praise  or  blame,  re- 
ward or  punishment ;  and  a  capacity  which  an 
agent  has  of  being  influenced  in  his  actions  by 
moral  inducements  or  motives,  exhibited  to  the 
view  of  the  understanding  or  reason,  to  engage  to 
a  conduct  agreeable  to  moral  faculty."    (p.  40.) 


edwards's  system.  71 

A  moral  agent  is  a  being  who  can  perform  mo- 
ral actions,  or  actions  which  are  subject  to  praise 
or  blame.  Now  the  same  action  may  be  commit- 
ted by  a  man  or  by  a  brute — and  the  man  alone 
will  be  guilty:  why  is  the  man  guilty?  Because 
he  has  a  moral  sense  or  perception  by  which  he 
distinguishes  right  and  wrong :  the  brute  has  no 
such  sense  or  perception.  The  man  having  thus 
the  power  of  perceiving  the  right  and  wrong  of  ac- 
tions —  actions  and  their  moral  qualities  may  be  so 
correlated  to  him  as  to  produce  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable  or  choice.  Or,  we  may  say  generally, 
moral  agency  consists  in  the  possession  of  a  reason 
and  conscience  to  distinguish  right  and  wrong,  and 
the  capacity  of  having  the  right  and  wrong  so  corre- 
lated to  the  mind  as  to  form  motives  and  produce 
volitions.  We  might  define  a  man  of  taste  in  the 
fine  arts  in  a  similar  way;  thus,  —  a  man  of  taste 
is  an  agent  who  has  the  power  of  distinguishing 
beauty  and  ugliness,  and  whose  mind  is  so  cor- 
related to  beauty  that  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able or  choice  is  produced.  The  only  difference 
between  the  two  cases  is  this :  that,  in  the  latter, 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  is  always  produced 
by  the  beauty  perceived  ;  while  in  the  former, 
the  right  perceived  does  not  always  produce  this 
sense  ;   on  the  contrary,  the  sense  of  the  most 


STATEMENT  OF 

agreeable  is  often  produced  by  the  wrong,  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  decisions  of  reason  and  conscience. 

I  have  now  completed  the  statement  of  Ed- 
wards's system,  nearly  in  his  own  words,  as  con- 
tained in  part  I.  of  his  work.  The  remarks  and 
explanations  which  have  been  thrown  in,  I  hope 
will  serve  to  make  him  more  perfectly  understood. 
This  end  will  be  still  more  fully  attained  by  pre- 
senting on  the  basis  of  the  foregoing  investigation 
and  statement,  a  compend  of  his  psychological 
system,  independently  of  the  order  there  pursued, 
and  without  largely  introducing  quotations,  which 
have  already  been  abundantly  made. 


COMPEND   OF   EDWARDS'S  PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL  SYSTEM. 

I.  There  are  two  cardinal  faculties  of  the  mind. 
1.  The  intellectual —  called  reason  or  understand- 
ing. 2.  The  active  and  feeling — called  will  or 
affections. 

II.  The  relation  of  these  to  each  other.  The 
first  precedes  the  second  in  the  order  of  exer- 
cise. The  first  perceives  and  knows  objects  in 
their  qualities,  circumstances,  and  relations.     The 


edwards's  system.  73 

second  experiences  emotions  and  passions,  or 
desires  and  choices,  in  relation  to  the  objects  per- 
ceived. 

III.  Perception  is  necessary.  When  the  un- 
derstanding and  its  objects  are  brought  together, 
perception  takes  place  according  to  the  consti- 
tuted laws  of  the  intelligence. 

IV.  The  acts  of  will  or  the  affections  are  ne- 
cessary. When  this  faculty  of  our  being  and  its 
objects  are  brought  together,  volition  or  choice, 
emotions,  passions,  or  desires  take  place,  accord- 
ing to  the  constituted  nature  and  laws  of  this 
faculty. 

The  objects  and  this  faculty  are  correlates. 
In  relation  to  the  object,  we  may  call  this  faculty 
subject.  When  subject  and  object  are  suited  to 
each  other,  that  is,  are  agreeable,  affections  are 
produced  which  we  call  pleasant ;  when  they  are 
not  suited,  that  is,  are  disagreeable,  affections  take 
place  which  are  unpleasant  or  painful.  Every  ob- 
ject in  relation  to  subject,  is  agreeable  or  disagree- 
able, and  produces  accordingly,  in  general,  affec- 
tions pleasant  or  painful. 

In  the  perfection  and  harmony  of  our  being, 

this  correspondence  is  universal ;  that  is,  what  is 

known  to  be  agreeable  is  felt  to  be  pleasant ;  — 

what  is  known  to  be  disagreeable  is  felt  to  be 

7 


'  I  STATEMENT  OF 

painful.  But,  in  the  corruption  of  our  being,  this 
is  reversed  in  respect  of  moral  objects.  Although 
whal  is  right  is  known  to  DC  agreeable,  that  is, 
suited  to  us,  it  is  felt  to  be  painful.  But  the 
wrong  which  is  known  to  be  unsuited,is  felt  to  be 
pleasant.  It  must  be  remarked  here,  that  pleasant 
and  agreeable,  are  used  by  Edwards  and  others, 
as  synonymous  terms.  The  distinction  I  have 
here  made  is  at  least  convenient  in  describing  the 
same  objects  as  presented  to  the  understanding 
and  to  the  will. 

V.  The  emotions  and  passions,  volitions  or 
choices,  are  thus  produced  in  the  correlation  of 
subject,  that  is  the  will,  and  the  object.  In  as- 
signing the  causes  of  these  affections,  we  may  re- 
fer to  the  nature  of  the  will,  which  is  such,  as  to 
receive  such  and  such  affections  when  in  the  pre- 
sence of  such  and  such  objects :  or,  we  may  re- 
fer to  the  objects,  and  say  their  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances are  such  as  to  produce  such  and  such 
affections  in  the  will :  or,  we  may  refer  to  both  at 
once,  and  say  that  the  affections  arise  from  the 
state  of  the  mind,  and  from  the  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  object. 

VI.  The  affections  of  the  will  stand  connected 
with  changes  or  effects  in  other  parts  of  our  be- 
ing, as  stated  antecedents.     First,  they  stand  thus 


EDWARDS  S  SYSTEM.  -■> 

connected  with  muscular  action,  —  as  walking, 
talking,  striking,  resisting,  &c.  Secondly,  they 
stand  thus  connected  with  mental  operations, — 
as  fixing  the  attention  upon  any  subject  of  thought 
and  investigation,  or  upon  any  imagination,  or 
any  idea  of  the  memory. 

VII.  The  affections  of  the  will,  when  thus  con- 
nected with  effects  in  other  parts  of  our  being, 
have  a  peculiar  and  striking  characteristic.  It 
is  this :  that  the  effect  contemplated  takes  place 
at  the  moment  it  appears  the  most  agreeable,  — 
the  greatest  apparent  good :  which,  as  Edwards 
uses  these  phrases,  means,  that  at  the  moment 
the  effect  contemplated  produces  the  most  pleas- 
ant affection,  —  the  most  intense  sense  of  the 
agreeable,  —  it  takes  place.  Thus,  when  walking 
seems  most  pleasant,  we  walk  ;  when  talking,  we 
talk  ;  when  thinking  on  a  particular  subject,  then 
we  think  on  that  subject.  Such  is  the  constitution 
and  law  of  our  being.  The  play  of  the  different 
parts  is  reciprocal.  Perception  must  bring  up  the 
objects,  and  the  affections  of  will  immediately  fol- 
low. The  most  agreeable  are  dwelt  upon  by  the 
mind,  and  perception  again  takes  place  particu- 
larly with  regard  to  these  ;  and  according  as  ob- 
jects affect  the  will,  do  all  the  activities  of  our 
bein£  come  forth. 


'U  STATEMENT  or 

VIII.  Various  terms  and  phrases  in  common 
use  can  be  easily  explained  by  this  system  :  — 
Choice  is  the  sense  or  the  affection  of  the  most 
pleasant  and  agreeable.  Preference  is  its  syno- 
nyme,  with  scarcely  a  shade  of  difference.  They 
both  have  respect  to  the  act  of  selection.  Volition 
is  another  name  for  this  affection  of  will,  and  is 
used  more  particularly  in  relation  to  effects  or 
changes  following  the  aflection.  Desire  is  a  nas- 
cent choice.  The  strongest  desire,  at  a  given 
moment,  is  choice.  Emotion  is  an  affection,  pleas- 
ant or  painful,  according  to  the  quality  of  the  ob- 
ject, but  not  ripened  into  desire.  It  is  the  first 
sudden  affection  arising  from  an  object  present- 
ed ;  and  with  respect  to  certain  objects,  it  ex- 
presses all  the  enjoyment  possible  in  relation  to 
them,  —  for  example,  the  emotion  of  sublimity, 
produced  by  an  object  which  can  hold  no  other 
relation  to  us.  But  then  the  sublimity  of  the  ob- 
ject may  be  the  motive  which  causes  the  choice 
of  gazing  at  it ;  that  is,  it  connects  this  act  of 
contemplation  with  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able. 

Passion  is  emotion  accompanied  by  desire  in 
reference  to  other  relations  with  the  object.  Thus 
the  emotion  of  beauty  awakened  by  a  flower 
may  be  accompanied  by  the  desire  of  possessing 


EDWARD*  S   8TSTEM. 


77      -S11 
^1 


it ;  and  if  this  desire  becomes  the  strongest  de- 
sire at  the  moment,  then  the  passion  has  the  cha- 
racteristic which  makes  it  choice,  and  some  cor- 
responding effects  take  place  in  order  to  possess 
it,  —  as  walking  towards  it,  stretching  out  the 
hand,  &c 

The  determination  of  will  is  the  production  or 
causation  of  choice.  It  is  used  in  reference  to  the 
immediate  and  particular  choice,  in  opposition  to 
all  other  choices. 

The  will  itself  is  the  capacity  of  being  affected 
by  objects  with  emotion,  passion,  and  desire,  — 
and  with  that  form  of  passion  which  we  call  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  or  choice,  and  which 
is  connected  with  effects  or  consequents  as  their 
stated  antecedent. 

The  motive  is  the  cause  of  choice,  and  is  com- 
plex. It  lies  in  the  nature  and  susceptibilities  of 
the  will,  and  in  the  nature  and  circumstances  of 
the  object  chosen. 

IX.  The  will  and  reason  may  be  opposed  ;  that 
is,  what  reason  commands  may  seem  disagreea- 
ble to  the  will,  and  of  course  reason  cannot  be 
obeyed.  Reason  can  be  obeyed  only  when  her 
commands  produce  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able. 

X.  The  terms  necessity,  and  freedom  or  liber- 

7* 


1  8  STATEMENT  OS 

ty  arc  opposed  in  reference  to  will.  Freedom  or 
liberty  is  the  attribute  of  the  man  —  the  human 
soul.  The  man  is  free  when  his  volitions  or 
choices  are  unimpeded, —  when,  upon  choosing  to 
walk,  he  walks,  &c.  The  man  is  not  free,  or  is 
under  necessity,  when  his  volitions  or  choices  are 
impeded,  —  when,  upon  choosing  to  walk,  he  finds 
his  legs  bound  or  paralysed,  &c.  Then  it  is  im- 
possible for  him  to  walk,  —  then  he  has  no  Wh  rty 
to  walk,  —  then  he  is  under  a  necessity  of  remain- 
ing in  one  place. 

Necessity  in  any  other  use  is  metaphysical  or 
philosophical  necessity,  and  is  applied  out  of  the 
sphere  of  the  will :  as  the  necessity  of  truth,  — 
the  necessity  of  being,  —  the  necessary  connex- 
ion of  cause  and  effect.     Hence, 

The  connexion  between  volitions  or  choices,  or 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  with  the  motive 
or  cause,  is  necessary  with  a  philosophical  neces- 
sity. The  necessity  of  volitions  in  reference  to 
motives  is  also  called  moral  necessity.  This  term 
moral  is  given,  not  in  reference  to  the  nature  of 
the  connexion,  but  in  reference  to  the  tenns  con- 
nected. Volitions  belonging  to  responsible  and 
moral  beings  are  thus  distinguished  from  those 
phenomena  which  we  commonly  call  natural. 

XL  An  agent  is  that  which  produces  effects. 


edwards's  system.  79 

A  natural  agent  is  that  which  produces  effects 
without  volition.  A  moral  agent  is  one  producing 
effects  by  volitions,  accompanied  with  an  intellec- 
tual perception  of  the  volitions  and  their  effects,  as 
right  or  wrong,  and  a  sense  of  desert,  or  of  praise- 
worthiness,  or  blameworthiness,  on  account  of  the 
volitions  and  their  effects. 

Brutes  or  irresponsible  beings  are  agents  that 
have  volitions,  but  have  no  reason  to  perceive 
right  and  wrong,  and  consequently  have  no  sense 
of  desert ;  and  as  they  cannot  perceive  right  and 
wrong,  they  cannot  be  made  the  subjects  of  moral 
appeals  and  inducements. 

XII.  Moral  responsibility  arises  first,  from  the 
possession  of  reason  ;  secondly,  from  the  capacity 
of  choice  ;  thirdly,  from  natural  ability. 

Natural  ability  exists  when  the  effect  or  act 
commanded  to  be  accomplished  has  an  establish- 
ed connexion  with  volition  or  choice.  Thus  we 
say  a  man  has  natural  ability  to  walk,  because  if 
he  chooses  to  walk,  he  walks.  Natural  ability 
differs  from  freedom  only  in  this:  —  The  first  re- 
fers to  an  established  connexion  between  volitions 
and  effects.  The  second  refers  to  an  absence  of 
all  impediment,  or  of  all  resisting  forces  from  be- 
tween volitions  and  effects. 

Hence  a  man  is  naturally  unable  to  do  any- 


Ml  STATl'-MKNT   OF 

thing  when  there  is  no  established  connexion  be- 
D  volition  and  that  thing.  A  man  is  natural- 
ly unable  to  push  a  mountain  from  its  scat.  He 
has  no  liberty  to  move  his  arm  when  it  is  bound. 
M>nil  inability  is  metaphysical  or  philosophical 
inability.  Philosophical  inability  in  general  refers 
to  the  impossibility  of  a  certain  effect  for  tho 
want  of  a  cause,  or  an  adequate  cause.  Thus 
there  is  a  philosophical  inability  of  transmuting 
metal ;  or  of  restoring  the  decay  of  old  age  to  the 
freshness  and  vigour  of  youth,  because  we  have 
no  cause  by  which  such  eflects  can  be  produced. 
There  is  a  philosophical  inability  also,  to  pry  up  a 
rock  of  a  hundred  tons  weight  with  a  pine  lath, 
and  by  the  hand  of  a  single  man,  because  we 
have  not  an  adequate  cause.  Moral  inability  re- 
lates to  the  connexion  between  motives  and  vo- 
litions in  distinction  from  natural  ability,  which 
relates  to  the  connexion  between  volitions  and  ac- 
tions consequent  upon  them :  but  the  term  moral 
as  we  have  seen,  does  not  characterize  the  na- 
ture of  the  connexion,  —  it  only  expresses  the 
quality  of  terms  connected.  Hence  moral  inabili- 
ty, as  philosphical  inability,  is  the  impossibility  of 
a  certain  volition  or  choice  for  the  want  of  a  mo- 
tive or  cause,  or  an  adequate  motive.  Thus  there 
is  a  moral  philosophical  inability  of  Faul  denying 


edwards's  system.  81 

Jesus  Christ,  for  there  is  plainly  no  motive  or 
cause  to  produce  a  volition  to  such  an  act.  There 
is  a  moral  philosophical  inability  also,  of  a  man 
selling  an  estate  for  fifty  dollars  which  is  worth 
fifty  thousand,  because  the  motive  is  not  adequate 
to  produce  a  volition  to  such  an  act. 

Philosophical  necessity  and  inability,  are  abso- 
lute in  respect  of  us,  because  beyond  the  sphere 
of  our  volition. 

XIII.  Praiseworthincss  or  virtue,  blameworthi- 
ness or  guilt,  apply  only  to  volitions.  This  indeed 
is  not  formally  brought  out  in  the  part  of  Ed- 
wards's work  we  have  been  examining.  His  dis- 
cussion of  it  will  be  found  in  part  IV.  sec.  I.  But 
as  it  is  necessary  to  a  complete  view  of  his  sys- 
tem, we  introduce  it  here. 

He  remarks  in  this  part,  "  If  the  essence  of 
virtuousness  or  commendableness,  and  of  vicious- 
ness  or  fault,  does  not  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  dis- 
position or  acts  of  the  mind,  which  are  said  to  be 
our  virtue  or  our  fault,  but  in  their  cause,  then  it 
is  certain  it  lies  no  where  at  all.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, if  the  vice  of  a  vicious  act  of  icill  lies  not 
in  the  nature  of  the  act,  but  in  the  cause,  so  that 
its  being  of  a  bad  nature  will  not  make  it  at  all 
our  fault,  unless  it  arises  from  some  faulty  deter- 
mination of  ours  as  its  cause,  or  something  in  us 


Bfl  STATEMENT  OF 

tliat  is  our  fault,  &c."  (page  190.)  "Disposition 
of  mind,"  or  inclination,  —  "acts  of  the  mind," 
"  acts  of  will,"  here  obviously  mean  the  same 
thing;  that  is,  they  mean  volition  or  choice,  and 
arc  distinguished  from  their  cause  or  motive. 
The  question  is  not  whether  the  cause  or  motive 
be  pure  or  impure,  but  whether  our  virtuousness 
or  viciousness  lie  in  the  cause  of  our  volition,  or 
in  the  volition  itself.  It  plainly  results  from  Ed- 
wards's psychology,  and  he  has  himself  in  the 
above  quotation  stated  it,  that  virtuousness  or  vi- 
ciousness lie  in  the  volition  itself.  The  charac- 
teristic of  our  personality  or  agency  is  volition. 
Jt  \  our  volitions  that  we  are  conscious 

of  doing  or  forbearing  to  do,  and  therefore  it  is 
in  respect  of  our  volitions  that  we  receive  praise 
for  well-doing,  or  blame  for  evil-doing.  If  these 
volitions  are  in  accordance  with  conscience  and 
the  law  of  God,  they  are  right ;  if  not,  they  are 
wrong,  and  we  are  judged  accordingly.  The  met- 
aphysical  questions,  how  the  volition  was  pro- 
duced, and  what  is  the  character  of  the  cause, 
is  the  cause  praiseworthy  or  blameworthy,  are 
questions  which  transcend  the  sphere  of  our  vo- 
litions, our  actions,  our  personality,  our  responsi- 
bility. We  are  concerned  only  with  this:  —  Do 
we  do  right  ?  do  we  do  wrong  7  What  is  the  na- 
ture of  our  volitions  ? 


EDWATIDS'S  SYSTEM.  83 

Nor  does  the  necessary  connexion  between  the 
motives  and  the  volitions,  destroy  the  blamewor- 
thiness and  the  praiseworthiness  of  the  volitions. 
We  are  blameworthy  or  praiseworthy  according 
to  the  character  of  the  volitions  in  themselves, 
considered  and  judged  according  to  the  rule  of 
right,  without  considering  how  these  volitions 
came  to  exist.  The  last  inquiry  is  altogether  of 
a  philosophical  or  metaphysical  kind,  and  not  of  a 
moral  kind,  or  that  kind  which  relates  to  moral 
agency,  responsibility,  and  duty. 

And  so  also  we  are  blameworthy  or  praise- 
worthy for  doing  or  not  doing  external  actions, 
so  far  only  as  these  actions  are  naturally  con- 
nected with  volitions,  as  sequents  with  their  sta- 
ted antecedents.  If  the  action  is  one  which  ought 
to  be  done,  we  are  responsible  for  the  doing  of 
it,  if  we  know  that  upon  our  willing  it,  it  will  be 
done  ;  although  at  this  very  moment  there  is  no 
such  correlation  between  the  action  and  the  will, 
as  to  form  the  motive  or  cause  upon  which  the 
existence  of  the  act  of  willing  depends.  If  the 
action  is  one  which  ought  not  to  be  done,  we  are 
guilty  for  doing  it,  when  we  know  that  if  we 
were  not  to  will  it,  it  would  not  be  done  :  although 
at  this  very  moment  there  is  such  a  correlation 
between  the  action,  and  the  state  of  the  will,  as  to 


9  I  BTATEMBHT   OF 

form  the  cause  or  motive  by  which  the  act  of 
willing  comes  necessarily  to  exist.  The  meta- 
physial or  philosophical  inquiry  respecting  the 
correlation  of  the  state  of  the  will  and  any  action, 
or  respecting  the  want  of  such  a  correlation,  is 
foreign  to  the  question  of  duty  and  responsibility. 
This  question  relates  only  to  the  volition  and  its 
connexion  with  its  consequents. 

This  does  not  clash  at  all  with  the  common 
sentiment  that  our  actions  are  to  be  judged  of  by 
our  motives  ;  for  this  sentiment  does  not  respect 
volitions  in  relation  to  their  cause,  but  external 
actions  in  relation  to  the  volitions  which  produce 
them.  These  external  actions  may  be  in  them- 
selves good,  but  they  may  not  be  what  was  willed  ; 
some  other  force  or  power  may  have  come  in 
between  the  volition  and  its  object,  and  changed 
the  circumstances  of  the  object,  so  as  to  bring 
about  an  event  different  from  the  will  or  inten- 
tion ;  although  being  in  connexion  with  the  agent, 
it  may  still  be  attributed  to  his  will :  or  the  im- 
mediate act  which  appears  good,  may,  in  the  mind 
of  the  agent  be  merely  part  of  an  extended  plan 
or  chain  of  volitions,  whose  last  action  or  result  is 
evil.  It  is  common,  therefore,  to  say  of  an  exter- 
nal action,  we  must  know  what  the  man  intends, 
before  we  pronounce  upon  him  ;  which  is  the  same 


edwards's  system.  85 

thing  as  to  say  we  must  know  what  his  volition 
really  is,  or  what  his  motive  is — that  is,  not  the 
cause  which  produces  his  volition,  but  the  volition 
which  is  aiming  at  effects,  and  is  the  motive  and 
cause  of  these  effects;  —  which  again,  is  the  same 
thing  as  to  say,  that  before  we  can  pronounce  upon 
his  conduct,  we  must  know  what  effects  he  really 
intends  or  wills,  or  desires,  that  is,  what  it  is 
which  is  really  connected  in  his  mind  with  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable. 

Edwards  and  Locke. 

Their  systems  are  one  :  there  is  no  difference 
in  the  principle.  Edwards  represents  the  will  as 
necessarily  determined  —  so  does  Locke.  Ed- 
wards places  liberty  in  the  unimpeded  connexion 
of  volition  with  its  stated  sequents  —  so  does 
Locke. 

They  differ  only  in  the  mode  of  developing  the 
necessary  determination  of  will.  According  to 
Locke,  desire  is  in  itself  a  necessary  modification 
of  our  being  produced  in  its  correlation  with  ob- 
jects ;  and  volition  is  a  necessary  consequent  of 
desire  when  excited  at  any  given  moment  to  a 
degree  which  gives  the  most  intense  sense  of 
uneasiness  at  that  moment.  "  The  greatest  pre- 
8 


80  STATEMENT    OF  EDWARDs's   SYSTEM. 

sent  uneasiness  is  llie  spur  of  action  that  is  con- 
stantly felt,  and  for  the  most  part,  determines  the 
will  in  its  choice  of  the  next  action."  (book  2. 
ch.  21,  §  10.)  According  to  Edwards,  desire  is 
not  distinguishable  from  will  as  a  faculty,  and  the 
strongest  desire,  at  any  moment,  is  the  volition  of 
that  moment. 

Edwards's  analysis  is  more  nice  than  Locke's, 
and  His  whole  dcvelopement  more  true  to  the 
great  principle  of  the  system  —  necessary  deter- 
mination. Locke,  in  distinguishing  the  will  from 
the  desire,  seems  about  to  launch  into  a  different 
psychology,  and  one  destructive  of  the  principle. 


II. 


LEGITIMATE    CONSEQUENCES 


EDWARDS'S   SYSTEM. 


II. 


THE  LEGITIMATE  CONSEQUENCES  OF 
EDWARDS'S  SYSTEM. 


These  consequences  must,  I  am  aware, be  deduced 
with  the  greatest  care  and  clearness.  The  deduc- 
tion must  be  influenced  by  no  passion  or  prejudice. 
It  must  be  purely  and  severely  logical  —  and  such 
I  shall  endeavour  to  make  it.  I  shall  begin 
with  a  deduction  which  Edwards  has  himself 
made. 

I.  There  is  no  self-determining  power  of  will, 
and  of  course  no  liberty  consisting  in  a  self-deter- 
ming  power. 

A  self-determining  power  of  will  is  a  supposed 
power,  which  will  has  to  determine  its  own  voli- 
tions. 

Will  is  the  faculty  of  choice,,  or  the  capacity  of 
desire,  emotion,  or  passion* 

Volition  is  the  strongest  desire,  or  the  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable  at  any  given  moment. 
8* 


90  CONSEQUENCE-    or 

Volition  arises  from  the  state  of  the  mind,  or 
of  the  will,  or  .sensitivity  itself,  in  correlation  with 
the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  object. 

Now,  if  the  will  determined  itself,  it  would  deter- 
mine its  own  stale,  in  relation  to  objects.  But  to 
determine  is  to  act,  and  therefore,  for  the  will  to 
determine  is  for  the  will  to  a^t ;  and  for  the  will 
to  determine  itself,  is  for  the  will  to  determine  itself 
by  an  act.  But  an  act  of  the  will  is  a  volition  ; 
therefore  for  the  will  to  determine  itself  is  to 
create  a  volition  by  a  volition.  But  then  we  have 
to  account  for  this  antecedent  volition,  and  it  can 
be  accounted  for  only  in  the  same  way*  We 
shall  then  have  an  infinite,,  or  more  properly*  an 
indefinite  series  of  volitions,  without  any  first  vo- 
lition j  consequently  we  shall  have  no  self-deter- 
miner after  all,  because  we  can  arrive  at  no  first 
determiner^  and  thus  the  idea  of  self-determina- 
tion becomes  self-destructive.  Again,  we  shall 
have  effects  without  a  cause,  for  the  series  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  never  ends  in  a  first*  which  is 
a  cause  per  se-.  Volitions  arc  thus  contingent, 
using  this  word  as  a  synonyme  of  chance^  the 
negative  of  cau-e. 

Now  that  tins  is  a  .legitimate  deduction,,  no  one 
can  question.  If  Edwards's  psychology  be  right, 
arul  if  self-determination  implies  a  will  to  will,  or 


EDWAKDS  S   SYSTEM.  !>1 

choosing  a  choice,  then  a  self-determining  power  is 
the  greatest  absurdity  possible. 

II.  It  is  clearly  deducible  from  this  also,  that 
God  can  exercise  a  perfect  control  over  his  intel- 
ligent creatures,  or  administer  perfectly  a  moral 
government  consisting  in  the  influence  of  motives. 

To  any  given  state  of  mind,  he  can  adapt  mo- 
tives in  reference  to  required  determinations.  And 
when  an  individual  is  removed  from  the  motives 
adapted  to  his  state  of  mind,  the  Almighty  Provi- 
dence can  so  order  events  as  to  bring  him  into 
contiguity  with  the  motives. 

If  the  state  of  mind  should  be  such  that  no 
motives  can  be  made  available  in  reference  to  a 
particular  determination,  it  is  clearly  supposable 
that  he  who  made  the  soul  of  man,  may  exert  a 
direct  influence  over  this  state  of  mind,  and  cause 
it  to  answer  to  the  motives  presented.  Whether 
there  are  motives  adapted  to  every  state  of  mind, 
in  reference  to  every  possible  determination  re- 
quired by  the  Almighty  Lawgiver,  so  as  to  render 
it  unnecessary  to  exert  a  direct  influence  over  the 
will,  is  a  question  which  I  am  not  called  upon 
here  to  answer.  But  in  either  case^  the  divine 
sovereignly,  perfect  and  absolute,  fore-determining 
and  bringing  to  pass  every  event  in  the  moral  as 
well  as  the  physical  world  ;  and  the  election  of  a 


92  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

certain  number  to  eternal  life,  and  the  making  of 
this  election  sure,  are  necessary  and  plain  conse- 
quences of  this  system.  And  as  God  is  a  being 
all-wise  and  good,  we  may  feel  assured  in  con- 
nexion with  this  system,  that,  in  the  working  out 
of  his  great  plan,  whatever  evil  may  appear  in 
the  progress  of  its  developement,  the  grand  con- 
summation will  show  that  all  things  have  been 
working  together  for  good. 

III.  It  is  plainly  deducible  from  this  system 
that  moral  beings  exert  an  influence  over  each 
other  by  the  presentation  of  motives.  And  thus 
efforts  may  be  made  either  to  the  injury  or  bene- 
fit of  society, 

IV.  If,  as  Edwards  contends,  the  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility, the  consciousness  of  guilt  or  of  recti- 
tude, and  consequently  the  expectation  of  punish- 
ment or  reward,  connect  themselves  simply  with 
the  nature  of  the  mere  fact  of  volition — that  is,  if 
this  is  a  true  and  complete  representation  of  con- 
sciousness in  relation  to  this  subject,  then  upon 
the  mere  fact  of  volition  considered  only  in  its 
own  nature,  and  wholly  independently  of  its 
causes,  can  the  processes  of  justice  go  forth. 

Thus  we  may  view  the  system  in  relation  both 
to  God  and  to  man. 


edwards's  SYSTEM.  93 

In  relation  to  God.  It  makes  him  supreme  and 
absolute  —  foreseeing  and  fore-determining,  and 
bringing  everything  to  pass  according  to  infinite 
wisdom,  and  by  the  energy  of  an  infinite  will. 

In  relation  to  man.  It  shuts  him  up  to  the 
consideration  of  the  simple  fact  of  volition,  and 
its  connexion  as  a  stated  or  established  antece- 
dent with  certain  effects.  He  is  free  to  accom- 
plish these  effects^  because  he  can  accomplish 
them  if  he  will.  He  is  free  to  forbear,  because 
he  can  forbear  if  he  will.  It  is  affirmed  to  be 
the  common  judgement  of  men,  and  of  course 
universally  a  fact  of  consciousness,  that  an  indi- 
vidual is  fully  responsible  for  the  doing  of  any- 
thing which  ought  to  be  doner  if  nothing  is  want- 
ing to  the  doing  of  it  but  a  volition :  that  he  is 
guilty  and  punishable  for  doing  anything  wrong, 
because  it  was  done  by  his  volition ;  that  he  is 
praiseworthy  and  to  be  rewarded  for  doing  any- 
thing right,  because  it  was  done  by  his  volition. 
In  vain  does  he  attempt  to  excuse  himself  from 
right-doing  on  the  plea  of  moral  inability  ;  this  is 
mi  tn physical  inability,  and  transcends  the  sphere 
of  volition.  He  can  do  it  if  he  will  —  and  there- 
fore he  has  all  the  ability  required  in  the  case. 
Nothing  is  immediately  wanting  but  a  willing- 
ness, and  all  his  responsibility  relates  to  this  ;  he 


91  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

can  do  nothing,  can  influence  nothing,  except  by 
will;  and  therefore  that  which  goes  before  will 
is  foreign  to  his  consideration,  and  impossible  to 
his  effort. 

In  vain  does  he  attempt  to  excuse  himself  for 
wrong-doing  on  the  ground  of  moral  necessity. 
This  moral  necessity  is  metaphysical  necessity, 
and  transcends  the  sphere  of  volition.  He  could 
have  forborne  to  do  wrong,  if  he  had  had  the  will. 
Whatever  else  may  have  been  wanting,  there 
was  not  wanting  to  a  successful  resistance  of  evil, 
anything  with  which  the  agent  has  any  concern, 
and  for  which  he  is  under  any  responsibility,  but 
the  volition.  By  his  volitions  simply  is  he  to  be 
tried.  No  court  of  justice,  human  or  divine,  that 
we  can  conceive  of,  could  admit  the  plea  —  "I  did 
not  the  good  because  I  had  not  the  will  to  do  it," 
or  "  I  did  the  evil  because  I  had  the  will  to  do  it." 
"  This  is  your  guilt,"  would  be  the  reply  of  the 
judge,  "that  you  had  no  will  to  do  the  good  — 
that  you  had  a  will  to  do  the  evil." 


We  must  now  take  up  a  different  class  of  de- 
ductions. They  are  such  as  those  abettors  of  this 
system  who  wish  to  sustain  the  great  interests  of 


edwards's  system.  95 

morality  and  religion  do  not  make,  but  strenuously 
contend  against.  If  however  they  are  logical  de- 
ductions, it  is  in  vain  to  contend  against  them.  I 
am  conscious  of  no  wish  to  force  them  upon  the 
system,  and  do  most  firmly  believe  that  they  are 
logical.  Let  the  reader  judge  for  himself,  but  let 
him  judge  thou  <jlt1  fully  and  candidly. 

I.  The  system  of  Edwards  leads  to  an  abso- 
lute and  unconditional  necessity,  particular  and 
general. 

1.  A  particular  necessity  —  a  necessity  abso- 
lute in  relation  to  the  individual. 

It  is  granted  in  the  system,  that  the  connexion 
of  motive  and  volition  is  necessary  with  an  abso- 
lute necessity,  because  this  precedes  and  there- 
fore is  not  within  the  reach  of  the  volition.  So 
also,  the  state  of  mind,  and  the  nature  and  circum- 
stances of  the  object  in  relation  to  this  state,  form- 
ing a  correlation,  in  which  lies  the  motive,  is  de- 
pendent upon  a  cause,  beyond  the  reach  of  volition. 
As  the  volition  cannot  make  its  motive,  so  neither 
can  the  volition  make  the  cause  of  its  motive,  and 
so  on  in  the  retrogression  of  causes,  back  to  the 
first  cause.  Hence,  all  the  train  of  causes  prece- 
ding the  volition  are  related  by  an  absolute  neces- 
sity :  and  the  volition  itself,  as  the  effect  of  motive, 
being  necessary  also  with  an  absolute  necessity, 


90  <  ONSBQ1  BJffCBS  OF 

the  only  place  for  freedom  that  remains,  if  free- 
dom be  possible,  is  the  connexion  of  volition  and 

effects,  internal  and  external.  And  this  is  the  only 
place  of  freedom  which  this  system  claims.  But 
what  new  characteristic  appears  in  this  relation? 
Have  we  here  anything  beyond  stated  antecedents 
and  Bequents  ?  I  will  to  walk,  and  I  walk  ;  1  w  ill 
to  talk,  and  I  talk  ;  I  will  to  sit  down,  and  I  sit 
down.  The  volition  is  an  established  antecedent 
to  these  muscular  movements.  So  also,  when  1 
will  to  think  on  a  certain  subject,  I  think  on  that 
subject.  The  volition  of  selecting  a  subject,  and 
the  volition  of  attending  to  it,  are  stated  antece- 
dents to  that  mental  operation  which  we  call 
thought.  We  have  here  only  another  instance  of 
cause  and  effect,  the  relation  being  one  as  abso- 
lute and  necessary  as  any  other  relation  of  cause 
and  effect*  The  curious  organism  by  which  a 
choice  or  a  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  produces 
muscular  movement,  has  not  been  arranged  by 
any  choice  of  the  individual  man.  The  connex- 
ion is  pre-established  for  him,  and  has  its  cause 
beyond  the  sphere  of  volition.  The  constitution 
of  mind  which  connects  volition  with  thinking  is 
also  pre-established,  and  beyond  the  sphere  of 
volition.  As  the  volition  itself  appears  by  an  ab- 
solute necessity  in  relation  to  the  individual  man, 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTEM.  '.»7 

so  also  do  the  stated  sequents  or  effects  of  volition 
appear  by  an  absolute  necessity  in  relation  to  him. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  connexion  between 
volition  and  its  objects  may  be  interrupted  by 
forces  coming  between,  or  overcome  by  superior 
forces,  but  this  is  common  to  cause  and  effect, 
and  forms  no  peculiar  characteristic;  it  is  a  lesser 
force  necessarily  interrupted  or  overcome  by  a 
greater.  Besides,  the  interruption  or  the  over- 
coming of  a  force  does  not  prove  its  freedom 
when  it  is  unimpeded  ;  its  movement  may  still  be 
necessitated  by  an  antecedent  force.  And  this  is 
precisely  the  truth  in  respect  of  volition,  according 
to  this  system.  The  volition  could  have  no  being 
without  a  motive,  and  when  the  motive  is  present 
it  must  have  a  being,  and  no  sooner  does  it  appear 
than  its  effects  follow,  unless  impeded.  If  impe- 
ded, then  we  have  two  trains  of  causes  coming 
into  collision,  and  the  same  necessity  which 
brought  them  together,  gives  the  ascendency  to 
the  one  or  the  other. 

It  seems  to  me  impossible  to  resist  the  conclu- 
sion, that  necessity,  absolute  and  unconditional,  as 
far  at  least  as  the  man  himself  is  concerned,  reigns 
in  the  relation  of  volition  and  its  effect,  if  the  vo- 
lition itself  be  a  necessary  existence.  All  that 
precedes  volition  is  necessary ;  volition  itself  is 
9 


98  CONSEQUENCES   OP 

necessary.  All  that  follows  volition  is  necessary. 
Humanity  ifl  but  a  link  of  the  inevitable  chain. 

2.  General  necessity  —  a  necessity  absolute,  in 
relation  to  all  being  and  causality,  and  applicable 
to  all  events. 

An  event  proved  to  be  necessary  in  relation  to 
an  individual  —  is  this  event  likewise  necessary  in 
the  whole  train  of  its  relations  ?  Let  this  event 
be  a  volition  of  a  given  individual ;  it  is  necessary 
in  relation  to  that  individual.  Now  it  must  be 
supposed  to  have  a  connexion  by  a  chain  of  se- 
quents  and  antecedents  with  a  first  cause.  Let 
us  now  take  any  particular  antecedent  and  sequent 
in  the  chain,  and  that  antecedent  and  sequent,  in 
its  particular  place  and  relations,  can  be  proved 
necessary  in  the  same  way  that  the  volition  is 
proved  necessary  in  its  particular  place  and  rela- 
tions ;  that  is,  the  antecedent  being  given  under 
the  particular  circumstances,  the  sequent  must 
follow.  But  the  antecedent  is  linked  by  like  ne- 
cessity to  another  antecedent,  of  which  it  is  the 
sequent ;  and  the  sequent  is  linked  by  like  neces- 
sity to  another  sequent,  of  which  it  is  the  antece- 
dent ;  and  thus  the  whole  chain,  from  the  given 
necessary  volition  up  to  the  first  cause,  is  neces- 
sary. We  come  therefore  at  last  to  consider  the 
connexion  between  the  first  sequent  and  the  first 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTEM.  99 

antecedent,  or  the  first  cause.  Is  this  a  necessary 
connexion?  If  that  first  antecedent  be  regarded 
as  a  volition,  then  the  connexion  must  be  neces- 
sary. If  God  will  the  first  sequent,  then  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  that  that  sequent  should  ap- 
pear. But  the  volition  itself  cannot  really  be  the 
first  antecedent  or  cause,  because  volition  or  choice, 
from  its  very  nature,  must  itself  have  a  determiner 
or  antecedent.  What  is  this  antecedent?  The 
motive:  —  for  self-determination,  in  the  sense  of 
the  will  determining  itself,  would  involve  the  same 
absurdities  on  this  system  in  relation  to  God  as 
in  relation  to  man ;  since  it  is  represented  as  an 
absurdity  in  its  own  nature  —  it  is  determining  a 
volition  by  a  volition,  in  endless  retrogression. 
As  the  motive  therefore  determines  the  divine  vo- 
lition, what  is  the  nature  of  the  connexion  between 
the  motive  and  the  volition  ?  It  cannot  but  be  a 
necessary  connexion ;  for  there  is  nothing  to  ren- 
der it  otherwise,  save  the  divine  will.  But  the 
divine  will  cannot  be  supposed  to  do  this,  for  the 
motive  is  already  taken  to  be  the  ground  and  cause 
of  the  action  of  the  divine  will.  The  necessity 
which  applies  to  volition,  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
must  therefore  apply  to  the  divine  volition.  No 
motives,  indeed,  can  be  supposed  to  influence  the 
divine  will,  except  those  drawn  from  his  infinite 


100  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

intelligence,  wisdom,  and  goodness ;  but  then  the 
connexion  between  these  motives  and  the  divine 
volitions  is  a  connexion  of  absolute  necessity. 
This  Edwards  expressly  affirms —  "If  God's  will 
is  steadily  and  surely  determined  in  everything  by 
supreme  wisdom,  then  it  is  in  everything  necessa- 
rily determined  to  that  which  is  most  wise."  (p. 
230.)  That  the  universe  is  governed  by  infinite 
wisdom,  is  a  glorious  and  satisfactory  thought,  and 
is  abundantly  contended  for  by  this  system  ;  but 
still  it  is  a  government  of  necessity.  This  may  be 
regarded  as  the  most  excellent  government,  and  if 
it  be  so  regarded  it  may  fairly  be  contended  for. 
Let  us  not,  however,  wander  from  the  question, 
and  in  representing  it  as  the  government  of  wis- 
dom, forget  that  it  is  a  government  of  necessity, 
and  that  absolute.  The  volition,  therefore,  with 
which  we  started,  is  at  last  traced  up  to  a  neces- 
sary and  infinite  wisdom  as  its  first  and  final 
cause  ;  for  here  the  efficient  cause  and  the  mo- 
tive are  indeed  one. 

What  we  have  thus  proved  in  relation  to  one 
volition,  must  be  equally  true  in  reference  to  every 
other  volition  and  every  other  event,  for  the  rea- 
soning must  apply  to  every  possible  case.  Every 
volition,  every  event,  must  be  traced  up  to  a  first 
and  final  cause,  and  this  must  be  necessary  and 
infinite  wisdom. 


edwards's  system.  101 

II.  It  follows,  therefore,  from  this  system,  that 
every  volition  or  event  is  both  necessary,  and 
necessarily  the  best  possible  in  its  place  and  re- 
lations. 

The  whole  system  of  things  had  its  origin  in 
infinite  and  necessary  wisdom.  All  volitions  and 
events  have  their  last  and  efficient  cause  in  infi- 
nite and  necessary  wisdom.^  All  that  has  been, 
all  that  is,  all  that  can  be,  are  connected  by  an 
absolute  necessity  with  the  same  great  source. 
It  would  be  the  height  of  absurdity  to  suppose  it 
possible  for  any  thing  to  be  different  from  what  it 
is,  or  to  suppose  that  any  change  could  make  any 
thing  better  than  it  isv?  for  all  that  is*  is  by  abso- 
lute necessity,  —  and  all  that  is,  is  just  what  and 
where  infinite  wisdom  has  made  it,  and  disposed 
of  it. 

III.  If  that  which  we  call  evil,  in  reality  be 
evil,  then  it  must  be  both  necessary  evil  and  evil 
having  its  origin  in  infinite  wisdom.  It  is  in  vain 
to  say  that  man  is  the  agent,  in  the  common  ac- 
ceptation of  the  word  ;  that  he  is  the  author,  be- 
cause the  particular  volitions  are  his.  These  vo- 
litions are  absolutely  necessary,  and  are  necessa- 
rily carried  back  to  the  one  great  source  of  all 
being  and  events.     Hence, 

1\  .  The  creature  man  cannot  be  blameable. 
9* 


102  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

Every  volition  which  appears  in  him,  appears  by 
an  absolute  necessity,  —  and  it  cannot  be  suppos- 
ed to  be  otherwise  than  it  is.  Now  the  ground  of 
blameworthiness  is  not  only  the  perception  of  the 
difference  between  right  and  wrong,  and  the  con- 
viction that  the  right  ought  to  be  done,  but  the 
possession  of  a  power  to  do  the  right  and  refrain 
from  the  wrong.  But  if  every  volition  is  fixed  by 
an  absolute  necessity,  then  neither  can  the  indi- 
vidual be  supposed  to  have  power  to  do  otherwise 
than  he  actually  does,  nor,  all  things  considered, 
can  it  be  supposed  there  could  have  been,  at  that 
precise  moment  and  in  that  precise  relation,  any 
other  volition.  The  volition  is  fixed,  and  fixed  by 
an  infinite  and  necessary  wisdom.  We  cannot 
escape  from  this  difficulty  by  perpetually  running 
the  changes  of — "He  can  if  he  will,"  —  "He 
could  if  he  would,"  —  "There  is  nothing  want- 
ing but  a  will,"  —  "  He  has  a  natural  ability,"  &c. 
&c.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves,  and  endeav- 
our to  stop  thought  and  conclusions  by  these 
words,  "  he  can  if  he  will"  !  but  he  cannot  if  he 
don't  will.  The  will  is  wanting,  —  and  while  it 
is  wanting,  the  required  effect  cannot  appear. 
And  how  is  that  new  volition  or  antecedent  to  be 
obtained  ?  The  man  cannot  change  one  volition 
for  another.    By  supposition,  he  has  not  the  moral 


edwards's  system.  103 

or  metaphysical  ability,  —  and  yet  this  is  the  only 
ability  that  can  produce  the  new  volition.  It  is 
passing  strange  that  the  power  upon  which  voli- 
tion is  absolutely  dependent,  should  be  set  aside 
by  calling  it  metaphysical,  —  and  the  man  blamed 
for  an  act  because  the  consequent  of  his  volition, 
when  the  volition  itself  is  the  necessary  conse- 
quent of  this  power !  The  man  is* only  in  his  vo- 
lition. The  volition  is  good  or  bad  in  itself.  The 
cause  of  volition  is  none  of  his  concern,  because  it 
transcends  volition.  He  can  if  he  will.  That  is 
enough  for  him  !  But  it  is  not  enough  to  make 
him  blameable,  when  whether  he  will  or  not  de- 
pends not  only  upon  an  antecedent  out  of  his 
reach,  but  the  antecedent  itself  is  fixed  by  a  ne- 
cessity in  the  divine  nature  itself. 

I  am  not  now  disputing  the  philosophy.  The 
philosophy  may  be  true ;  it  may  be  very  good  : 
but  then  we  must  take  its  consequences  along  w  ith 
it ;  and  this  is  all  that  1  now  insist  upon. 

V.  It  is  another  consequence  of  this  system, 
that  there  can  be  nothing  evil  in  itself.  If  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness  are  the  highest  form  of 
moral  perfection,  as  indeed  their  very  names  im- 
ply, then  all  the  necessary  consequences  of  these 
must  partake  of  their  nature.  Infinite  wisdom 
and  goodness,  as  principles,  can  only  envelope 


101  CONSKQUENCKS   OP 

parts  of  themselves.  It  would  be  the  destruction 
of  all  logic  to  deny  this.  It  would  annihilate  eve- 
ry conclusion  that  has  ever  been  drawn.  If  it  be 
said  thai   infinite  wisdom  has  promulged  a  law 

which  drlincs  clearly  what  is  essentially  right, 
and  that  it  is  a  fact  that  volitions  do  transgress 
this  law,  still  this  cannot  affect  what  is  said  above. 
The  promulgation  of  the  law  was  a  necessary  de- 
velopement  of  infinite  wisdom  ;  and  the  volition 
which  transgresses  it  is  a  developement  of  the 
same  nature.  If  this  seems  contradictory.  I  can- 
not help  it.  It  is  drawn  from  the  system,  and 
the  system  alone  is  responsible  for  its  conclusions. 

If  it  should  be  replied  here,  that  every  system 
must  be  subject  to  the  same  difficulty,  because  if 
evil  had  a  beginning,  it  must  have  had  a  holy 
cause,  inasmuch  as  it  could  not  exist  before  it  be- 
gan to  exist,  —  I  answer,  this  would  be  true  if 
evil  is  the  necessary  developement  of  a  holy  cause. 
But  more  of  this  hereafter. 

VI.  The  system  of  Edwards  is  a  system  of 
utilitarianism.  Every  volition  being  the  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable,  and  arising  from  the  corre- 
lation of  the  object  and  the  sensitivity,  it  follows 
that  every  motive  and  every  action  comes  under, 
and  cannot  but  come  under,  the  one  idea  of  grati- 
fication or  enjoyment.     According  to  this  system, 


edwards's  system.  105 

there  can  be  no  collision  between  principle  and 
passion,  because  principle  can_Jiave- no^powcr 
to  determine  the  will,  except  as  it  becomes  the 
most  agreeable.  Universally,-^1'00'  truth,  and 
benevolence,  obtain  swny  anly  \}y  uniting  with 
desire,  and- thus  coming  undjX-CPnditions  of  yield- 
ing the  highest  enjoyment.  Justice^,  truth,  and 
benevolence,  when  obeyed,  therefore,  are  not 
obeyed  as  such,  but  simply  as  the_most~agreeable ; 
and  so  alsojnjustice,  falsehood,  and  malignity,  arc 
not  obeyed  as  such,  but  simply  as  the_  most  agree- 
able. In  this,  quality  of  the  most  agreeable,  as 
the  qua!ityo)f  all  motive_and_  the  universal  prin- 
ciple of  the  determinations  of  the  will,  intrinsic 
moral  distinctions  fade  away.  We  may  indeed 
speculate  respecting  these  distinctions,  —  we  may 
say  that  justice  evidently  is  right  in  itself,  and  in- 
justice wrong  in  itself;  but  this  judgement  has 
practical  efficiency  only  as  one  of  the  terms  takes 
the  form  of  the  most  agreeable.  But  we  have 
seen  that  the  most  agreeable  depends  upon  the 
state  of  the  sensitivity  in  correlation  with  the  ob- 
ject,—  a  state  and  a  correlation  antecedent  to  ac- 
tion ;  and  that  therefore  it  is  a  necessary  law  of 
our  being,  to  be  determined  by  the  greatest  appa- 
rent good  or  the  most  agreeable.  Utility,  there- 
fore, is  not  only  in  point  of  fact,  but  also  in  point 


100  I  0H8]  Ql  I  n<  Eifl  OP 

of  necessity,  the  law  of  action.  There  is  no  oth- 
er law  under  which  it  is  conceivable  that  we 
can  act. 

VII.  It  follows  from  this  system,  again,  that  no 
individual  can  make  an  effort  to  change  the  ha- 
bitual character  of  his  volitions,  —  and  of  course 
cannot  resist  his  passions,  or  introduce  any  intel- 
lectual or  moral  discipline  other  than  that  in 
which  he  is  actually  placed,  or  undertake  any  en- 
terprise that  shall  be  opposite  to  the  one  in  which 
he  is  engaged,  or  not  part  or  consequent  of  the 
same. 

If  he  effect  any  change  directly  in  the  habitual 
character  of  his  volitions,  he  must  do  it  by  a  vo- 
lition ;  that  is,  he  must  will  different  from  his  ac- 
tual will,  —  his  will  must  oppose  itself  in  its  own 
act :  but  this  is  absurd,  the  system  itself  being 
judge.  As,  therefore,  the  will  cannot  oppose  it- 
self, a  new  volition  can  be  obtained  only  by  pre- 
senting a  new  motive  ;  but  this  is  equally  impos- 
sible. To  present  a  new  motive  is  to  call  up  new 
objects  and  circumstances  in  relation  to  the  actu- 
al state  of  the  mind,  touching  upon  some  princi- 
ples which  had  been  slumbering  under  the  habit- 
ual volitions ;  or  the  state  of  the  mind  itself  must 
be  changed  in  relation  to  the  objects  now  before 
it ;  or  a  change  must  take  place  both  of  subject 


edwards's  system.  107 

and  object,  —  for  the  motive  lies  in  the  correla- 
tion of  the  two.  But  the  volition  to  call  up  new 
objects  and  circumstances  in  relation  to  some 
principle  of  the  mind  that  had  been  slumbering, — 
for  example,  fear,  —  must  itself  have  a  motive  ; 
but  the  motive  to  call  up  objects  of  fear  must  pre- 
exist, if  it  exist  at  all.  If  it  pre-exist,  then  of  ne- 
cessity the  volition  to  call  up  objects  of  fear  will 
take  place  ;  and  it  will  not  be  a  change  effected 
by  the  man  himself,  out  of  the  actually  existing 
state  of  mind  and  objects.  If  there  be  no  such 
motive  pre-existing,  then  it  would  become  neces- 
sary to  present  a  new  motive,  to  cause  the  choice 
of  objects  of  fear ;  and  here  would  be  a  recur- 
rence of  the  original  difficulty,  —  and  so  on,  ad  in- 
finitum. 

If  the  problem  be  to  effect  a  change  in  the 
state  of  the  mind  in  relation  to  existing  objects, 
in  the  first  place,  this  cannot  be  effected  by  a  di- 
rect act  of  will,  for  the  act  of  will  is  caused  by 
the  state  of  mind,  and  this  would  be  an  effect 
changing  or  annihilating  its  cause. 

Nor  can  it  be  done  indirectly.  For  to  do  it 
indirectly,  would  be  to  bring  influences  to  bear 
upon  the  state  of  mind  or  the  sensitivity  ;  but  the 
choice  and  volition  of  these  influences  would  re- 
quire a  motive  —  but  the  motive  to  change  the 
stale  of  mind  must  pre-exist  in  the  state  of  mind 


108  I  0583  QUBHCBfl  «»F 

itself.  And  thus  wc  have  on  the  one  hand,  to 
shew  the  possibility  of  finding  a  principle  in  the 
state  of  mind  on  which  to  bring  about  its  change. 
And  then  if  this  be  shown,  the  change  is  not  re- 
ally a  change,  but  a  new  developcnient  of  the 
long  chain  of  the  necessary  causes  and  volitions. 
And  on  the  other,  if  this  be  not  shown,  we  must 
find  a  motive  to  change  the  state  of  mind  in  or- 
der to  a  change  of  the  state  :  but  this  motive,  if  it 
exist,  must  pre-exist  in  the  state  of  mind.  If  it 
pre-exist,  then  no  change  is  required :  if  it  do 
not,  then  we  must  seek  still  an  antecedent  motive, 
and  so  in  endless  retrogression.  If  the  problem 
be  to  change  both  subject  and  object,  the  same 
difficulties  exist  in  twofold  abundance. 

The  grand  difficulty  is  to  find  a.  primum  mobile, 
or  first  mover,  when  the  very  act  of  seeking  im- 
plies a  primum  mobile,  which  the  conditions  of  the 
act  deny. 

Any  new  discipline,  therefore,  intellectual  or 
moral,  a  discipline  opposite  to  that  which  the 
present  state  of  the  mind  would  naturally  and 
necessarily  bring  about,  is  impossible. 

Of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  restrain  passion, 
to  deny  or  mortify  one's  self.  The  present  voli- 
tion is  as  the  strongest  present  desire  —  indeed,  is 
the   strongest  present  desire  itself.     "  Will   and 


edwards's  system.  109 

desire  do  not  run  counter  at  all."  "A  man  never  in 
any  instance,  wills  anything  contrary  to  his  desires, 
or  desires  anything  contrary  to  his  will."  (p.  17.) 
Hence  to  restrain  a  present  passion  would  be  to 
will  against  will — would  be  to  desire  opposite 
ways  at  the  same  moment.  Desires  may  be  rel- 
atively stronger  and  weaker,  and  the  stronger 
will  overcome  the  weaker ;  but  the  strongest  de- 
sire must  prevail  and  govern  the  man  ;  it  is  ut- 
terly impossible  for  him  to  oppose  any  resistance, 
for  his  whole  power,  activity,  and  volition,  are  in 
the  desire  itself. 

He  can  do  nothing  but  will :  and  the  nature 
and  direction  of  his  volitions  are,  at  least  in  refer- 
ence to  any  effort  of  his  own,  immutable  as  ne- 
cessity itself. 

A  III.  All  exhortations  and  persuasions  which 
call  upon  the  man  to  bestir  himself,  to  think,  to 
plan,  to  act,  are  inconsistent  and  absurd.  In  all 
such  exhortations  and  persuasions,  the  man  is  urg- 
ed to  will  or  put  forth  volitions,  as  if  he  were  the 
author,  the  determiner  of  the  volitions.  It  may 
be  replied,  'that  the  man  does  will,  that  the  voli- 
tions are  his  volitions.'  But  then  he  wills  only  pas- 
sively, and  these  volitions  are  his  only  because  they 
appear  in  his  consciousness.  You  exhort  and 
persuade  him  to  arouse  himself  into  activity  ;  but 
10 


1  10  (  ON81  Ql  BIN  i;.S  OF 

what  is  his  real  condition  according  to  this  sys- 
tem '  The  exhortations  and  persuasions  do  them- 
selves contain  the  motive  power;  and  instead  of 
arousing  himself  to  action,  he  is  absolutely  and 
necessarily  passive  under  thejmdtives  you  present, 
"Whether  he  be  moved  or  not,  as  truly  and  abso- 
lutely depends  upon  the  motives  you  present,  as 
the  removing  of  any  material  mass  depends  upon 
the  power  and  lever  applied.  And  die  material 
mass,  whether  it  be  wood  or  stone,  may  with  as 
much  propriety  be  said  to  arouse  itself  as  the 
man  ;  and  the  man's  volition  is  his  volition  in  no 
other  sense  than  the  motion  of  the  material  mass 
is  its  motion*  In  the  one  case,  the  man  per- 
ceives ;  and  in  the  other  case,  the  material  mass 
does  not  perceive  —  but  perception  is  granted  by 
all  parties  to  be  necessary ;  the  addition  of  per- 
ception, therefore,  only  modifies  the  character  of 
the  being  moved,  without  altering  the  nature  of 
his  relation  to  the  power  which  moves  him.  In 
the  material  mass,  too,  we  have  an  analogous  pro- 
perty, so  far  as  motion  is  considered.  For  as  mo- 
tive cannot  determine  the  will  unless  there  be 
perception,  so  neither  can  the  lever  and  power 
move  the  mass  unless  it  possess  resistance,  and 
cohesion  of  parts.  If  I  have  but  the  wisdom  to 
discover  the  proper  correlation  of  object  and  sen- 


EDWARDS S  SYSTEM.  Ill 

sitivity  in  the  case  of  individuals  or  of  masses  of 
men,  I  can  command  them  in  any  direction  I 
please,  with  a  necessity  no  less  absolute  than  that 
with  which  a  machine  is  caused  to  work  by  the 
application  of  a  steam  or  water-power. 

When  I  bring  motives  before  the  minds  of  my 
fellow-beings  in  the  proper  relation,  the  volition 
is  necessarily  produced  ;  but  let  me  not  forget, 
that  in  bringing  these  motives  I  put  forth  volitions, 
and  that  of  course  I  am  myself  moved  under  the 
necessity  of  some  antecedent  motive.  My  per- 
suasions and  exhortations  are  necessary  sequents, 
as  well  as  necessary  antecedents.  The  water 
must  run  through  the  water-course  ;  the  wheel 
must  turn  under  the  force  of  the  current  ;  I  must 
exhort  and  persuade  when  motives  determine  me. 
The  minds  I  address  must  yield  when  the  mo- 
tives are  properly  selected. 

IX.  Divine  commands,  warnings,  and  rebukes, 
when  obeyed  and  yielded  to,  are  obeyed  and 
yielded  to  by  the  necessary  force  which  thevpos- 
sess  in  relation  to  the  state  of  mind  to  which  they 
arc  addressed.  When  not  obeyed  and  yielded  to. 
they  fail  necessarily,  through  a  moral  inability  on 
the  part  of  the  mind  addressed  *  or,  in  other  v. 
through  the  want  of  a  proper  correlation  between 
them  and  the  state  of  mind   addressed  :  that  is, 


1 12  i  iinmiji  knces  or 

there  is  not  in  the  case  a  sufficient  power  to  pro- 
duce the  required  volitions,  and  their  existence  of 
course  is  an  utter  impossibility. 

Divine  commands,  warnings,  and  rebukes,  pro- 
duce volitions  of  obedience  and  submission,  only 
as  they  produce  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  : 
and  as  the  will  of  the  creature  can  have  no  part 
in  producing  ihis  sense,  since  this  would  be  pro- 
ducing a  volition  by  a  volition,  it  is  produced  in  a 
correlation  antecedent  to  will,  and  of  course  by  a 
positive  necessity.  This  is  so  clear  from  all  that 
has  gone  before,  that  no  enlargement  here  is  re- 
quired. 

When  no  obedience  and  submission  take  place, 
it  is  because  the  divine  commands,  warnings,  and 
rebukes,  do  not  produce  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable.  And  as  the  will  of  the  creature  can 
have  no  part  in  producing  this  sense,  since  this 
would  be  producing  a  volition  by  a  volition  ;  and 
as  it  is  produced  in  a  correlation  antecedent  to 
\\  ill,  and  of  course  by  a  positive  necessity  ;  so  like- 
wise the  will  of  the  creature  can  have  no  part  in 
preventing  this  sense  from  taking  place.  The  vo- 
lition of  obedience  and  the  volition  of  disobedience 
arc  manifestations  "of  the  antecedent  correlations 
of  certain  objects  with  the  subject,  and  are  neces- 
sarily determined  by  the  nature  of  the  correlation. 


EDWARDS  S  SYSTEM.  113 

Now  the  Divine  Being  must  know  the  precise 
relation  which  his  commands  will  necessarily  hold 
to  the  vast  variety  of  mind  to  which  they  are  ad- 
dressed, and  consequently  must  know  in  what  ca- 
ses obedience  will  be  produced,  and  in  what  cases 
disobedience.  Both  results  are  equally  necessary* 
The  commands  have  therefore,  necessarily  and 
fitly,  a  twofold  offices  When  they  come  into  con- 
nexion with  certain  states  of  mind,  they  necessa- 
rily and  fitly  produce  what  we  call  obedience  { 
when  in  connexion  with  other  states  of  mind, 
they  necessarily  and  fitly  produce  what  we  call 
rebellion  :  and  as  all  volitions  are  predetermined 
and  fixed  by  a  necessary  and  infinite  wisdom,  and 
are  therefore  in  their  time  and  place  the  best,  it 
must  follow  that  rebellion  no  less  than  obedience 
is  a  wise  and  desirable  result. 

The  consequences  I  am  here  deducing  seem 
almost  too  shocking  to  utter.  But  show  me, 
he  that  can,  that  they  are  not  logical  deduc- 
tions from  this  system  ?  I  press  the  system  to 
its  consequences,  —  not  to  throw  any  reproach 
upon  those  great  ard  good  men  who  unfortunate- 
ly were  led  away  by  a  false  philosophy,  but  to 
expose  and  bring  to  its  close  this  philosophy  itself. 
It  has  too  long  been  consecrated  by  its  association 
with  the  good.  I  know  I  shall  be  justified  in  the 
10* 


1 1 1  rami  *i  bw  bs  of 

honest,  though  bold  work,  of  destroying  this  un- 
natural and  portentous  alliance. 

X.  The  sense  of  guilt  and  shame  and  the  fear 
of  retribution  cannot,  according  to  this  system, 
have  a  real  and  necessary  connexion  with  any 
volitions,  but  must  be  regarded  as  prejudices  or 
errors  of  education,  from  which  philosophy  will 
serve  to  relieve  us. 

Edwards  labours  to  prove,  (part  iv.  sec.  1.)  that 
virtue  and  vice  lie  essentially  in  the  volitions 
themselves,  and  that  of  course  the  consciousness 
of  evil  volitions  is  the  consciousness  of  guilt.  I 
will,  or  put  forth  volitions.  The  volitions  are 
mine,  and  therefore  I  am  guilty.  This  reason- 
ing is  plausible,  but  not  consequential ;  for,  ac- 
cording to  this  system,  I  put  forth  volitions  in 
entire  passivity :  the  volitions  appear  necessari- 
ly and  by  antecedent  motives  in  my  conscious- 
ness, and  really  are  mine  only  because  they  are 
produced  in  me.  Connected  with  this  may  be 
the  perception  that  those  volitions  are  wrong  ;  but 
if  there  is  likewise  the  conviction  that  they  arc 
necessary,  and  that  to  suppose  them  different  from 
what  they  are,  is  to  suppose  what  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  been,  —  since  a  series  of  sequents  and 
antecedents  connect  these  volitions  which  now  ap- 
pear, by  absolutely  necessary  relations,  with  a  first 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTEM. 


and  necessary  cause,  —  then  the  sense  of  guilt 
and  shame,  and  the  judgement  I  ought  to  be  pun- 
ished, can  have  no  place  in  the  human  mind.  It 
is  of  no  avail  to  tell  me  that  I  will,  and,  accord- 
ing to  the  common  judgement  of  mankind,  I  must 
be  guilty  when  I  will  wrong,  —  if,  at  the  same 
time,  philosophy  teaches  me  that  I  will  under  the 
necessary  and  inevitable  governance  of  an  ante- 
cedent motive.  The  common  judgement  of  man- 
kind is  an  error,  and  philosophy  must  soon  dissi- 
pate the  sense  of  guilt  and  shame,  and  of  moral 
desert,  which  have  hitherto  annoyed  me  and  made 
me  fearful :  and  much  more  must  such  a  result 
ensue,  when  I  take  into  consideration,  likewise, 
that  the  necessity  which  determines  me,  is  a  ne- 
cessity which  takes  its  rise  in  infinite  and  neces- 
sary wisdom. 

What  is  true  of  guilt  and  retribution  is  true  al- 
so of  well-doing  and  reward.  If  I  do  well,  the 
volitions  being  determined  by  an  antecedent  ne- 
cessity, I  could  not  possibly  have  done  otherwise. 
It  does  not  answer  the  conditions  of  the  case  at 
all,  to  say  I  might  have  done  otherwise,  if  I  had 
willed  to  do  otherwise  ;  because  the  will  to  do  as 
I  actually  am  doing,  is  a  will  that  could  not  have 
been  otherwise.  Give  me,  then,  in  any  action 
called  good,  great,  noble,  glorious,  etc.  the  con- 


1  ]G  (  ONBSQUBIN  BB  OF 

viction  that  the  choice  of  this  action  was  a  neces- 
sary choice,  predetermined  in  a  long  and  unbro- 
ken chain  of  necessary  antecedents,  and  the  sense 
of  praise\vorthiness,and  the  judgement  I  ought  to 
be  rewarded,  remain  no  longer. 

Merit  and  demerit  are  connected  in  our  minds 
with  our  volitions,  under  the  impression  that  the 
good  we  perform,  we  perform  in  opposition  to 
temptation,  and  with  the  power  and  possibility  of 
doing  evil ;  and  that  the  evil  we  perform,  we  per- 
form in  opposition  to  motives  of  good,  and  with 
the  power  and  possibility  of  doing  good.  But 
when  we  are*  informed  that  all  the  power  and 
possibility  of  a  conduct  opposite  to  our  actual 
conduct  is  this,  —  that  if  we  had  put  forth  oppo- 
site volitions,  there  would  have  been  opposite  ex- 
ternal acts,  but  that  nevertheless  the  volitions 
themselves  were  necessary,  and  could  not  have 
been  otherwise,  —  we  cannot  but  experience  a 
revulsion  of  mind.  We  perhaps  are  first  led  to 
doubt  the  philosophy,  —  or  if,  by  acute  reason- 
ings, or  by  the  authority  of  great  names,  we  are 
influenced  to  yield  an  implicit  belief,  —  the  sense 
of  merit  and  demerit  must  either  die  away,  or  be 
maintained  by  a  hasty  retreat  from  the  regions  of 
speculation  to  those  of  common  sense. 

XI.  It  follows  from  this  system,  also,  that  na- 


edwards's  system.  117 

ture  and  spirit,  as  causes  or  agents,  cannot  be  dis- 
tinguished in  their  operations. 

There  are  three  classes  of  natural  causes  or 
agents  generally  acknowledged  :  1.  Inanimate. — 
as  water,  wind,  steam,  magnetism,  &c. ;  2.  Ani- 
mate, but  insensible,  —  as  the  life  and  affinities  of 
plants  ;  3.  Animate  and  sensitive,  or  brute  animal 
power. 

These  all  properly  come  under  the  denomina- 
tion of  natural,  because  they  are  alike  necessita- 
ted. "  Whatever  is  comprised  in  the  chain  and 
mechanism  of  cause  and  effect,  of  course  necessi- 
tated, and  having  its  necessity  in  some  other  thing 
antecedent  or  concurrent,  —  this  is  said  to  be  nat- 
ural ;  and  the  aggregate  and  system  of  all  such 
things  is  nature."  Now  spirit,  as  a  cause  or  agent. 
by  this  system,  comes  under  the  same  definition : 
in  all  its  acts  it  is  necessitated.  It  is  in  will  par- 
ticularly that  man  is  taken  as  a  cause  or  agent, 
because  it  is  by  will  that  he  directly  produces 
phenomena  or  effects  ;  and  by  this  system  it  is 
not  possible  to  distinguish,  so  far  as  neces-ary 
connexion  is  considered,  a  chain  of  antecedents 
and  sequents  made  up  of  motives,  volitions,  and 
the  consequents  of  volitions,  from  a  chain  of  se- 
quents and  antecedents  into  which  the  three  first 
mentioned  classes  of  natural  agents  enter.      V 


119  CONSEQUFJfCBE   Of 

the  several  classes  have  peculiar  and  distinguish' 
ing  characteristics ;  but  in  the  relation  of  antece- 
dence and  sequence,  —  their  relation  as  causes  or 
agents  producing  effects, —  no  distinction  can  be 
perceived.  Wind,  water,  &c.  form  one  kind  of 
cause  ;  organic  life  forms  another  ;  brute  organi- 
zation and  sensitivity  another  ;  intelligent  volition 
another :  but  they  are  all  necessary,  absolutely 
necessary  ;  and  therefore  they  are  the  co-ordinate 
parts  of  the  one  system  of  nature.  The  differ- 
ence which  exists  between  them  is  a  difference 
of  terms  merely.  There  is  no  difference  in  the 
nature  of  the  relation  between  the  terms.  The 
nature  of  the  relation  between  the  water-wheel 
and  the  water,  —  of  the  relation  between  the  or- 
ganic life  of  plants  and  their  developement,  — 
of  the  relation  between  passion  and  volition  in 
brutes,  —  of  the  relation  between  their  efforts  and 
material  effects,  —  and  the  nature  of  the  relation 
between  motive  and  volition,  —  are  one  :  it  is  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  considered  as  stated 
antecedent  and  sequent,  and  no  more  and  no  less 
necessary  in  one  subject  than  in  another. 

XII.  It  follows,  again,  that  sensations  produced 
by  external  objects,  and  all  emotions  following 
perception,  and  all  the  acts  of  the  intelligence, 
whether  in  intuitive  knowledge  or  in  ratiocination, 


edwards's  system.  119 

are  as  really  our  acts,  and  acts  for  which  we  are 
as  really  responsible,  if  responsibility  be  granted  to 
exist,  as  acts  of  volition.  Sensations,  emotions, 
perceptions,  reasonings,  are  all  within  us  ;  they  all 
lie  in  our  consciousness  ;  they  are  not  created  by 
our  volitions,  like  the  motions  of  the  hands  and 
feet ;  they  take  place  by  their  own  causes,  just  as 
volitions  take  place  by  their  causes.  The  relation 
of  the  man  to  all  is  precisely  the  same.  He  is  in 
no  sense  the  cause  of  any  of  these  affections  of 
his  being  ;  he  is  simply  the  subject :  the  subject  of 
sensation,  of  perception,  of  emotion,  of  reasoning, 
and  of  volition  ;  and  he  is  the  subject  of  all  by 
the  same  necessity. 

XIII.  The  system  of  punishment  is  only  a  sys- 
tem accommodated  to  the  opinions  of  society. 

There  is  nothing  evil  in  itself,  according  to  this 
system  of  necessity,  as  we  have  already  shown. 
Ever}7  thing  which  takes  place  is,  in  its  time, 
place,  and  relations  generally,  the  necessary  re- 
sult of  necessary  and  infinite  wisdom.  But  still  it 
is  a  fact  that  society  are  desirous  of  preventing 
certain  acts,  —  such  as  stealing,  adulter}',  murder, 
&c. ;  and  they  are  necessarily  so  desirous.  Now 
the  system  of  punishment  is  a  mere  collection  of 
motives  in  relation  to  the  sense  of  pain  and  the 
emotion  of  fear,  which  prevent  the  commission  of 


1*20  '  ON8BQ1  i  \<  i:s  of 

these  ads.  Where  these  acts  do  take  place,  it  is 
best  they  Bhould  take  place  ;  but  where  they  are 
prevented  by  the  fear  of  punishment,  it  is  best 
they  should  be  prevented.  Where  the  criminal 
Buffers,  he  has  no  right  to  complain,  because  it  is 
best  that  he  should  suffer;  and  yet,  if  he  does 
complain,  it  is  best  that  he  should  complain.  The 
system  of  punishment  is  good,  as  every  thing  else 
is  good.  The  system  of  divine  punishments  must 
be  considered  in  the  same  light.  Indeed,  what 
are  human  punishments,  when  properly  consid- 
ered, but  divine  punishments  ?  They  are  com- 
prehended in  the  pre-ordained  and  necessary 
chain  of  being  and  events. 

XIV.  Hence  we  must  conclude,  also,  that  there 
cannot  really  be  any  calamity.  The  calamities 
which  we  may  at  any  time  experience,  we  ought 
to  endure  and  rejoice  in,  as  flowing  from  the 
same  perfect  and  necessary  source.  But  as  ca- 
lamity does  nevertheless  necessarily  produce  suf- 
fering and  uneasiness,  and  the  desire  of  relief,  we 
may  be  permitted  to  hope  that  perfect  relief  and 
entire  blessedness  will  finally  ensue,  and  that  the 
final  blessedness  will  be  enhanced  just  in  propor- 
tion to  the  present  suffering. 

The  necessitarian  may  be  an  optimist  of  a 
high  order.     If  he  commits  what  is  called  crime, 


edwards's  system.  121 

and  remorse  succeeds,  and  punishment  is  inflicted 
under  law,  the  crime  is  good,  the  remorse  is  good, 
the  punishment  is  good,  all  necessary  and  good, 
and  working  out,  as  he  hopes,  a  result  of  pure 
happiness.  Nothing  can  be  bad  in  itself:  it  may 
be  disagreeable  ;  but  even  this  will  probably  give 
way  to  the  agreeable.  And  so  also  with  all  afflic- 
tions :  they  must  be  good  in  themselves,  although 
disagreeable,  —  and  will  probably  lead  the  way  to 
the  agreeable,  just  as  hunger  and  thirst,  which  are 
disagreeable,  lead  the  way  to  the  enjoyments  of 
eating  and  drinking.  All  is  of  necessity,  and  of 
a  necessary  and  perfect  wisdom. 

XV.  But  as  all  is  of  necessity,  and  of  a  neces- 
sary and  perfect  wisdom,  there  really  can  no 
more  be  folly  in  conduct,  or  error  in  reasoning 
and  belief,  than  there  can  be  crime  and  calamity, 
considered  as  evils  in  themselves.  Every  act  that 
we  call  folly  is  a  necessary  act,  in  its  time,  place, 
and  relations  generally,  and  is  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  infinite  wisdom ;  but  a  necessary 
consequence  of  infinite  wisdom  cannot  be  oppos- 
ed to  infinite  wisdom  ;  so  that  what  we  call  folly, 
when  philosophically  considered,  ceases  to  be 
folly. 

In  any  act  of  pure  reasoning,  the  relations  seem 
necessary,  and  the  assent  of  the  mind  is  neces- 
11 


122  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

sary.  Tins  is  granted  by  all  parties.  But  it  must 
be  admitted,  that  when  men  are  said  to  reason 
falsely,  and  to  yield  their  assent  to  false  conelu- 
.  the  relations  seem  necessary  to  them  :  and. 
according  to  this  system,  they  necessarily  so  seem, 
and  cannot  seem  otherwise:  and  the  assent  of  the 
mind  is  also  necessary. 

The  reasoning,  to  others,  would  be  false  rea- 
soning, because  it  so  necessarily  seems  to  them  ; 
but  to  the  individual  to  whom  it  seems  different, 
it  must  really  be  different,  and  be  good  and  valid 
reasoning. 

Again :  as  all  these  different  reasonings  and  be- 
liefs proceed  necessarily  from  the  same  source, 
they  must  all  be  really  true  where  they  seem 
true,  and  all  really  false  where  they  seem  false. 
It  would  follow,  from  this,  that  no  one  can  really 
be  in  a  false  position  except  the  hypocrite  and 
sophist,  pretending  to  believe  and  to  be  what  he 
does  not  believe  and  what  he  is  not,  and  purpose- 
ly reasoning  falsely,  and  stating  his  false  conclu- 
sions as  if  they  were  truths.  I  say  this  would 
follow,  were  we  not  compelled  by  this  system  to 
allow  that  even  the  hypocrite  and  sophist  cannot 
hold  a  false  position,  inasmuch  as  his  position  is 
a  necessary  one,  predetermined  in  its  necessary 
connexion  with  the  first  necessary  wisdom. 


EDWABD8S   -V^TT-.M.  123 

XVI.  Another  consequence  of  this  system  is 
fatalism,  —  or,  perhaps,  more  properly  speaking, 
the  system  is  itself  a  system  of  fatalism. 

This,  indeed,  has  already  been  made  to  appear 
substantially.  The  word,  however,  has  not  yet 
been  used.  I  here,  then,  charge  directly  this  con- 
sequence or  feature  upon  the  system. 

Fatalism  is  the  absolute  negation  of  liberty. 
This  system  is  fatalism,  because  it  is  the  absolute 
negation  of  liberty. 

No  liberty  is  contended  for,  in  this  system,  in 
relation  to  man,  but  physical  liberty  :  viz.  that 
when  he  wills,  the  effect  will  follow,  —  that  when 
he  wills  to  walk,  he  walks,  &c.  "  Liberty,  as  I 
have  explained  it,  is  the  power,  opportunity,  or 
advantage,  that  any  one  has  to  do  as  he  pleases, 
or  conducting  himself  in  any  respect  according  to 
his  pleasure,  without  considering  how  his  pleasure 
comes  to  be  as  it  is."    (p.  291.) 

In  the  first  place,  this  is  no  higher  liberty  than 
what  brutes  possess.  They  have  power,  opportu- 
nity, or  advantage,  to  do  as  they  please.  Effects 
follow  their  volitions  by  as  certain  a  law  as  effects 
follow  the  volitions  of  men. 

In  the  second  place,  this  is  no  higher  liberty 
than  slaves  possess.  Slaves  uniformly  do  as  they 
please.     If  the  motive  be  the  lash,  or  the  fear  of 


124  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

the  lash,  still,  in  their  case  as  well  as  in  that 
of  brutes  under  similar  circumstances,  the  volition 
which  takes  place  is  the  most  pleasing  at  the  mo- 
ment. The  slave  and  the  animal  do  what  is  most 
pleasing  to  them,  or  do  according  to  their  pleas- 
ure, when  the  one  drags  the  plough  and  the  other 
holds  it.  Nay,  it  is  impossible  for  any  animal,  ra- 
tional or  irrational,  to  act  without  doing  what  is 
most  pleasing  to  him  or  it.  Volition  is  always  as 
the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  as  the  sense  of  the 
most  pleasant  or  agreeable. 

If  any  should  reply  that  slaves  and  animals  arc 
liable  to  be  fettered,  and  this  distinguishes  them 
from  the  free,  I  rejoin  that  every  being  is  liable 
to  various  restraints ;  none  of  us  can  do  many 
things  which  in  themselves  appear  desirable,  and 
would  be  objects  of  volition  if  there  were  known 
to  be  an  established  connexion  between  them  and 
our  wills.  We  are  limited  in  our  actions  by  the 
powers  of  nature  around  us  ;  we  cannot  overturn 
mountains,  or  command  the  winds.  We  are 
limited  in  the  nature  of  our  physical  being.  We 
are  limited  by  our  want  of  wealth,  knowledge, 
and  influence.  In  all  these  respects,  we  may, 
with  as  much  propriety  as  the  slave,  be  regarded 
as  deprived  of  liberty.  It  docs  not  avail  to  say 
that.  as  we  never  really  will  what  we  know  to  be 


edwards's  system.  125 

impossible  or  impracticable,  so  in  relation  to  such 
objects,  neither  liberty  or  a  want  of  liberty  is  to 
be  affirmed ;  for  the  same  will  apply  to  the  fet- 
tered slave  ;  he  does  not  will  to  walk  or  run 
when  he  knows  it  to  be  impossible.  But  in  rela- 
tion to  him  as  well  as  to  every  other  being,  accord- 
ing to  this  system  it  holds  true,  that  whether  he 
act  or  forbear  to  act,  his  volitions  are  as  the  most 
agreeable. 

All  creatures,  therefore,  acting  by  volition,  are 
to  be  accounted  free,  and  one  really  as  free  as 
another. 

In  the  third  place,  the  liberty  here  affirmed  be- 
longs equally  to  every  instance  of  stated  antece- 
dence and  sequence. 

The  liberty  which  is  taken  to  reside  in  the 
connexion  between  volition  and  effects,  is  a  liberty 
lying  in  a  connexion  of  stated  antecedence  and 
sequence,  and  is  perfect  according  as  this  connex- 
ion is  necessary  and  unimpeded.  The  highest 
form  of  liberty,  therefore,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
most  absolute  form  of  necessity.  Liberty  thus 
becomes  identified  also  with  power  :  where  there 
is  power,  there  is  liberty  ;  and  where  power  is 
the  greatest,  that  is,  where  it  overcomes  the  most 
obstacles  and  moves  on  irresistibly  to  its  effects, 
there  is  the  greatest  degree  of  liberty.  God  is 
11* 


12G  CON8EQ1  BNCE8  <>l 

the  most  free  of  all  beings,  because  nothing  car, 
impede  his  will.  His  volitions  arc  always  the 
antecedents  of  elfects. 

But  obviously  \vc  do  not  alter  the  relation,  when 
we  change  the  terms.  If  liberty  lie  in  the  stated 
antecedence  of  volition  to  effects,  and  if  libcrt\  if 
measured  by  the  necessity  of  the  relation,  then 
when  the  antecedent  is  changed,  the  relation  re- 
maining the  same,  liberty  must  still  be  present. 
For  example  :  when  a  volition  to  move  the  arm 
is  followed  by  a  motion  of  the  arm,  there  is  liber- 
ty :  now  let  galvanism  be  substituted  for  the  vo- 
lition, and  the  effect  as  certainly  takes  place  ;  and 
as  freedom  is  doing  as  we  please,  or  will,  "  with- 
out considering  how  this  pleasure  (or  will)  comes 
to  be  as  it  is  ;"  that  is,  without  taking  its  motive 
into  the  account.  So  likewise,  freedom  may  be 
affirmed  to  be  doing  according  to  the  galvanic 
impulse,  "without  considering  how'"  that  impulse 
"  comes  to  be  as  it  is." 

If  we  take  any  other  instance  of  stated  ante- 
cedence and  sequence,  the  reasoning  is  the  same. 
For  example,  a  water  wheel  in  relation  to  the  mill- 
stone :  when  the  wheel  turns,  the  mill-stone  moves. 
In  this  case  freedom  may  be  defined  :  the  mill- 
stone moving  according  to  the  turn  of  the  wheel, 
M  without  considering  how"  that  turn  of  the  wheel 


edwards's  system.  1J7 

"  comes  to  be  as  it  is."  In  the  case  of  human 
freedom,  freedom  is  defined,  doing  according  to 
our  volitions,  without  considering  how  the  volition 
comes  to  be  as  it  is  ;  doing  "  according  to  choice, 
without  taking  into  the  meaning  of  the  word  any- 
thing of  the  cause  of  that  choice."     (p.  39.) 

If  it  be  said  that  in  the  case  of  volition,  we 
have  the  man  of  whom  to  affirm  freedom  ;  but  in 
the  case  of  the  wheel  and  mill-stone,  we  have 
nothing  of  which  liberty  can  properly  be  affirmed. 
I  reply,  that  liberty  must  be  affirmed,  and  is  pro- 
perly affirmed,  of  that  to  which  it  really  belongs  ; 
and  hence  as  volition  is  supposed  to  belong  to  the 
spiritual  essence,  man  ;  and  this  spiritual  essence 
is  pronounced  free,  because  volition  appears  in  it. 
and  is  attended  by  consequences  :  —  so,  likewise, 
the  material  essence  of  the  wheel  may  be  pro- 
nounced free,  because  motion  belongs  to  it,  and 
is  followed  by  consequences.  As  every  being 
that  has  volition  is  free,  so  likewise  every  thing 
that  hath  motion  is  free  :  —  in  every  instance  of 
cause  and  effect,  we  meet  with  liberty. 

But  volition  cannot  be  the  characteristic  of  lib- 
erty, if  volition  itself  be  governed  by  necessity  : 
and  yet  this  system  which  affirms  liberty,  where- 
evcr  there  is  unimpeded  volition,  makes  volition  a 
necessary  determination.     In  the  fact  of  unimpe- 


128  consequences  or 

dcd  volition,  it  gives  liberty  to  all  creatures  that 
have  volition  ;  and  then  again,  in  the  fact  of  the 
necessary  determination  of  volition  it  destroys  the 
possibility  of  liberty.  But  even  where  it  affirms 
liberty  to  exist,  there  is  no  new  feature  to  charac- 
terize it  as  liberty.  The  connexion  between  voli- 
tion and  its  stated  consequences,  is  a  connexion 
as  necessary  and  absolute  as  the  connexion  be- 
tween the  motive  and  the  volition,  and  between 
any  antecedent  and  sequent  whatever.  That  my 
arm  should  move  when  I  make  a  volition  to  this 
effect,  is  just  as  necessary  and  just  as  incompre- 
hensible too,  as  that  water  should  freeze  at  a  given 
temperature  :  when  the  volition  is  impeded,  we 
have  only  another  instance  of  necessity,  —  a  lesser 
force  overcome  by  a  greater. 

The  liberty  therefore  which  this  system  affirms 
in  the  fact  of  volition  and  its  unimpeded  con- 
nexion with  its  consequents,  is  an  assumption  —  a 
mere  name.  It  is  a  part  of  the  universal  necessity 
arbitrarily  distinguished  and  named.  As  liberty 
does  not  reside  in  human  volition,  so  neither  can 
it  reside  in  the  divine  volition.  The  necessary 
dependence  of  volition  upon  motive,  and  the  ne- 
cessary sequence  of  effects  upon  volition,  can  no 
more  be  separated  from  the  divine  mind  than 
from  ours.     It  is  a  doctrine  which,  if  true,  is  im- 


EDWAKDS's  SYSTEM.  129 

plied  in  the  universal  conception  of  mind.  It  be- 
longs to  mind  generically  considered.  The  crea- 
tion of  volition  by  volition  is  absurd  in  itself — it 
cannot  but  be  an  absurdity.  The  determination 
of  will  by  the  strongest  motive,  if  a  truth  is  a 
truth  universally  ;  on  this  system,  it  contains  the 
whole  cause  and  possibility  of  volition.  The 
whole  liberty  of  God,  it  is  affirmed,  is  contained 
in  this,  to  do  as  pleases  him,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  what  he  wills  is  accomplished,  and  necessa- 
rily accomplished :  what  pleases  him  is  also  fixed 
in  the  necessity  of  his  own  nature.  His  liberty, 
therefore,  by  its  own  definition,  differs  nothing 
from  necessity. 

If  the  movements  of  mind  are  necessary,  no 
argument  is  required  to  prove  that  all  being  and 
events  are  necessary.  We  are  thus  bound  up  in  a 
universal  necessity.  Whatever  is,  is,  and  cannot 
be  otherwise,  and  could  not  have  been  otherwise. 
As  therefore  there  is  no  liberty,  we  are  reduced 
to  the  only  remaining  alternative  of  fatalism. 

Edwards  does  not  indeed  attempt  to  rebut 
wholly  the  charge  of  fatalism,  (part  iv.  §  vi.)  In 
relation  to  the  Stoics,  he  remarks: — "It  seems 
they  differed  among  themselves ;  and  probably 
the  doctrine  of  fate  as  maintained  by  most  of 
them,   was,  in   some   respects,   erroneous.     But 


130  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

whatever  their  doctrines  was,  if  any  of  them  held 
such  a  fate,  as  is  repugnant  to  any  liberty,  consist' 
ing  in  our  doing  as  we  please,  I  utterly  deny  such 
a  fate."  He  objects  to  fatalism  only  when  it 
should  deny  our  actions  to  be  connected  with  our 
pleasure,  or  our  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  that 
is  our  volition.  But  this  connexion  we  have  fully 
proved  to  be  as  necessary  as  the  connexion  be- 
tween the  volition  and  its  motive.  This  reserva- 
tion therefore  does  not  save  him  from  fatalism. 

In  the  following  section,  (sec.  vii.)  he  repre- 
sents the  liberty  and  sovereignty  of  God  as  con- 
sisting in  an  ability  "  to  do  whatever  pleases  him." 
His  idea  of  the  divine  liberty,  therefore,  is  the 
same  as  that  attributed  to  man.  That  the  divine 
volitions  are  necessarily  determined,  he  repeated- 
ly affirms,  and  indeed  represents  as  the  great  ex- 
cellence of  the  divine  nature,  because  this  neces- 
sity of  determination  is  laid  in  the  infinite  wisdom 
and  perfection  of  his  nature. 

If  necessity  govern  all  being  and  events,  it  i  • 
cheering  to  know  that,  it  is  necessity  under  the 
forms  of  infinite  wisdom  and  benevolence.  But 
still  it  remains  true  that  necessity  governs.  If 
"  it  is  no  disadvantage  or  dishonour  to  a  being, 
necessarily  to  act  in  the  most  excellent  and  hap- 
py manner  from  the  necessary  perfection  of  his 


edwards's  system.  131 

own  nature,''  still  let  us  remember  that  under  this 
representation  he  docs  act  necessarily.  Fate  must 
have  some  quality  or  form ;  it  must  be  what 
we  call  good  or  evil :  but  in  determining  its  qual- 
ity, we  do  not  destroy  its  nature.  Now  if  we 
call  this  fate  a  nature  of  goodness  and  wisdom, 
eternal  and  infinite,  we  present  it  under  forms 
beautiful,  benign,  and  glorious,  but  it  is  neverthe- 
less fate,  —  and  as  such  it  governs  the  divine  vo- 
litions ;  and  through  the  divine  volitions,  all  the 
consequents  and  effects  of  these  volitions  ;  —  the 
universe  of  being  and  things  is  determined  by 
fate  ; — and  all  volitions  of  angels  or  men  are  de- 
termined by  fate  —  by  this  fate  so  beautiful,  be- 
nign, and  glorious.  Now  if  all  things  thus  pro- 
ceeding from  fate  were  beautiful,  benign,  and  glo- 
rious, the  theory  might  not  alarm  us.  But  that 
deformity,  crime,  and  calamity  should  have  place 
as  developements  of  this  fate,  excites  uneasiness. 
The  abettors  of  this  system,  however,  may  per- 
haps comfort  themselves  with  the  persuasion  that 
deformity,  crime,  and  calamity,  are  names  not  of 
realities,  but  of  the  limited  conceptions  of  man- 
kind. We  have  indeed  an  instance  in  point  in 
Charles  Bonnet,  whom  Dugald  Stewart  men- 
tions as  -  a  very  learned  and  pious  disciple  of 
Leibnitz."    Says  Bonnet  —  "Thus  the  same  chain 


\'.)2  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

embraces  the  physical  and  moral  world,  binds 
the  past  to  the  present,  the  present  to  the  future, 
the  future  to  eternity.  That  wisdom  which  has 
ordained  the  existence  of  this  chain,  has  doubtless 
willed  that  of  every  link  of  which  it  is  composed. 
A  Caligula  is  one  of  these  links;  and  this  link  is 
of  iron.  A  Marcus  Aurelius  is  another  link  ;  and 
this  link  is  of  gold.  Both  are  necessary  parts  of 
one  whole,  which  could  not  but  exist.  Shall  God 
then  be  angry  at  the  sight  of  the  iron  link  ? 
What  absurdity !  God  esteems  this  link  at  its 
proper  value.  He  sees  it  in  its  cause,  and  he 
approves  this  cause,  for  it  is  good.  God  beholds 
moral  monsters  as  he  beholds  physical  monsters. 
Happy  is  the  link  of  gold !  Still  more  happy  if 
he  know  that  he  is  only  fortunate.  lie  has  at- 
tained the  highest  degree  of  moral  perfection,  and 
is  nevertheless  without  pride,  knowing  that  what 
he  is,  is  the  necessary  result,  of  the  place  which 
he  must  occupy  in  the  chain.  The  gospel  is  the 
allegorical  exposition  of  this  system  ;  the  simile 
of  the  potter  is  its  summary."  He  might  have 
added,  "  Happy  is  the  link  of  iron,  if  he  know 
that  he  is  not  guilty,  but  at  worst  only  unfortu- 
nate ;  and  really  not  unfortunate,  because  holding 
a  necessary  place  in  the  chain  which  both  as  a 
whole  and  in  its  parts,  is  the  result  of  infinite  wis- 
dom." 


edwards's  system.  133 

If  anything  more  is  required  in  order  to  estab- 
lish this  consequence  of  the  system  we  are  exam- 
ining, I  would  call  attention  to  the  inquiry,  wheth- 
er after  a  contingent  self-determining  will  there 
remains  any  theory  of  action  except  fatalism  ?  A 
contingent  self-determining  will  is  a  will  which  is 
the  cause  of  its  own  volitions  or  choices  —  a  self- 
conscious  power,  self-moved  and  directed,  and  at 
the  moment  of  its  choice,  or  movement  towards 
a  particular  object,  conscious  of  ability  of  choos- 
ing, or  moving  towards,  an  opposite  object.  Now 
what  conception  have  we  to  oppose  to  this  but 
that  of  a  will  not  determining  itself,  —  not  the 
cause  of  its  own  volitions,  —  a  power  not  self- 
moved  and  directed,  —  and  not  conscious  of  abili- 
ty at  the  moment  of  a  particular  choice,  to  make 
a  contrary  choice  ?  And  this  last  conception  is 
a  will  whose  volitions  are  determined  by  some 
power  antecedent  to  itself,  not  contingently,  but 
necessarily.  As  the  will  is  the  only  power  for 
which  contingent  self-determination  is  claimed,  if 
it  be  proved  to  be  no  such  power,  then  no  such 
power  exists.  The  whole  theory  of  action  and 
causality  will  then  be  expressed  as  follows  : 

1.  Absolute  and  necessary  connexion  of  mo- 
tives and  volitions.  2.  Absolute  and  necessary 
connexion  of  volitions  and  effects.  3.  Absolute 
12 


134  COHSBQUEKCEfl  OF 

and  necessary  connexion  of  all  sequenls  and  an- 
tecedents in  nature.  4.  Absolute  and  necessary 
connexion  of  all  things  existent  with  a  first  and 
necessary  principle  or  cause.  5.  The  necessaiy 
determination  of  this  principle  or  cause. 

Denying  a  contingent  self-determining  will,  this 
theory  is  all  that  remains.  If  liberty  be  affirmed 
to  reside  in  the  2d  particular  of  this  theory,  it  be- 
comes a  mere  arbitrary  designation,  because  the 
nature  of  the  relation  is  granted  to  be  the  same  ; 
it  is  not  contingent,  but  necessary.  Nor  can  lib- 
erty be  affirmed  to  reside  in  the  5th  ;  because  in 
the  first  place,  the  supposed  demonstration  of  the 
absurdity  of  a  contingent  self-determining  will,  by 
infinite  series  of  volitions,  must  apply  to  this  great 
first  principle  considered  as  God.  And  in  the 
second  place,  the  doctrine  of  the  necessary  de- 
termination of  motive  must  apply  here  likewise, 
since  God  as  will  and  intelligence  requires  mo- 
tives no  less  than  we  do.  Such  determination  is 
represented  as  arising  from  the  very  nature  of 
mind  or  spirit.  Now  this  theory  advanced  in  op- 
position to  a  self-determining  will,  is  plainly  the 
negation  of  liberty  as  opposed  to  necessity.  And 
this  is  all  that  can  be  meant  by  fatalism.  Liberty 
thus  becomes  a  self-contradictory  conception,  and 
fatalism  alone  is  truth  and  reality. 


EDWARDs's   SYSTEM.  135 

XVII.  It  appears  to  me  also,  that  pantheism  is 
a  fair  deduction  from  this  system. 

According  to  this  system,  God  is  the  sole  and 
universal  doer  —  the  only  efficient  cause.  1.  His 
volition  is  the  creative  act,  by  which  all  beings 
and  things  exist.  Thus  far  it  is  generally  conce- 
ded that  God  is  all  in  all.  "  By  him  we  live,  and 
move,  and  have  our  being."  2.  The  active  powers 
of  the  whole  system  of  nature  he  has  constituted 
and  regulated.  The  winds  are  his  messengers, 
The  flaming  fire  his  servant.  However  we  may 
conceive  of  these  powers,  whether  as  really  pow- 
ers acting  under  necessary  laws,  or  as  immediate 
manifestations  of  divine  energy,  in  either  case  it 
is  proper  to  attribute  all  their  movements  to  God. 
These  movements  were  ordained  by  his  wisdom, 
and  are  executed  directly  or  indirectly  by  his 
will.  Every  effect  which  we  produce  in  the  ma- 
terial world,  we  produce  by  instrumentality.  Our 
arms,  hands,  &x.  are  our  first  instruments.  All 
that  we  do  by  the  voluntary  use  of  these,  we  at- 
tribute to  ourselves.  Now  if  we  increase  the  in- 
strumentality by  the  addition  of  an  axe,  spade,  or 
hammer,  still  the  effect  is  justly  attributed  in  the 
same  way.  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  to  whatever 
extent  we  multiply  the  instruments,  the  principle 
is  the  same.     Whether  I  do   the  deed   directly 


186  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

with  my  hand,  or  do  it  by  an  instrument  held  in 
my  hand,  or  by  a  concatenation  of  machinery, 
reaching  from  "the  centre  to  the  utmost  pole,"  — 
if  I  contemplate  the  deed,  and  designedly  accom- 
plish it  in  this  way,  the  deed  is  mine.  And  not 
only  is  the  last  deed  contemplated  as  the  end  of 
all  this  arrangement  mine,  all  the  intermediary 
movements  produced  as  the  necessary  chain  of 
antecedents  and  sequents  by  which  the  last  is  to 
be  attained,  are  mine  likewise. 

I  use  powers  and  instruments  whose  energy 
and  capacity  I  have  learned  by  experience,  but 
in  whose  constitution  I  have  had  no  hand.  They 
are  provided  for  me,  and  I  merely  use  them.  But 
God  in  working  by  these,  works  by  what  his  own 
wisdom  and  power  have  created ;  and  therefore 
a  fortiori  must  every  effect  produced  by  these, 
according  to  his  design,  and  by  his  volition  as  at 
least  the  first  power  of  the  series,  be  attributed  to 
him,  —  be  called  his  doing.  He  causeth  the  sun 
to  rise  and  set.  "  He  causeth  the  grass  to  grow 
for  the  cattle,  and  herb  for  the  service  of  man." 
"  lie  watereth  the  hills  from  his  chambers."  This 
is  not  merely  poetry.    It  is  truth. 

Now  the  system  we  arc  considering  goes  one 
step  further;  it  makes  human  volitions  as  much 
the  objects  of  the  eternal  design,  and  as  really  the 


EDWAKDs's   SYSTEM.  137 

effects  of  the  divine  volition,  as  the  rising  of  the 
stars,  the  flight  of  the  lightning,  the  tumult  of  the 
waters,  or  the  light  which  spreadeth  itself  like  a 
garment  over  creation.  Every  volition  of  created 
mind  is  God's  act,  as  really  as  any  effect  in  nature. 
We  have  seen  how  every  volition  is  connected 
with  its  motive  ;  how  the  motive  lies  in  a  pre- 
constitution ;  how  the  series  of  antecedents  and 
sequents  necessarily  runs  back  and  connects  itself 
with  the  infinite  wisdom.  God's  volition  is  his 
own  act ;  the  effect  immediately  produced  by 
that  volition  is  his  own  deed.  Let  that  effect  be 
the  creation  of  man :  the  man  in  all  his  powers 
and  susceptibilities  is  God's  work ;  the  objects 
around  him  are  God's  work ;  the  correlation  of 
the  objects  with  the  sensitivity  of  man  is  God's 
work ;  the  volition  which  necessarily  takes  place 
as  the  result  of  this  correlation  is  God's  work. 
The  volition  of  the  man  is  as  strictly  attributable 
to  God,  as,  according  to  our  common  apprehen- 
sions, the  blow  which  I  give  with  an  axe  is  attri- 
butable to  me.  What  is  true  of  the  first  man, 
must  be  equally  true  of  the  man  removed  by  a 
thousand  generations,  for  the  intermediary  links 
are  all  ordained  by  God  under  an  inevitable  ne- 
cessity. God  is  really,  therefore,  the  sole  doer  — 
the  only  efficient,  the  only  cause.  All  beings  and 
12* 


138  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

things,  all  motion  and  all  volition,  are  absolutely 
resolved  into  divine  volition.  God  is  the  author 
ol'  all  beings,  things,  motions,  and  volitions,  and 
as  much  the  author  of  any  one  of  these  as  of  any 
other,  and  the  author  of  all  in  the  same  way  and 
in  the  same  sense.  Set  aside  self-determining 
will,  and  there  is  no  stopping-place  between  a  hu- 
man volition  and  the  divine  volition.  The  human 
volition  is  but  the  divine,  manifested  through  a 
lengthened  it  may  be,  but  a  connected  and  neces- 
sary chain  of  antecedents  and  sequents.  I  see  no 
way  of  escaping  from  this,  as  a  necessary  and  le- 
gitimate consequence  of  the  necessary  determina- 
tion of  will.  And  what  is  this  consequence  but 
pantheism  ?  God  is  the  universal  and  all-perva- 
ding intelligence  —  the  universal  and  only  power. 
Every  movement  of  nature  is  necessary ;  every 
movement  of  mind  is  necessary ;  because  neces- 
sarily caused  and  determined  by  the  divine  voli- 
tion. There  is  no  life  but  his,  no  thought  but  his, 
no  efficiency  but  his.  He  is  the  soul  of  the  world. 
Spinosa  never  represented  himself  as  an  athe- 
ist, and  according  to  the  following  representation 
appears  rather  as  a  pantheist.  "  He  held  that 
God  is  the  cause  of  all  things ;  but  that  he  acts, 
not  from  choice,  but  from  necessity  ;  and,  of  con- 
sequence, that  he  is  the  involuntary  author  of  all 


EDWARDS  S  SYSTEM.  139 

the  good  and  evil,  virtue  and  vice,  which  are  ex- 
hibited in  human  life."  (Dugald  Stewart,  vol.  6. 
p.  276,  note.) 

Cousin  remarks,  too,  that  Spinosa  deserves 
rather  the  reproacli  of  pantheism  than  of  atheism. 
His  pantheism  was  fairly  deduced  from  the  doctrine 
of  necessary  determination,  which  he  advocated. 

XVIII.  Spinosa,  however,  is  generally  consid- 
ered an  atheist.  "  It  will  not  be  disputed,"  say3 
Stewart,  M  by  those  who  comprehend  the  drift  of 
his  reasonings,  that  in  point  of  practical  tendency 
atheism  and  Spinosism  are  one  and  the  same." 

The  following  is  Cousin's  view  of  his  system. 
It  apparently  differs  from  the  preceding  in  some 
respects,  but  really  tends  to  the  same  conclusions. 

"Instead  of  accusing  Spinosa  of  atheism,  he 
ought  to  be  reproached  for  an  error  in  the  other 
direction.  Spinosa  starts  from  the  perfect  and 
infinite  being  of  Descartes's  system,  and  easily 
demonstrates  that  such  a  being  is  alone  a  being 
in  itself;  but  that  a  being,  finite,  imperfect,  and 
relative,  only  participates  of  being,  without  pos- 
sessing it,  in  itself:  that  a  being  in  itself  is  one 
necessarily  :  that  there  is  but  one  substance  ;  and 
that  all  that  remains  has  only  a  phenomenal  ex- 
istence :  that  to  call  phenomena,  finite  substances, 
is   affirming    and    denying,    at   the    same   time ; 


1  40  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

whereas,  there  being  but  one  substance  which 
possesses  being  in  itself,  and  the  finite  being  that 
which  participates  of  existence  without  possessing 
it  in  itself,  a  substance  finite  implies  two  contra- 
dictory notions.  Thus,  in  the  philosophy  of  Spi- 
nosa,  man  and  nature  are  pure  phenomena  ;  sim- 
ple attributes  of  that  one  and  absolute  substance, 
but  attributes  which  are  co-eternal  with  their  sub- 
stance :  for  as  phenomena  cannot  exist  without  a 
subject,  the  imperfect  without  the  perfect,  the 
finite  without  the  infinite,  and  man  and  nature 
suppose  God  ;  so  likewise,  the  substance  cannot 
exist  without  phenomena,  the  perfect  without  the 
imperfect,  the  infinite  without  the  finite,  and  God 
on  his  part  supposes  man  and  nature.  The  error 
of  his  system  lies  in  the  predominance  of  the  re- 
lation of  phenomenon  to  being,  of  attribute  to  sub- 
stance, over  the  relation  of  effect  to  cause.  When 
man  has  been  represented,  not  as  a  cause,  volun- 
tary and  free,  but  as  necessary  and  uncontrollable 
desire,  and  as  an  imperfect  and  finite  thought ; 
God,  or  the  supreme  pattern  of  humanity,  can  be 
only  a  substance,  and  not  a  cause  —  a  being,  per- 
fect, infinite,  necessary — the  immutable  substance 
of  the  universe,  and  not  its  producing  and  creating 
cause.  In  Cartesianism,  the  notion  of  substance 
figures  more  conspicuously  than  that  of  cause  ; 


edwards's  system.  141 

and  this  notion  of  substance,  altogether  predomi- 
nating, constitutes  Spinosism."  (Hist,  de  la  Phil, 
torn.  1.  p.  4GG.) 

The  predominance  of  the  notion  of  substance 
and  attribute,  over  that  of  cause  and  effect,  which 
Cousin  here  pronounces  the  vice  of  Spinosa's  sys- 
tem, is  indeed  the  vice  of  every  system  which 
contains  the  dogma  of  the  necessary  determina- 
tion of  will.  The  first  consequence  is  pantheism  ; 
the  second,  atheism.  I  will  endeavour  to  explain. 
When  self-determination  is  denied  to  will,  and  it 
is  resolved  into  mere  desire,  necessitated  in  all  its 
acts  from  its  pre-constituted  correlation  with  ob- 
jects, then  will  really  ceases  to  be  a  cause.  It 
becomes  an  instrument  of  antecedent  power,  but 
is  no  power  in  itself,  creative  or  productive.  The 
reasoning  employed  in  reference  to  the  human 
will,  applies  in  all  its  force  to  the  divine  will,  as 
has  been  already  abundantly  shown.  The  divine 
will  therefore  ceases  to  be  a  cause,  and  becomes 
a  mere  instrument  of  antecedent  power.  This 
antecedent  power  is  the  infinite  and  necessary 
wisdom ;  but  infinite  and  necessary  wisdom  is 
eternal  and  unchangeable  ;  what  it  is  now,  it  al- 
ways was ;  what  tendencies  or  energies  it  has 
now,  it  always  had  ;  and  therefore,  whatever  vo- 
litions it  now  necessarily  produces,  it  always  ne- 


142  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

ccssarily  produced.  If  we  conceive  a  volition  to 
have  been,  in  one  direction,  the  immediate  and 
necessary  antecedent  of  creation  ;  and,  in  another, 
the  immediate  and  necessary  sequent  of  infinite, 
and  eternal,  and  necessary  wisdom  ;  then  this  vo- 
lition must  have  always  existed,  and  consequently, 
creation,  as  the  necessary  effect  of  this  volition, 
must  have  always  existed.  The  eternal  and  infi- 
nite wisdom  thus  becomes  the  substance,  because 
this  is  existence  in  itself,  no  antecedent  being  con- 
ceivable ;  and  creation,  consisting  of  man  and  na- 
ture, imperfect  and  finite,  participating  only  of  ex- 
istence, and  not  being  existence  in  themselves,  are 
not  substances,  but  phenomena.  But  what  is  the 
relation  of  the  phenomena  to  the  substance  ?  Not 
that  of  effect  to  cause;  —  this  relation  slides  en- 
tirely out  of  view,  the  moment  will  ceases  to  be  a 
cause.  It  is  the  relation  simply  of  phenomena  to 
being,  considered  as  the  necessary  and  insepara- 
ble manifestations  of  being  ;  the  relation  of  attri- 
butes to  substance,  considered  as  the  necessary 
and  inseparable  properties  of  substance.  We  can- 
not conceive  of  substance  without  attributes  or 
phenomena,  nor  of  attributes  or  phenomena  with- 
out substance  ;  they  are,  therefore,  co-eternal  in 
this  relation.  Who  then  is  God  ?  Substance  and 
its  attributes  ;  being  and  its  phenomena.    In  other 


edwards's  system.  143 

words,  the  universe,  as  made  up  of  substance  and 
attributes,  is  God.  This  is  Spinosism  ;  this  is  pan- 
theism ;  and  it  is  the  first  and  legitimate  conse- 
quence of  a  necessitated  will. 

The  second  consequence  is  atheism.  In  the 
denial  of  will  as  a  cause  per  se,  —  in  resolving  all 
its  volitions  into  the  necessary  phenomena  of  the 
eternal  substance,  —  we  destroy  personality  :  wo 
have  nothing  remaining  but  the  universe.  Now 
we  may  call  the  universe  God  ;  but  with  equal 
propriety  we  call  God  the  universe.  This  destruc- 
tion of  personality,  —  this  merging  of  God  into 
necessary  substance  and  attributes,  —  is  all  that 
we  mean  by  Atheism.  The  conception  is  really 
the  same,  whether  we  name  it  fate,  pantheism, 
or  atheism. 

The  following  remark  of  Dugald  Stewart, 
shows  that  he  arrived  at  the  same  result :  "  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  doctrines  of  some  of  the 
ancient  atheists  about  man's  free  agencv,  it  will 
not  be  denied  that,  in  the  history  of  modern  phi- 
losophy, the  schemes  of  atheism  and  of  necessitv 
have  been  hitherto  always  connected  together. 
Not  that  I  would  by  any  means  be  understood  to 
say.  that  every  necessitarian  must  ipso  facto  be 
an  atheist,  or  even  that  any  presumption  is  afford- 
ed, by  a  man's  attachment  to  the  former  sect,  of 


Mi  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

his  having  the  slightest  bias  in  favour  of  the  lat- 
ter :  hut  only  that  ever}'  modern  atheist  I  have 
heard  of  has  been  a  necessitarian.  I  cannot  help 
adding,  that  the  most  consistent  necessitarians 
who  have  yet  appeared,  have  been  those  who 
followed  out  their  principles  till  they  ended  in 
Spinosism,  —  a  doctrine  which  differs  from  athe- 
ism more  in  words  than  in  reality."  (Vol.  6, 
p.  470.) 

Cudworth,  in  his  great  work  entitled  "  The 
true  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe,"  shows 
clearly  the  connexion  between  fatalism  and 
atheism.  This  work  seems  to  have  grown  out 
of  another  undertaking,  which  contemplated  spe- 
cifically the  question  of  liberty  and  necessity,  and 
its  bearing  upon  morality  and  religion.  The  pas- 
sage in  the  preface,  in  which  he  informs  us  of  his 
original  plan,  is  a  very  full  expression  of  his  opin- 
ion. "  First,  therefore,  I  acknowledge,"  says  he, 
"  that  when  I  engaged  the  press,  I  intended  only 
a  discourse  concerning  liberty  and  necessity,  or, 
to  speak  out  more  plainly,  against  the  fatal  neces- 
sity of  all  actions  and  events  ;  which,  upon  what- 
soever grounds  or  principles  maintained,  will,  as 
we  conceive,  serve  the  design  of  atheism,  and  un- 
dermine Christianity,  and  all  religion,  as  taking 
away  all  guilt  and  blame,  punishments  and  re- 


edwards's  system.  145 

wards,  and  plainly  rendering  a  day  of  judgement 
ridiculous."  This  opinion  of  the  tendency  of  the 
doctrine  of  a  necessitated  will,  is  the  germ  of  his 
work.  The  connexion  established  in  his  mind  be- 
tween this  doctrine  and  atheism,  naturally  led 
him  to  his  masterly  and  elaborate  exposition  and 
refutation  of  the  latter. 

The  arguments  of  many  atheists  might  be  re- 
ferred to,  to  illustrate  the  connexion  between  ne- 
cessity and  atheism.  I  shall  here  refer,  how- 
ever, to  only  one  individual,  remarkable  both  for 
his  poetic  genius  and  metaphysical  acumen.  I 
mean  the  late  Piercy  Bysshe  Shelley.  He  openly 
and  unblushingly  professed  atheism.  In  his  Queen 
Mab  we  find  this  line  :  "  There  is  no  God."  In 
a  note  upon  this  line,  he  remarks  :  "  This  nega- 
tion must  be  understood  solely  to  affect  a  creative 
Deity.  The  hypothesis  of  a  pervading  spirit,  co- 
eternal  with  the  universe,  remains  unshaken." 
This  last  hypothesis  is  Pantheism.  Pantheism  is 
really  the  negation  of  a  creative  Deity,  —  the 
identity  or  at  least  necessary  and  eternal  co-exist- 
ence of  God  and  the  universe.  Shelley  has  ex- 
pressed this  clearly  in  another  passage  : 

"Spirit  of  nature!  all-sufficing  power, 
Necessity  !  thou  mother  of  the  world  !"' 

In  a  note  upon  this  passage,  Shelley  has  ar- 
13 


1  50  CONSSQUZlfCE 

gw  .I  the  doctrine  of  the  necessary  determination 
of  will  by  motive,  with  an  acuteness  and  power 
scarcely  inferior  to  Collins  or  Edwards.  lie 
makes,  indeed,  a  different  application  of  the  doc- 
trim  i,  but  a  perfectly  legitimate  one.  Collins  and 
Edwards,  and  the  whole  race  of  necessitarian 
theologians,  evidently  toil  under  insurmountable 
difficulties,  while  attempting  to  base  religion  upon 
this  doctrine,  and  effect  their  escape  only  under  a 
fog  of  subtleties.  But  Shelley,  in  daring  to  be 
perfectly  consistent,  is  perfectly  clear.  He  fear- 
lessly proceeds  from  necessity  to  pantheism,  and 
thence  to  atheism  and  the  destruction  of  all  mor- 
al distinctions.  "  We  are  taught,"  he  remarks, 
u  by  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  that  there  is  neither 
good  nor  evil  in  the  universe,  otherwise  than  as 
the  events  to  which  we  apply  these  epithets  have 
relation  to  our  own  peculiar  mode  of  being.  Still 
less  than  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  God,  will  the 
doctrine  of  necessity  accord  with  the  belief  of  a 
future  state  of  punishment." 

I  here  close  my  deductions  from  this  system. 
If  these  deductions  be  legitimate,  as  I  myself  can- 
not doubt  they  are,  then,  to  the  largest  class  of 
readers,  the  doctrine  of  necessity  is  overthrown  : 
it  is  overthrown  by  its    consequences,  and  my 


ED\VARP>">   SYSTEM.  1  17 

argument  has  the  force  of  a  rcductio  ad  absurd  um. 
If  a  self-determined  will  appear  an  absurdity,  still 
it  cannot  be  as  absurd  as  the  contrary  doctrine,  if 
this  doctrine  involve  the  consequences  above  giv- 
en. At  least,  practical  wisdom  will  claim  that 
doctrine  which  leaves  to  the  world  a  God,  and  to 
man  a  moral  and  responsible  nature. 

A  question  will  here  very  naturally  arise  : 
How  can  we  account  for  the  fact  that  so  many 
wise  and  good  men  have  contended  for  a  neces- 
sitated will,  as  if  they  were  contending  for  the 
great  basis  of  all  morality  and  religion  l  For  ex- 
ample, take  Edwards  himself,  as  a  man  of  great 
thought  and  of  most  fervent  piety.  In  the  whole 
of  his  treatise,  he  argues  with  the  air  and  manner 
of  one  who  is  opposing  great  errors  as  really  con- 
nected with  a  self-determined  will.  What  can 
be  stronger  than  the  following  language  :  "  I  think 
that  the  notion  of  liberty,  consisting  in  a  contin- 
gent self-determination  of  the  will,  as  necessary  to 
the  morality  of  men's  dispositions  and  actions,  is 
almost  inconceivably  pernicious ;  and  that  the 
contrary  truth  is  one  of  the  most  important  truths 
of  moral  philosophy  that  ever  was  discussed,  and 
most  necessary  to  be  known."  The  question  is  a 
fair  one,  and  I  will  endeavour  to  answer  it. 

1.  The  impossibility  of  a  self-determining  will 


1  18  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

as  being  in  itself  a  contradictory  idea,  and  as 
leading  to  the  consequence  of  affirming  the  exist- 
ence of  elVects  without  causes,  takes  strong  hold 
of  the  mind  in  these  individuals.  This  I  believe, 
and  hope  to  prove  in  the  course  of  this  treatise, 
to  be  a  philosophical  error;  —  but  it  is  no  new 
thills  for  great  and  good  men  to  fall  into  philoso- 
phical errors. 

As,  therefore,  the  liberty  consisting  in  a  self-de- 
termining will,  or  the  liberty  of  indifference,  as  it 
has  been  technically  called,  is  conceived  to  be  ex- 
ploded, they  endeavour  to  supply  a  liberty  of 
spontaneity,  or  a  liberty  lying  in  the  unimpeded 
connexion  between  volition  and  sequents. 

Hobbes  has  defined  and  illustrated  this  liberty 
in  a  clearer  manner  than  any  of  its  advocates : 
"  I  conceive,''  says  he,  "  liberty  to  be  rightly  de- 
fined,—  the  absence  of  all  impediments  to  action, 
that  are  not  contained  in  the  nature  and  intrinsi- 
cal  quality  of  the  agent.  As  for  example,  the 
water  is  said  to  descend  freely,  or  is  said  to  have 
liberty  to  descend  by  the  channel  of  the  river,  be- 
cause there  is  no  impediment  that  way  ;  but  not 
across,  because  the  banks  are  impediments :  and 
though  water  cannot  ascend,  yet  men  never  say, 
it  wants  the  liberty  to  ascend,  but  the  faculty  or 
power,  because  the  impediment  is  in  the  nature  of 


EDWAKDS'S   SYSTEM.  149 

the  water,  and  intrinsical.  So  also  we  say,  he 
that  is  tied,  wants  the  liberty  to  go,  because  the 
impediment  is  not  in  him,  but  in  his  hands;  where- 
as, we  say  not  so  of  him  who  is  sick  or  lame,  be- 
cause the  impediment  is  in  himself,"  —  that  is,  he 
wants  the  faculty  or  power  of  going  :  —  this  con- 
stitutes natural  inability.  Liberty  is  volition  act- 
ing upon  physical  instrumentalities,  or  upon  men- 
tal faculties,  according  to  a  fixed  and  constituted 
law  of  antecedents,  and  meeting  with  no  impedi- 
ment or  overcoming  antagonistic  power.  Natu- 
ral ability  is  the  fixed  and  constituted  antecedence 
itself.  Hence  there  may  be  natural  ability  with- 
out liberty ;  but  liberty  cannot  be  affirmed  with- 
out natural  ability.  Both  are  necessary  to  con- 
stitute responsibility.  Natural  ability  is  volition 
known  as  a  stated  antecedent  of  certain  effects. 
Liberty  is  this  antecedent  existing  without  impedi- 
ment or  frustration.  Since  this  is  the  only  possible 
liberty  remaining,  and  as  they  have  no  wish  to  be 
considered  fatalists,  they  enlarge  much  upon  this  ; 
not  only  as  the  whole  of  liberty  actually  existing, 
but  as  the  full  and  satisfactory  notion  of  liberty. 

In  basing  responsibility  and  praise  and  blame- 
worthiness upon  this  liberty,  an  appeal  is  made  to 
the  common  ideas,  feelings,  and  practices  of  men. 
Every  man  regards  himself  as  free  when  he  does 
13* 


150  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

as  he  pleases,  —  when,  if  he  pleases  to  walk,  he 
walks,  —  when,  if  he  pleases  to  sit  down,  he  sits 
down,  Sec.  If  a  man,  in  a  court  of  justice,  were 
to  plead  in  excuse  that  he  committed  the  crime 
because  he  pleased  or  willed  to  do  it,  the  judge 
would  reply  —  "  this  is  your  guilt,  that  you  pleased 
or  willed  to  commit  it :  nay,  your  being  pleased  or 
willing  to  commit  it  was  the  very  doing  of  it." 
Now  all  this  is  just.  I  readily  admit  that  we  are 
free  when  we  do  as  we  please,  and  that  we  arc 
guilty  when,  in  doing  as  we  please,  we  commit  a 
crime. 

Well,  then,  it  is  asked,  is  not  this  liberty  suffi- 
cient to  constitute  responsibility  ?  And  thus  the 
whole  difficulty  seems  to  be  got  over.  The  rea- 
soning would  be  very  fair,  as  far  as  it  goes,  if  em- 
ployed against  fatalists,  but  amounts  to  nothing 
when  employed  against  those  who  hold  to  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will.  The  latter 
receive  these  common  ideas,  feelings,  and  prac- 
tices of  men,  as  facts  indicative  of  freedom,  be- 
cause they  raise  no  question  against  human  free- 
dom. The  real  question  at  issue  is,  how  are  we 
to  account  for  these  facts  ?  The  advocates  of  self- 
determining  power  account  for  them  by  referring 
them  to  a  self-determined  will.  We  say  a  man 
is  free  when  he  does  as  he  pleases  or  according 
to  his  volitions,  and  has  the  sense  of  freedom  in 


edwards's  system.  151 

iiis  volitions,  because  he  determines  his  own  voli- 
tions ;  and  that  a  man  is  guilty  for  crime,  if  com- 
mitted by  his  volition,  because  he  determined  this 
volition,  and  at  the  very  moment  of  determining 
it,  was  conscious  of  ability  to  determine  an  oppo- 
posite  volition.  And  we  affirm,  also,  that  a  man 
is  free,  not  only  when  he  docs  as  he  pleases,  or, 
in  other  words,  makes  a  volition  without  any  im- 
pediment between  it  and  its  object,  —  he  is  free,  if 
he  make  the  volition  without  producing  effects 
by  it :  volition  itself  is  the  act  of  freedom.  But 
how  do  those  who  deny  a  self-determining  pow- 
er account  for  these  facts  ?  They  say  that  the 
volition  is  caused  by  a  motive  antecedent  to  it, 
but  that  nevertheless,  inasmuch  as  the  man  feels 
that  he  is  free  and  is  generally  accounted  so,  he 
must  be  free  :  for  liberty  means  nothing  more  than 
"  power  and  opportunity  to  do  and  conduct  as  he 
will,  or  according  to  his  choice,  without  taking  in- 
to the  meaning  of  the  word  any  thing  of  the  cause 
of  that  choice,  or  at  all  considering  how  the  per- 
son came  to  have  such  a  volition," — that  is,  the 
man  is  free,  and  feels  himself  to  be  so,  when  he 
does  as  he  pleases,  because  this  is  all  that  is  meant 
by  freedom. 

But  suppose  the  objection  be  brought  up,  that 
the  definition  of  liberty  here  given  is  assumed,  ar- 


152  (  oN^EQUENCES   OF 

bitrary,  and  unsatisfactory  ;  and  that   the   sense 
or  consciousness  of  freedom  in  the  act  of  volition, 
and  the  common  sentiments  and  practices  of  men 
in  reference  to   voluntary  action,  are  not   ade- 
quately accounted  for,  —  then  the   advocates  of 
necessitated  volition  return  to  the  first  argument, 
of  the  impossibility  of  any  other  definition,  —  and 
affirm  that,  inasmuch  as  this  sense  of  freedom 
does  exist,  and  the  sentiments  and   practices  of 
men  generally  correspond  to  it,  we  must  believe 
that  we  are  free  when  volition  is  unimpeded  in 
its   connexion  with    sequents,  and   that   we  are 
blame  or  praiseworthy,  according  to  the  perceiv- 
ed character  of  our  volitions,  —  although  it  can- 
not but  be  true  that  the  volitions  themselves  are 
necessary.    On  the  one  hand,  they  are  compelled 
by  their  philosophy  to  deny   a  self-determining 
will.     On  the  other  hand,  they  are  compelled,  by 
their  moral  sense  and  religious  convictions,  to  up- 
hold moral  distinctions  and  responsibility.     In  or- 
der to  do  this,  however,  a  quasi  liberty  must  be 
preserved  :  hence  the  attempt  to  reconcile  liber- 
ty and  necessity,  by  referring  the  first  exclusively 
to  the   connexion   between   volition   and  its  se- 
quents, and  the  second  exclusively  to  the  connex- 
ion between  the  volition  and  its  antecedents  or 
motives.     Liberty  is  physical ;  necessity  is  meta- 


EDWAItDS's  SYSTEM.  153 

physical.  The  first  belongs  to  man  ;  the  second 
transcends  the  sphere  of  his  activity,  and  is  not 
his  concern.  In  this  very  difficult  position,  no 
better  or  more  ingenious  solution  could  be  devis- 
ed ;  but  that  it  is  wholly  illogical  and  ineffectual, 
and  forms  no  escape  from  absolute  and  universal 
necessity,  has  already  been  abundantly  proved. 

2.  The  philosophers  and  divines  of  whom  we 
are  speaking,  conceive  that  when  volitions  are 
supposed  to  exist  out  of  the  necessary  determina- 
tion of  motives,  they  exist  fortuitously  and  with- 
out a  cause.  But  to  give  up  the  necessary  and 
universal  dependence  of  phenomena  upon  causes, 
would  be  to  place  events  beyond  the  divine  con- 
trol :  nay,  more,  —  it  would  destroy  the  great 
a  posteriori  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  God. 
Of  course  it  wrould  be  the  destruction  of  all  mo- 
rality and  religion. 

3.  The  doctrine  of  the  divine  foreknowledge, 
in  particular,  is  much  insisted  upon  as  incompati- 
ble with  contingent  volitions.  Divine  foreknow- 
ledge, it  is  alleged,  makes  all  events  certain  and 
necessary.  Hence  volitions  are  necessary  ;  and, 
to  carry  out  the  reasoning,  it  must  be  added  like- 
wise that  the  connexion  between  volitions  and 
their  sequents  is  equally  necessary.  God  fore- 
sees the  sequent  of  the  volition  as  well  as  the  vo- 


164  CONSEQUENCE-   OF 

litidii.  The  theory,  however,  is  careful  to  pre- 
serve the  name  of  liberty,  because  it  fears  the  de- 
signation which  properly  belongs  to  it. 

4.  By  necessary  determination, the  sovereignty 
of  (-'id  ami  the  harmony  of  his  government  are 
preserved.  His  volitions  are  determined  by  his 
infinite  wisdom.  The  world,  therefore,  must  be 
ruled  in  truth  and  righteousness. 

These  philosophers  and  divines  thus  represent 
to  themselves  the  theory  of  a  self-determining 
will  as  an  absurdity  in  itself,  and,  if  granted  to  be 
true,  as  involving  the  most  monstrous  and  disas- 
trous consequences,  while  the  theory  which  they 
advocate  is  viewed  only  in  its  favourable  points, 
and  without  reaching  forth  to  its  legitimate  con- 
sequences. If  these  consequences  are  urged  by 
another  hand,  they  are  sought  to  be  evaded  by 
concentrating  attention  upon  the  fact  of  volition 
and  the  sense  of  freedom  attending  it :  for  exam- 
ple, if  fatalism  be  urged  as  a  consequence  of  this 
theory,  the  ready  reply  is  invariably  — "  No  such 
necessity  is  maintained  as  goes  to  destroy  the  lib- 
erty which  consists  in  doing  as  one  pleases ;"  or 
if  the  destruction  of  responsibility  be  urged  as  a 
consequence,  the  reply  is  —  "A  man  is  always 
held  a  just  subject  of  praise  or  blame  when  he 
acts  voluntarily."     The  argumentation  undoubt-- 


edwards's  system.  155 

edly  is  as  sincere  as  it  is  earnest.  The  interests 
at  stake  are  momentous.  They  are  supposed  to 
perish,  if  this  philosophy  be  untrue.  No  wonder, 
then,  that,  reverencing  and  loving  morality  and  re- 
ligion, they  should  by  every  possible  argument  aim 
to  sustain  the  philosophy  which  is  supposed  to  lie 
at  their  basis,  and  look  away  from  consequences 
so  destructive,  persuading  themselves  that  these 
consequences  are  but  the  rampant  sophistries  of 
infidelity. 

It  is  a  wonderful  fact  in  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy, that  the  philosophy  of  fate,  pantheism,  and 
atheism,  should  be  taken  as  the  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion. Good  men  have  misapprehended  the  phi- 
losophy, and  have  succeeded  in  bringing  it  into 
fellowship  with  truth  and  righteousness.  Bad 
men  and  erring  philosophers  have  embraced  it  in 
a  clear  understanding  of  its  principles,  and  have 
both  logically  reasoned  out  and  fearlessly  owned 
its  consequences. 

XIX.  Assuming,  for  the  moment,  that  the  defi- 
nition of  liberty  given  by  the  theologians  above 
alluded  to,  is  the  only  possible  definition,  it  must 
follow  that  the  most  commonly  received  modes 
of  preaching  the  truths  and  urging  the  duties  of 
religion  are  inconsistent  and  contradictory. 

A  class  of  theologians  has  been  found  in  the 


156  COMBSQUBlfCBfl  OF 

church,  who,  perhaps  without  intending  absolute- 
ly to  deny  human  freedom,  have  denied  all  abili- 
ty on  the  part  of  man  to  comply  with  the  divine 
precepts.  A  generic  distinction  between  inability 
and  a  want  of  freedom  is  not  tenable,  and  cer- 
tainly is  of  no  moment,  where,  as  in  this  rase,  the 
inability  contended  for  is  radical  and  absolute. 

These  theologians  clearly  perceived,  that  if  vo- 
lition is  necessarily  determined  by  motive,  and  if 
motive  lies  in  the  correlation  of  desire  and  object, 
then,  in  a  being  totally  depraved,  or  a  being  of 
radically  corrupt  desires,  there  can  be  no  ability 
to  good  deeds :  the  deed  is  as  the  volition,  and 
the  volition  is  as  the  strongest  desire  or  the  sense 
of  the  most  agreeable. 

Hence  these  theologians  refer  the  conversion 
of  man  exclusively  to  divine  influence.  The  man 
cannot  change  his  own  heart,  nor  employ  any 
means  to  that  end  ;  for  this  would  imply  a  volition 
for  which,  according  to  the  supposition,  he  has  no 
ability. 

Now,  at  the  same  time,  that  this  class  represent 
men  as  unable  to  love  and  obey  the  truths  of  reli- 
gion, they  engage  with  great  zeal  in  expounding 
these  truths  to  their  minds,  and  in  urging  upon 
them  the  duty  of  obedience.  But  what  is  the  aim 
of  this  preaching  ?  Perhaps  one  will  reply,  I  know 


UNIVERSIT 


EDWARDS  S   SYSTKM. 


the  man  cannot  determine  himself  to  obedience, 
but  in  preaching  to  him,  I  am  presenting  motives 
which  may  influence  him.  But  in  denying  his 
ability  to  do  good,  you  deny  the  possibility  of 
moving  him  by  motives  drawn  from  religious 
truth  and  obligation.  His  heart,  by  supposition,  is 
not  in  correlation  with  truth  and  duty  ;  the  more, 
therefore,  you  preach  truth  and  duty,  the  more 
intense  is  the  sense  of  the  disagreeable  which  you 
awaken.  As  when  you  present  objects  to  a  man's 
mind  which  are  correlated  to  his  feelings,  the 
more  clearly  and  frequently  you  present  them,  the 
more  you  advance  towards  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable  or  choice.  So  when  you  present  ob- 
jects which  are  not  correlated  to  his  feelings,  the 
more  clearly  and  frequently  you  present  them, 
the  more  you  must  advance  towards  the  sense  of 
the  most  disagreeable,  or  positive  refusal. 

If  it  be  affirmed,  in  reply  to  this,  that  the  pre- 
sentation of  truth  forms  the  occasion  or  condition 
on  which  the  divine  influence  is  exerted  for  the 
regeneration  of  the  heart,  then  I  ask,  why  do  you 
urge  the  man  to  repent,  and  believe,  and  love 
God,  and  discharge  religious  duty  generally,  and 
rebuke  him  for  sin,  when  you  know  that  he  is 
utterly  unable  to  move,  in  the  slightest  degree, 
towards  any  of  these  affections  and  actions,  and 
14 


158  CONSEQUENCES    OF 

utterly  unable  to  leave  off  sinning,  until  the  divine 
influence  be  exerted,  which  brings  his  heart  into 
correlation  with  religion, and  makes  it  possible  for 
him  to  put  forth  the  volitions  of  piety  and  duty? 
It  can  be  regarded  in  no  other  light  than  playing 
a  solemn  farce,  thus  to  rebuke  and  urge  and  per- 
suade, as  if  the  man  ought  to  make  some  exertion 
when  you  feel  convinced  that  exertion  is  impossi- 
ble. It  certainly  can  form  no  occasion  for  divine 
interposition,  unless  it  be  in  pity  of  human  folly. 
If  you  say  that  such  a  course  does  succeed  in  the 
conversion  of  men,  then  we  are  constrained  to 
believe  that  your  philosophy  is  wrong,  and  that 
your  practice  succeeds,  because  inconsistent  with 
it,  and  really  belonging  to  some  other  system 
which  you  know  not,  or  understand  not  and  deny. 
A  total  inability  to  do  good  makes  man  the 
passive  subject  of  influences  to  be  employed  for 
his  regeneration,  and  he  can  no  more  be  consid- 
ered active  in  effecting  it  than  he  is  in  the  process 
of  digesting  food,   or  in  the   curative    action  of 

DO  * 

medicines  upon  any  diseased  part  of  his  system. 
If  you  urge  him  to  exert  himself  for  his  regenera- 
tion, you  urge  him  to  put  forth  volitions  which, 
according  to  this  philosophy,  are  in  no  sense  pos- 
sible until  the  regeneration  has  been  effected,  or 
at  least  commenced. 


edwards's  system.  159 

I  will  go  one  step  farther  in  this  reasoning :  — 
on  supposition  of  total  inability,  not  only  is  the  in- 
dividual a  passive  subject  of  regenerating  influ- 
ences, but  he  is  also  incapable  of  regeneration,  or 
any  disposition  or  tendency  towards  regeneration, 
from  any  influences  which  lie  merely  in  motives, 
produced  by  arraying  objects  before  the  mind. 
Motive,  according  to  the  definition,  exhibited  in 
the  statement  of  Edwards's  system,  lies  in  the 
nature  and  circumstances  of  the  object  standing 
in  correlation  with  the  state  of  mind.  Now  the 
state  of  mind,  in  an  unregenerate  state,  is  a  state 
represented  by  this  system  itself,  as  totally  adverse 
to  the  objects  of  religion.  Hence,  there  is  no 
conceivable  array  of  religious  truth,  and  no  con- 
ceivable religious  exhortation  and  persuasion  that 
could  possibly  come  into  such  a  relation  to  this 
state  of  mind  as  to  form  the  motive  of  a  religious 
choice  or  volition.  It  is  perfectly  plain,  that  be- 
fore such  a  result  could  take  place,  the  state  of 
mind  itself  would  have  to  be  changed.  But  as 
the  array  of  religious  truth  and  the  energy  of  reli- 
gious exhortation  must  fail  to  produce  the  requir- 
ed volitions,  on  account  of  the  state  of  mind,  so 
neither  can  the  state  of  mind  be  changed  by  this 
array  of  truth  or  by  this  exhortation.  There  is  a 
positive  opposition  of  mind  and  object,  and  the 


100  CONSEQUENCES   OF 

collision  becomes  more  severe  upon  every  attempt 
to  bring  them  together.  It  must  follow,  therefore, 
that  preaching  truth  and  duty  to  the  unregcnerate, 
so  far  from  leading  to  their  conversion,  can  only 
serve  to  call  out  more  actively  the  necessary  de- 
termination, not  to  obey.  The  very  enlightening 
of  the  intelligence,  as  it  gives  a  clearer  perception 
of  the  disagreeable  objects,  only  increases  the  dis- 
inclination. 

Nor  can  we  pause  in  this  consequence,  at  human 
instrumentality.  It  must  be  equally  true,  that  if 
divine  interposition  lies  in  the  presentation  of  truth 
and  persuasions  to  duty,  only  that  these  are  given 
with  tenfold  light  and  power,  it  must  fail  of  accom- 
plishing regeneration,  or  of  producing  any  tenden- 
cy towards  regeneration.  The  heart  being  in  no 
correlation  with  these, — its  sense  of  the  disagree- 
able,— and  therefore  the  energy  of  its  refusal  will 
only  be  the  more  intense  and  decided. 

If  it  should  be  remarked  that  hope  and  fear  are 
feelings,  which,  even  in  a  state  of  unregeneracy, 
can  be  operated  upon,  the  state  of  things  is  equally 
difficult.  No  such  hope  can  be  operated  upon  as 
implies  desire  after  religious  principles  and  enjoy- 
ments ;  for  this  cannot  belong  to  the  corrupt  na- 
ture ;  nor  can  any  fear  be  aroused  which  implies 
a  reverence  of  the  divine  purity,  and  an  abhor- 


EDW.VUDs's  SYSTEM.  10] 

rence  of  sin.  The  fear  could  only  relate  to  dan- 
ger and  suffering ;  and  the  hope,  to  deliverance 
and  security,  independently  of  moral  qualities. 
The  mere  excitement  of  these  passions  might 
awaken  attention,  constrain  to  an  outward  obedi- 
ence, and  form  a  very  prudent  conduct,  but  could 
effect  no  purification  of  the  heart. 

There  is  another  class  of  theologians,  of  whom 
Edwards  is  one,  who  endeavour  to  escape  the 
difficulties  which  attend  a  total  inability, by  making 
the  distinction  of  moral  and  natural  inability :  — 
man,  they  say,  is  morally  unable  to  do  good,  and 
naturally  able  to  do  good,  and  therefore  he  can 
justly  be  made  the  subject  of  command,  appeal, 
rebuke,  and  exhortation.  The  futility  of  this  dis- 
tinction I  cannot  but  think  has  already  been  made 
apparent.  It  may  be  well,  however,  inasmuch  as 
so  great  stress  is  laid  upon  it,  to  call  up  a  brief 
consideration  of  it  in  this  particular  connexion. 

Moral  inability,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  impos- 
sibility of  a  given  volition,  because  there  are  no 
motives  or  causes  to  produce  it.  It  is  simply  the 
impossibility  of  an  effect  for  the  want  of  a  cause  : 
when  we  speak  of  moral  cause  and  effect,  accord- 
ing to  Edwards,  we  speak  of  nothing  different  from 
physical  cause  and  effect,  except  in  the  quality  of 
the  terms  —  the  relation  of  the  terms  is  the  same. 
14* 


1G'2  CONSEQUENCES    OF 

The  impossibility  of  a  given  volition,  therefore, 
when  the  appropriate  motive  is  wanting,  is  equal 
to  the  impossibility  of  freezing  water  in  the  sun 
of  a  summer's  noon-tide.* 

When  objects  of  volition  are  fairly  presented, 
an  inability  to  choose  them  must  lie  in  the  state 
of  the  mind,  sensitivity,  desire,  will,  or  affections, 
for  all  these  have  the  same  meaning  according  to 
this  system.  There  is  no  volition  of  preference 
where  there  is  no  motive  to  this  effect ;  and  there  is 
no  motive  to  this  effect  where  the  state  of  the  mind 
is  not  in  correlation  with  the  objects  presented  : 
on  the  contrary,  the  volition  which  now  takes 
place,  is  a  volition  of  refusal. 

Natural  inability,  as  defined  by  this  system,  lies 
in  the  connexion  between  the  volition  considered 
as  an  antecedent,  and  the  effect  required.  Thus 
I  am  naturally  unable  to  walk,  when,  although  I 


*  "It  is  remarkable  that  the  advocates  for  necessity  have  adopt- 
ed a  distinction  made  use  of  for  other  purposes,  and  forced  it  into 
their  service ;  I  mean  moral  and  natural  necessity.  They  say 
natural  or  physical  necessity  takes  away  liberty,  but  moral  ne- 
cessity does  not :  at  the  same  time  they  explain  moral  necessity 
so  as  to  make  it  truly  physical  or  natural.  That  is  physical  ne- 
cessity which  is  the  invincible  effect  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  it  is 
neither  less  natural,  nor  less  insurmountable,  if  it  is  from  the 
laws  of  spirit  than  it  would  be  if  it  were  from  the  laws  of  matter." 
—  (Witherspoon's  Lectures  on  Divinity,  lect.  xiii.) 


BDWABDS's  system.  103 

make  the  volition,  my  limbs,  through  weakness  or 
disease,  do  not  obey.  Any  defect  in  the  powers 
or  instrumentalities  dependent  for  activity  upon 
volition,  or  any  impediment  which  volition  cannot 
surmount,  constitutes  natural  inability.*  Accord- 
ing to  this  system,  I  am  not  held  responsible  for 
anything  which,  through  natural  inability,  cannot 
be  accomplished,  although  the  volition  is  made. 
But  now  let  us  suppose  that  there  is  no  defect  in 
the  powers  or  instrumentalities  dependent  for 
activity  upon  volition,  and  no  impediment  which 
volition  cannot  surmount,  so  that  there  need  be 
only  a  volition  in  order  to  have  the  effect,  and 
then  the  natural  ability  is  complete: — I  will  to 
walk,  and  I  walk. 

Now  it  is  affirmed  that  a  man  is  fairly  respon- 
sible for  the  doing  of  anything,  and  can  be  fairly 
urged  to  do  it  when  all  that  is  necessary  for  the 
doing  of  it  is  a  volition  —  although  there  may  be 
a  moral  inability  to  the  volition  itself. 

Nothing  it  seems  to  me  can  be  more  absurd 
than  this  distinction.     If  liberty  be  essential  to 

*  Natural  inability,  and  a  want  of  liberty,  arc  identified  in  this 
usage  ;  for  the  want  of  a  natural  faculty  essential  to  the  perform- 
ance of  an  action,  and  the  existence  of  an  impediment  or  antag- 
onistic force,  which  takes  from  a  faculty  supposed  to  exist,  the 
liberty  of  action,  have  the  same  bearing  upon  responsibility. 


H*>1  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

responsibility,  liberty,  as  we  have  clearly  shown, 
can  no  more  lie  in  the  connexion  between  volition 
and  its  effects,  than  in  the  connexion  between  vo- 
lition and  its  motives.  One  is  just  as  necessary 
as  the  other.  If  it  be  granted  to  be  absurd  with 
the  first  class  of  theologians  to  urge  men  to  do 
right  when  they  are  conceived  to  be  totally  una- 
ble to  do  right,  it  is  equally  so  when  they  are 
conceived  to  have  only  a  natural  ability  to  do 
right,  —  because  this  natural  ability  is  of  no  avail 
without  a  corresponding  moral  ability.  If  the 
volition  take  place,  there  is  indeed  nothing  to  pre- 
vent the  action ;  nay,  "the  very  willing  is  the  do- 
ing of  it ;"  but  then  the  volition  as  an  effect  can- 
not take  place  without  a  cause  ;  and  to  acknow- 
ledge a  moral  inability,  is  nothing  less  than  to  ac- 
knowledge that  there  is  no  cause  to  produce  the 
required  volition. 

The  condition  of  men  as  represented  by  the 
second  class  of  theologians,  is  not  really  different 
from  their  condition  as  represented  by  the  first 
class.  The  inability  under  both  representations 
is  a  total  inability.  In  the  utter  impossibility  of 
a  right  volition  on  these,  is  the  utter  impossibility 
of  any  good  deed. 

When  we  have  denied  liberty,  in  denying  a 
self-determining  power,  these  definitions  in  order 


edwards's  systkm.  1G5 

to  make  out  a  quasi  liberty  and  ability,  are  noth- 
ing but  ingenious  folly  and  plausible  deception. 

You  tell  the  man,  indeed,  that  he  can  if  he 
will  :  and  when  he  replies  to  you,  that  on  your 
own  principles  the  required  volition  is  impossible, 
you  refer  him  to  the  common  notions  of  mankind. 
According  to  these,  you  say  a  man  is  guilty  when 
he  forbears  to  do  right,  since  nothing  is  wanting 
to  right-doing  but  a  volition,  —  and  guilty  when 
he  does  wrong,  because  he  wills  to  do  wrong. 
According  to  these  common  notions,  too,  a  man 
may  fairly  be  persuaded  to  do  right,  when  noth- 
ing is  wanting  but  a  will  to  do  right.  But  do  we 
find  this  distinction  of  natural  and  moral  ability  in 
the  common  notions  of  men  ?  When  nothing  is 
required  to  the  performance  of  a  deed  but  a  vo- 
lition, do  men  conceive  of  any  inability  whatever  ? 
Do  they  not  feel  that  the  volition  has  a  metaphysi- 
cal possibility  as  well  as  that  the  sequent  of  the 
volition  has  a  physical  possibility  ?  Have  we 
not  at  least  some  reason  to  suspect  that  the  phi- 
losophy of  responsibility,  and  the  basis  of  rebuke 
and  persuasion  lying  in  the  common  notions  of 
men,  are  something  widely  different  from  the 
scheme  of  a  necessitated  volition  ? 

This  last  class  of  theologians,  equally  with  the 
first,  derive  all  the  force  of  their  preaching  from 


10G  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

a  philosophy,  upon  which  they  arc  compelled  to 
act,  but  which  they  stoutly  deny.  Let  them  car- 
ry out  their  philosophy,  and  fur  preaching  no 
place  remains. 

Preaching  can  produce  good  ellects  only  by 
producing  good  volitions  ;  and  good  volitions  can 
be  produced  only  by  good  motives:  but  good  mo- 
tives can  exist  under  preaching  only  when  the 
subjects  of  the  preaching  are  correlated  with  the 
state  of  mind.  But  by  supposition  this  is  not  the 
case,  for  the  heart  is  totally  depraved. 

To  urge  the  unregeneratc  man  to  put  forth  vo- 
litions in  reference  to  his  regeneration,  may  con- 
sist with  a  self-determining  power  of  will,  but  is 
altogether  irrelevant  on  this  system.  It  is  urging 
him  to  do  what  he  cannot  do  ;  and  indeed  what 
all  persuasion  must  fail  to  do  in  him  as  a  mere 
passive  subject.  To  assure  him  that  the  affair  is 
quite  easy,  because  nothing  is  required  of  him  but 
to  will,  is  equivalent  to  assuring  him  that  the  af- 
fair is  quite  easy,  because  it  will  be  done  when 
he  has  done  it.  The  man  may  reply,  the  affair 
would  indeed  be  quite  easy  if  there  existed  in  me 
a  motive  to  produce  the  volition  ;  but  as  there 
does  not,  the  volition  is  impossible.  And  as  I 
cannot  put  forth  the  volition  without  the  motive, 
so  neither  can  I  make  the  motive  which  is  to  pro- 


edwards's  system.  107 

duce  the  volition  —  for  then  an  effect  would  make 
its  cause.  What  I  cannot  do  for  myself,  I  fear 
neither  you,  nor  indeed  an  angel  from  heaven 
will  succeed  in  doing  for  me.  You  array  the 
truths,  and  duties,  and  prospects  of  religion  be- 
fore my  mind,  but  they  cannot  take  the  character 
ot  motives  to  influence  my  will,  because  they  are 
not  agreeable  to  my  heart. 

You  indeed  mean  well ;  but  do  you  not  per- 
ceive that  on  your  own  principles  all  your  zeal 
and  eloquence  must  necessarily  have  an  opposite 
effect  from  what  you  intend  ?  My  affections 
not  being  in  correlation  with  these  subjects,  the 
more  you  urge  them,  the  more  intense  becomes 
my  sense  of  the  most  disagreeable,  or  my  positive 
refusal ;  and  this,  my  good  friends,  by  a  necessity 
which  holds  us  all  alike  in  an  inevitable  and  ever- 
during  chain. 

It  is  plainly  impossible  to  escape  from  this  con- 
clusion, and  yet  maintain  the  philosophy.  All 
efforts  of  this  kind,  made  by  appealing  to  the 
common  sentiments  of  mankind,  we  have  seen 
are  self-contradictory.  It  will  not  do  to  press 
forward  the  philosophy  until  involved  in  difficulty 
and  perplexity,  and  then  to  step  aside  and  bor- 
row arguments  from  another  system  which  is  as- 
sumed to  be  overthrown.     There  is  no  necessity 


1G8  COlfSSQUBHCKS  OF 

more  absolute   and  sovereign,  than  a  logical  nc- 

i !  \  .  ■ 

Will.  The  Cardinal  principles  of  Edwards's 
system  in  the  sections  we  have  been  examining, 
from  which  the  above  consequences  are  deduced, 
are  the  three  following: 

1.  The  will  is  always  determined  by  the  strong- 
est motive. 

2.  The  strongest  motive  is  always  "  the  most 
agreeable." 

3.  The  will  is  necessarily  determined. 

*  It  is  but  justice  to  remark  here,  that  the  distinction  of  moral 
and  natural  inability  is  made  by  many  eminent  divines,  without 
intending  anything  so  futile  as  that  we  have  above  exposed.    By 
moral  inability  they  do  not  appear  to  mean  anything  which  really 
render  the  actions  required,  impossible  ;  but  such  an  impediment 
as  lies  in  corrupt  affections,  an  impediment  which  may  be  re- 
moved by  a  self-determination  to  the  use  of  means  and  applian- 
ces  graciously  provided  or  promised.     By  natural  ability  they 
mean  the  possession  of  all  the  natural  faculties  necessary  to  the 
performance  of  the  actions  required.     In  their  representations  of 
this  natural  ability,  they  proceed  according  to  a  popular  method, 
rather  than  a  philosophical.     They  affirm  this  natural  ability  as  a 
fact,  the  denial  of  which  involves  monstrous  absurdities,  but  they 
give  no  psychological  view  of  it.     This  task  I  shall  impose  upon 
myself  in  the  subsequent  volume.     I  shall  there  endeavour  to 
point  out  the  connexion  between  the  sensitivity  and  the  will,  both 
in  a  pure  and  a  corrupt  state,  —  and  explain  what  these  natural 
faculties  are,  which,  according  to  the  just  meaning  of  these  divines, 
form  the  ground  of  rebuke  and  persuasion,  and  constitute  respon- 
sibility. 


edwards's  system.  1G9 

I  shall  close  this  part  of  the  present  treatise 
with  a  brief  examination  of  the  reasoning  by 
which  he  endeavours  to  establish  these  points. 

The  reasoning  by  which  the  first  point  is  aimed 
to  be  established,  is  the  general  reasoning  respect- 
ins  cause  and  effect.  Volition  is  an  effect,  and 
must  have  a  cause.  Its  cause  is  the  motive  lying 
in  the  correlation  of  mind  and  object.  When 
several  physical  causes  conflict  with  each  other, 
we  call  that  the  strongest  which  prevails  and  pro- 
duces its  appropriate  effects,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  others.  So  also  where  there  are  several 
moral  causes  or  motives  conflicting  with  each 
other,  we  call  that  the  strongest  which  prevails. 
Where  a  physical  cause  is  not  opposed  by  any 
other  force,  it  of  course  produces  its  effect;  and 
in  this  case  we  do  not  say  the  strongest  cause 
produces  the  effect,  because  there  is  no  compari- 
son. So  also  there  are  cases  in  which  there  is 
but  one  moral  cause  or  motive  present,  when 
there  being  no  comparison,  we  cannot  affirm 
that  the  volition  is  determined  by  the  strongest 
motive  :  the  doing  of  something  may  be  en- 
tirely agreeable,  and  the  not  doing  of  it  may  be 
utterly  disagreeable  :  in  this  case  the  motive  is 
only  for  the  doing  of  it.  But  wherever  the  case 
contains  a  comparison  of  causes  or  of  motives,  it 

]5 


1^0  (  0N8EQUENCE8  OF 

must  be  true  that  the  effect  which  actually  takes 
place,  is  produced  by  the  strongest  cause  or  mo- 
tive. This  indeed  is  nothing  more  than  a  truism, 
or  a  mere  postulate,  as  if  we  should  say,  —  let  a 
cause  or  motive  producing  effects  be  called  the 
strongest.  It  may  be  represented,  also,  as  a  j)c- 
hiio  principii, or  reasoning  in  a  circle,  —  since  the 
proof  that  the  will  is  determined  by  the  strongest 
motive  is  no  other  than  the  fact  that  it  is  deter- 
mined. It  may  be  stated  thus  :  The  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive.  How  do  you 
know  this  ?  Because  it  is  determined.  How  does 
this  prove  it  ?  Because  that  which  determines  it 
must  be  the  strongest.* 

*  "  The  great  argument  that  men  are  determined  by  the  strong- 
est motives,  is  a  mere  equivocation,  and  what  logicians  call  pe- 
titio  principii.  It  is  impossible  even  to  produce  any  medium  of 
proof  that  it  is  the  strongest  motive,  except  that  it  has  prevailed. 
It  is  not  the  greatest  in  itself,  nor  docs  it  seem  to  be  in  all  re- 
spects the  strongest  to  the  agent ;  but  you  say  it  appears  strong- 
est in  the  meantime.  Why  ?  Because  you  arc  determined  by 
it.  Alas!  you  promised  to  prove  that  I  was  determined  by  the 
ttrongest  motive,  and  you  have  only  shown  that  I  had  a  motive 
when  I  acted.  But  what  has  determined  you  then  ?  Can  any 
effect  be  without  a  cause?  I  answer  —  supposing  my  self-de- 
termining power  to  exist,  it  is  as  real  a  cause  of  its  proper  and 
distinguishing  effect,  as  your  moral  necessity:  so  that  the  matter 
just  conies  to  a  stand,  and  is  but  one  and  the  same  thing  on  one 
side  and  o  1  the  other.'' —  (Withcrspoon's  Lectures,  lect.  xiii.) 


edwards's  system.  171 

Edwards  assumes,  also,  that  motive  is  the  cause 
of  volition.  This  assumption  he  afterwards  en- 
deavours indirectly  to  sustain,  when  he  argues 
against  a  self-determining  will.  If  the  will  do  not 
cause  its  own  volitions,  then  it  must  follow  that 
motive  is  the  cause.  The  argument  against  a 
self-determining  will  we  are  about  to  take  up. 

2.  Tlie  strongest  motive  is  always  the  most  agree- 
able. Edwards  maintains  that  the  motive  which 
always  prevails  to  cause  volition,  has  this  charac- 
teristic, —  that  it  is  the  most  agreeable  or  pleas- 
ant at  the  time,  and  that  volition  itself  is  nothing 
but  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable.  If  there 
should  be  but  one  motive  present  to  the  mind,  as 
in  that  case  there  would  be  no  comparison,  we 
presume  he  would  only  say  that  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  agreeable. 

But  how  are  we  to  know  whether  the  motive 
of  every  volition  has  this  characteristic  of  agreea- 
bleness,  or  of  most  agreeableness,  as  the  case  may 
be  ?  We  can  know  it  only  by  consulting  our  con- 
sciousness. If,  whenever  we  will,  we  find  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  identified  with  the 
volition,  and  if  we  are  conscious  of  no  power  of 
willing,  save  under  this  condition  of  willing  what 
is  most  agreeable  to  us,  then  certainly  there  re- 
mains no  farther  question  on  this  point.     The  de- 


172  CONSBQl  F.NCES  OF 

termination  of  consciousness  is  final.  Whether 
such  be  the  determination  of  consciousness,  we 
are  hereafter  to  consider. 

Does  I'M  wards  appeal  to  consciousness? 

He  does,  —  but  without  formally  announcing 
it.  The  following  passage  is  an  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness, and  contains  Edwards's  whole  thought 
on  this  subject :  "  There  is  scarcely  a  plainer  and 
more  universal  dictate  of  the  sense  and  experience 
of  mankind,  than  that  when  men  act  voluntarily, 
and  do  what  they  please,  then  they  do  what  suits 
them  best,  or  what  is  most  agreeable  to  them.  To 
say  that  they  do  what  jrfeases  them,  but  yet  what 
is  not  agreeable  to  them,  is  the  same  thing  as  to 
say,  they  do  what  they  please,  but  do  not  act  their 
pleasure  ;  and  that  is  to  say,  that  they  do  what 
they  please,  and  yet  do  not  what  they  please."  (p. 
25.)  Motives  differ  widely,  intrinsically  consider- 
ed. Some  are  in  accordance  with  reason  and 
conscience  ;  some  are  opposed  to  reason  and  con- 
science. Some  are  wise  ;  some  are  foolish.  Some 
are  good ;  some  are  bad.  But  whatever  may  be 
their  intrinsic  properties,  they  all  have  this  cha- 
racteristic of  agreeableness  when  they  cause  voli- 
tion ;  and  it  is  by  this  characteristic  that  their 
strength  is  measured.  The  appeal,  however, 
which  is  made  to  sustain  this,  is  made  in  a  way  to 


edwards's  system.  173 

beg  the  very  point  in  question.  Will  not  every 
one  admit,  that  "  when  men  act  voluntarily  and 
do  what  tlicy  please,  they  do  what  suits  them  best, 
and  what  is  most  agreeable  to  them  ?"  Yes.  Is 
it  not  a  palpable  contradiction,  to  say  that  men 
"do  what  pleases  them,"  and  yet  do  "  what  is  not 
agreeable  to  them,"  according  to  the  ordinary  use 
of  these  words?    Certainly. 

But  the  poiet  in  question  is,  whether  men,  act- 
ing voluntarily,  always  do  what  is  pleasing  to 
them  :  and  this  point  Edwards  assumes.  He  as- 
sumes it  here,  and  he  assumes  it  throughout  his 
treatise.  We  have  seen  that,  in  his  psychology, 
he  identifies  will  and  desire  or  the  affections  :  — 
hence  volition  is  the  prevailing  desire  or  affection, 
and  the  object  which  moves  the  desire  must  of 
course  appear  desirable,  or  agreeable,  or  pleas- 
ant ;  for  they  have  the  same  meaning.  If  men 
always  will  what  they  most  desire,  and  desire 
what  they  will,  then  of  course  when  they  act  vol- 
untarily, they  do  what  they  please  ;  and  when 
they  do  what  they  please,  they  do  what  suits 
them  best  and  is  most  agreeable  to  them. 

Edwards  runs  the  changes  of  these  words  with 
great  plausibility,  and  we  must  say  deceives  him- 
self as  well  as  others.  The  great  point,  —  wheth- 
er will  and  desire  are  one,  —  whether  the  volition 
15* 


1"  1  (  0N8BQITBNCE8  OF 

is  as  the  most  agreeable,  —  lie  takes  up  at  the  be- 
gioning  as  an  unquestionable  fact,  and  adheres  to 
throughout  as  such  ;  but  he  never  once  attempts 
an  analysis  of  consciousness  in  relation  to  it,  ade- 
quate and  satisfactory.  His  psychology  is  an  as- 
sumption. 

3.  The  will  is  necessarily  determined. 

How  does  Edwards  prove  this?  1.  On  the 
general  connexion  of  causes  and  effects.  Causes 
necessarily  produce  effects,  unless  resisted  and 
overcome  by  opposing  forces  ;  but  where  several 
causes  are  acting  in  opposition,  the  strongest  will 
necessarily  prevail,  and  produce  its  appropriate 
effects. 

Now,  Edwards  affirms  that  the  nature  of  the 
connexion  between  motives  and  volitions  is  the 
same  with  that  of  any  other  causes  and  effects. 
The  difference  is  merely  in  the  terms  :  and  when 
he  calls  the  necessity  which  characterizes  the 
connexion  of  motive  and  volition  "  a  moral  neces- 
sity." he  refers  not  to  the  connexion  itself,  but 
only  to  the  terms  connected.  In  this  reasoning 
he  plainly  assumes  tl.at  the  connexion  betveen 
cause  and  effect  in  general,  is  a  necessary  con- 
nexion ;  that  is,  all  causation  is  necessary.  A 
contingent,  self-determining  cause,  in  his  system, 
is  characterized  as  an  absurdity.     Hence  he  lays 


edwards's  system.  175 

himself  open  to  all  the  consequences  of  a  univer- 
sal and  absolute  necessity. 

2.  He  also  endeavours  to  prove  the  necessity 
of  volition  by  a  method  of  approximation,  (p.  33.) 
He  here  grants,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  that 
the  will  may  oppose  the   strongest  motive  in  a 
given  case  ;  but  then  he  contends  that  it  is  sup- 
posable  that  the  strength  of  the  motive  may  be 
increased  beyond  the  strength  of  the  will  to  resist, 
and  that  at  this  point,  on  the  general  law  of  cau- 
sation, the  determination  of  the  will  must  be  con- 
sidered necessary.     "  Whatever   power,"  he  re- 
marks, "  men  may  be   supposed  to  have  to  sur- 
mount difficulties,  yet  that  power  is  not  infinite." 
If  the  power  of  the  man  is  finite,  that  of  the  mo- 
tive may  be  supposed  to  be  infinite  :  hence  the 
resistance  of  the  man  must  at  last  be  necessarily 
overcome.     This   reasoning    seems   plausible   at 
first ;  but  a  little  examination,  I  think,  will  show 
it  to  be  fallacious.     Edwards  does  not  determine 
the  strength  of  motives  by  inspecting  their  intrin- 
sic qualities,  but  only  by  observing  their  degrees 
of  agrceableness.     But  agrecableness,  by  his  own 
representation,  is  relative,  —  relative  to  the  will 
or  sensitivity.   A  motive  of  infinite  strength  would 
be  a  motive  of  infinite  agrecableness,  and  could 
be  known  to  be  such  only  by  an  infinite  sense  of 


176      CONSBQUBirCM  Off  KDWARDs's  SYSTEM. 

agrecableness  in  the  man.  The  same  of  course 
must  hold  true  of  any  motive  less  than  infinite  : 
and  universally, whatever  be  the  degree  of  strength 
of  the  motive,  there  must  be  in  the  man  an  affec- 
tion of  corresponding  intensity.  Now,  if  there 
be  a  power  of  resistance  in  the  will  to  any  mo- 
tive, which  is  tending  strongly  to  determine  it, 
this  power  of  resistance,  according  to  Edwards, 
must  consist  of  a  sense  of  agrecableness  opposing 
the  other  motive,  which  is  likewise  a  sense  of 
agrecableness :  and  the  question  is  simply,  which 
shall  predominate  and  become  a  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable.  It  is  plain  that  if  the  first  be  in- 
creased, the  second  may  be  supposed  to  be  in- 
creased likewise  ;  if  the  first  can  become  infinite, 
the  second  can  become  infinite  likewise :  and 
hence  the  power  of  resistance  may  be  supposed 
always  to  meet  the  motive  required  to  be  resist- 
ed, and  a  point  of  necessary  determination  may 
never  be  reached. 

If  Edwards  should  choose  to  throw  us  upon  the 
strength  of  motives  intrinsically  considered,  then 
the  answer  is  ready.  There  are  motives  of  infi- 
nite strength,  thus  considered,  which  men  are 
continually  resisting  :  for  example,  the  motive 
which  urges  them  to  obey  and  love  God,  and  seek 
the  salvation  of  their  souls. 


III. 


EXAMINATION  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS 


AGAINST    A 


SELF-DETERMINING  WILL. 


III. 


AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS 
AGAINST  A  SELF-DETERMINING  AND 
CONTINGENT  WILL. 


Edwards's  first  and  great  argument  against  a 
self-determining  will,  is  given  in  part  II.  sec.  1,  of 
his  work,  and  is  as  follows  : 

The  will,—  or  the  soul,  or  man,  by  the  faculty  of 
willing,  effects  every  thing  within  its  power  as  a 
cause,  by  acts  of  choice.  "  The  will  determines 
which  way  the  hands  and  feet  shall  move,  by  an 
act  of  choice  ;  and  there  is  no  other  way  of  the 
will's  determining,  directing,  or  commanding  any 
thing  at  all."  Hence,  if  the  will  determines  it- 
self, it  does  it  by  an  act  of  choice  ;  "  and  if  it  has 
itself  under  its  command,  and  determines  itself  in 
its  own  actions,  it  doubtless  does  it  in  the  same 
way  that  it  determines  other  things  which  are  un- 
der its  command.''    But  if  the  will  determines  its 


180        EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

choice  by  its  choice,  then  of  course  we  have  an 
infinite  series  of  choices,  or  wc  have  a  first  choice 
which  is  not  determined  by  a  choice,  —  "which 
brings  us  directly  to  a  contradiction  ;  for  it  sup- 
poses an  act  of  the  will  preceding  the  first  act  in 
the  whole  train,  directing  and  determining  the 
rest ;  or  a  free  act  of  the  will  before  the  first  free 
act  of  the  will  :  or  else  we  must  come  at  last  to 
an  act  of  the  will  determining  the  consequent 
acts,  wherein  the  will  is  not  self-determined,  and 
so  is  not  a  free  act,  in  this  notion  of  freedom." 
(p.  43.) 

This  reasoning,  and  all  that  follows  in  the  at- 
tempt to  meet  various  evasions,  as  Edwards  terms 
them,  of  the  advocates  of  a  self-determining  will, 
depend  mainly  upon  the  assumption,  that  if  the 
will  determines  itself,  it  must  determine  itself  by 
an  act  of  choice  ;  that  is,  inasmuch  as  those  acts 
of  the  will,  or  of  the  soul,  considered  in  its  power 
of  willing,  or  in  its  personal  activity,  by  which  ef- 
fects are  produced  out  of  the  activity  or  will  itself, 
are  produced  by  acts  of  choice,  for  example, 
walking  and  talking,  rising  up  and  sitting  down  : 
therefore,  if  the  soul,  in  the  power  of  willing, 
cause  volitions,  it  must  cause  them  by  volitions. 
The  causative  act  by  which  the  soul  causes  voli- 
tions, must  itself  be  a  volition.     This  assumption 


A   SELF-DETERMINING    WILL.  181 

Edwards  does  not  even  attempt  to  sustain,  but 
takes  for  granted  that  it  is  of  unquestionable  va- 
lidity. If  the  assumption  be  of  unquestionable 
validity,  then  his  position  is  impregnable  ;  for 
nothing  can  be  more  palpably  absurd  than  the 
will  determining  volitions  by  volitions,  in  an  inter- 
minable series. 

Before  directly  meeting  the  assumption,  I  re- 
mark, that  if  it  be  valid,  it  is  fatal  to  all  causal- 
ity. Will  is  simply  cause  ;  volition  is  effect.  1 
affirm  that  the  will  is  the  sole  and  adequate 
cause  of  volition.  Edwards  replies  :  if  will  is 
the  cause  of  volition,  then,  to  cause  it,  it  must 
put  forth  a  causative  act;  but  the  only  act  of  will 
is  volition  itself:  hence  if  it  cause  its  own  voli- 
tions, it  must  cause  them  by  volitions. 

Now  take  any  other  cause :  there  must  be 
some  effect  which  according  to  the  general  views 
of  men  stands  directly  connected  with  it  as  its 
effect.  The  effect  is  called  the  phenomenon,  or 
that  by  which  the  cause  manifests  itself.  But 
how  does  the  cause  produce  the  phenomenon  ? 
By  a  causative  act:  —  but  this  causative  act,  ac- 
cording to  Edwards's  reasoning,  must  itself  be  an 
effect  or  phenomenon.  Then  this  effect  comes 
between  the  cause,  and  what  was  at  first  consid- 
ered the  immediate  effect :  but  the  effect  in  question 
16 


182         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

must  likewise  be  caused  by  a  causative  act ;  and 
(his  causative  act,  again,  being' an  effect,  must 
have  another  causative  ad  before  it ;  and  so  on, 

ad  infinitum.  We  have  here  then  an  infinite  se- 
ries of  causative  acts  —  an  absurdity  of  the  same 
kind,  with  an  infinite  series  of  volitions. 

It  follows  from  this,  that  there  can  be  no  cause 
whatever.  An  infinite  series  of  causative  acts, 
without  any  first,  being,  according  to  this  reason- 
ing, the  consequence  of  supposing  a  cause  to  cause 
its  own  acts,  it  must  therefore  follow,  that  a  cause 
does  not  cause  its  own  acts,  but  that  they  must 
be  caused  by  some  cause  out  of  the  cause.  But 
the  cause  out  of  the  cause  which  causes  the  cau- 
sative acts  in  question,  must  cause  these  causative 
acts  in  the  other  cause  by  a  causative  act  of  its 
0Wn  :  —  but  the  same  difficulties  occur  in  relation 
to  the  second  cause  as  in  relation  to  the  first ;  it 
cannot  cause  its  own  acts,  and  they  must  there- 
fore be  caused  out  of  itself  by  some  other  cause  ; 
and  so  on,  ad  infinitum.  We  have  here  again  the 
absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  causative  acts  ; 
and  also,  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of 
causes  without  a  first  cause.  Otherwise,  we  must 
come  to  a  first  cause  which  causes  its  own  acts, 
without  an  act  of  causation ;  but  this  is  impossi- 
ble, according  to  the  reasoning  of  Edwards.  As, 
therefore,  there  cannot  be  a  cause  causing  its  own 


A    SELF-DETERMINING    WILL.  183 

acts,  and  inasmuch  as  the  denial  of  this  leads  to 
the  absurdities  above  mentioned,  we  are  driven  to 
the  conclusion,  that  there  is  no  cause  whatever. 
Every  cause  must  either  cause  its  own  acts,  or  its 
acts  must  be  caused  out  of  itself.  Neither  of  these 
is  possible  ;  therefore,  there  is  no  cause. 

Take  the  will  itself  as  an  illustration  of  this  last 
consequence.  The  will  is  cause  ;  the  volition,  ef- 
fect. But  the  will  does  not  cause  its  own  voli- 
tion :  the  volition  is  caused  by  the  motive.  But 
the  motive,  as  a  cause,  must  put  forth  a  causative 
act  in  the  production  of  a  volition.  If  the  motive 
determine  the  will,  then  there  must  be  an  act  of 
the  motive  to  determine  the  will.  To  determine, 
to  cause,  is  to  do,  is  to  act.  But  what  determines 
the  act  of  the  motive  determining  the  act  of  the 
will  or  volition  ?  If  it  determine  its  own  act,  or 
cause  its  own  act,  then  it  must  do  this  by  a  pre- 
vious act,  according  to  the  principle  of  this  reason- 
ing ;  and  this  again  by  another  previous  act ;  and 
so  on,  ad  infinitum. 

Take  any  other  cause,  and  the  reasoning  must 
be  the  same. 

It  may  be  said  in  reply  to  the  above,  that  voli- 
tion is  an  effect  altogether  peculiar.  It  implies 
selection  or  determination  in  one  direction  rather 
than  in  another,  and  therefore  that  in  inquiring 


184         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

after  its  cause,  we  inquire  not  merely  after  the 
energy  which  makes  it  existent,  but  also  after  the 
cause  of  its  particular  determination  in  one  direc- 
tion rather  than  in  another.  "  The  question  is  not 
so  much,  how  a  spirit  endowed  with  activity  comes 
to  act,  as  why  it  exerts  such  an  act,  and  not  an- 
other ;  or  why  it  acts  with  a  particular  determi- 
nation ?  If  activity  of  nature  be  the  cause  why  a 
spirit  (the  soul  of  man,  for  instance)  acts  and  does 
not  lie  still ;  yet  that  alone  is  not  the  cause  why 
its  action  is  thus  and  thus  limited,  directed  and 
determined."    (p.  50.) 

Every  phenomenon  or  effect  is  particular  and 
limited.  It  must  necessarily  be  one  thing  and  not 
another,  be  in  one  place  and  not  in  another,  have 
certain  characteristics  and  not  others ;  and  the 
cause  which  determines  the  phenomenon,  may  be 
supposed  to  determine  likewise  all  its  properties. 
The  cause  of  a  particular  motion,  for  example, 
must,  in  producing  the  motion,  give  it  likewise  a 
particular  direction. 

Volition  must  have  an  object ;  something  is 
willed  or  chosen  ;  particular  determination  and 
direction  are  therefore  inseparable  from  every  vo- 
lition, and  the  cause  which  really  gives  it  a  being, 
must  necessarily  give  it  character,  and  particular 
direction  and  determination. 


A  SELF-DETERMINING   WILL.  185 

Selection  is  the  attribute  of  the  cause,  and  an- 
swers to  particular  determination  and  direction  in 
the  effect.  As  a  phenomenon  or  effect  cannot 
come  to  exist  without  a  particular  determination, 
so  a  cause  cannot  give  existence  to  a  phenomenon, 
or  effect,  without  selection.  There  must  neces- 
sarily be  one  object  selected  rather  than  another. 
Thus,  if  fire  be  thrown  among  various  substances, 
it  selects  the  combustibles,  and  produces  pheno- 
mena accordingly.  It  selects  and  gives  particu- 
lar determination.  We  cannot  conceive  of  cause 
without  selection,  nor  of  effect  without  a  particu- 
lar determination.  But  in  what  lies  the  selection  ? 
In  the  nature  of  the  cause  in  correlation  with  cer- 
tain objects.  Fire  is  in  correlation  with  certain 
objects,  and  consequently  exhibits  phenomena  only 
with  respect  to  them.  In  chemistry,  under  the 
title  of  affinities,  we  have  wonderful  exhibitions  of 
selection  and  particular  determination.  Now  mo- 
tive, according  to  Edwards,  lies  in  the  correlation 
of  the  nature  of  the  will,  or  desire,  with  certain 
objects ;  and  volition  is  the  effect  of  this  correla- 
tion. The  selection  made  by  will,  arising  from 
its  nature,  is,  on  the  principle  of  Edwards,  like  the 
selection  made  by  any  other  cause  :  and  the  par- 
ticular determination  or  direction  of  the  volition, 
in  consequence  of  this,  is  like  that  which  appears 
16* 


18G  EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS    AGAINST 

in  every  other  effect.  In  the  case  of  will,  what- 
ever effect  is  produced,  is  produced  of  necessity, 
by  ;i  pro-constitution  and  disposition  of  will  and 
objects,  just  as  in  the  case  of  any  other  cause. 

Prom  this  it  appears  sufficiently  evident,  that  on 
Edwards's  principles  there  is  no  such  difference 
between  volition  and  any  other  effect,  as  to  shield 
his  reasonings  respecting  a  self-determining  will, 
against  the  consequences  above  deduced  from 
them.  The  distinction  of  final  and  efficient  causes 
does  not  lie  in  his  system.  The  motive  is  that 
which  produces  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable, 
and  produces  it  necessarily,  and  often  in  opposi- 
tion to  reason  and  conscience ;  and  this  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable  is  choice  or  volition.  It  be- 
longs to  the  opposite  system  to  make  this  distinc- 
tion in  all  its  clearness  and  force  —  where  the 
efficient  will  is  distinguished,  both  from  the  per- 
suasions and  allurements  of  passion  and  desire, 
and  from  the  laws  of  reason  and  conscience. 

Thus  far  my  argument  against  Edwards's  as- 
sumption,—  that,  to  make  the  will  the  cause  of 
its  own  volitions,  is  to  make  it  cause  its  volitions 
by  an  act  of  volition,  —  has  been  indirect.  If  this 
indirect  argument  has  been  fairly  and  legitimately 
conducted,  few  probably  will  be  disposed  to  deny 
that  the  assumption  is  overthrown  by  its  conse- 


A.   SELF-DETEKMINI3C    WILL.  187 

quences.  In  addition  to  the  above,  however,  on 
a  subject  so  important,  a  direct  argument  will  not 
be  deemed  superfluous. 

Self-determining  will  means  simply  a  will  caus- 
ing its  own  volitions ;  and  consequently,  particu- 
larly determining  and  directing  them.  Will,  in 
relation  to  volition,  is  just  what  any  cause  is  in 
relation  to  its  effect.  Will  causing  volitions, 
causes  them  just  as  any  cause  causes  its  effects. 
There  is  no  intervention  of  anything  between  the 
cause  and  effect ;  between  will  and  volition.  A 
cause  producing  its  phenomena  by  phenomena,  is 
a  manifest  absurdity.  In  making  the  will  a  self- 
determiner,  we  do  not  imply  this  absurdity.  Ed- 
wards assumes  that  we  do,  and  he  assumes  it  as 
if  it  were  unquestionable. 

The  will,  he  first  remarks,  determines  all  our 
external  actions  by  volitions,  as  the  motions  of  the 
hands  and  feet.  He  next  affirms,  generally,  that 
all  which  the  will  determines,  it  determines  in  this 
way  ;  and  then  concludes,  that  if  it  determines  its 
own  volitions,  they  must  come  under  the  general 
law,  and  be  determined  by  volitions. 

The  first  position  is  admitted.  The  second,  in- 
volving the  last,  he  does  not  prove,  and  I  deny 
that  it  is  unquestionable. 

In  the  first  place,  it  cannot  legitimately  be  taken 


188  EXAMINATION   OK   AKUUMKNTS   AGAINST 

as  following  from  the  first.  The  relation  of  will 
to  the  sequents  of  its  volitions,  is  not  necessarily 

the  same  as  its  relation  to  its  volitions.  The  se- 
quents of  volitions  are  changes  or  modifications,  in 
external  nature,  or  in  parts  of  the  being  external 
to  the  will  ;  but  the  volitions  are  modifications  of 
the  will  itself.  Now  if  the  modification  of  exter- 
nal nature  by  the  will  can  be  effected  only  by  that 
modification  of  itself  called  volition,  how  does  it 
appear  that  this  modification  of  itself,  if  effected 
by  itself,  must  be  effected  by  a  previous  modifica- 
tion of  itself?  We  learn  from  experience,  that 
volitions  have  sequents  in  external  nature,  or  in 
parts  of  our  being  external  to  will ;  but  this  expe- 
rience teaches  us  nothing  respecting  the  produc- 
tion of  volitions.  The  acts  of  the  will  are  voli- 
tions, and  all  the  acts  of  wills  are  volitions  ;  but 
this  means  nothing  more  than  that  all  the  acts  of 
the  will  are  acts  of  the  will,  for  volition  means 
only  this  —  an  act  of  the  will.  But  has  not  the 
act  of  the  will  a  cause?  Yes,  you  have  assigned 
the  cause,  in  the  very  language  just  employed. 
It  is  the  act  of  the  will  —  the  will  is  the  cause. 
But  how  does  the  will  cause  its  own  acts  ?  I  do 
not  know,  nor  do  I  know  how  any  cause  exerts 
itself,  in  the  production  of  its  appropriate  pheno- 
mena; I  know  merely  the  facts.     The  connexion 


A  SELF-DETERMINING    WILL.  189 

between  volition  and  its  sequents,  is  just  as  won- 
derful and  inexplicable,  as  the  connexion  between 
will  and  its  volitions.  How  does  volition  raise  the 
arm  or  move  the  foot  ?  How  does  fire  burn,  or 
the  sun  raise  the  tides  ?  And  how  does  will  cause 
volitions  ?  I  know  not ;  but  if  I  know  that  such 
are  the  facts,  it  is  enough. 

Volitions  must  have  a  cause ;  but,  says  Edwards, 
will  cannot  be  the  cause,  since  this  would  lead  to 
the  absurdity  of  causing  volitions  by  volitions.  But 
we  cannot  perceive  that  it  leads  to  any  such  ab- 
surdity. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  explain  how  a  cause 
acts.  If  the  will  produce  effects  in  external  na- 
ture by  its  acts,  it  is  impossible  to  connect  wTith 
this  as  a  sequence,  established  either  by  experi- 
ence or  logic,  that  in  being  received  as  the  cause 
of  its  own  acts,  it  becomes  such  only  by  willing  its 
own  acts.  It  is  clearly  an  assumption  unsupport- 
ed, and  incapable  of  being  supported.  Besides,  in 
denying  will  to  be  the  cause  of  its  own  acts,  and 
in  supplying  another  cause,  namely,  the  motive, 
Edwards  does  not  escape  the  very  difficulty  which 
he  creates ;  for  I  have  already  shown,  that  the 
same  difficulty  appertains  to  motive,  and  to  every 
possible  cause.  Every  cause  produces  effects  by 
exertion  or  acting ;  but  what  is  the  cause  of  its 


190  EXAMINATION   OF   AKCI'.Mi:NTS   AGAINST 

acting  ?  To  suppose  it  the  cause  of  its  own  acts, 
involves  all  the  absurdities  which  Edwards  attri- 
butes to  Belf-de termination.     But, 

Jn  the  second  place!  —  let  us  look  at  the  con- 
nexion of  cause  and  phenomena  a  little  more  parti- 
cularly. What  is  cause  !  It  is  that  which  is  the 
ground  of  the  possible,  and  actual  existence  of 
phenomena.  How  is  cause  known?  By  the  phe- 
nomena. Is  cause  visible  ?  No :  whatever  is 
seen  is  phenomenal.  We  observe  phenomena,  and 
by  the  law  of  our  intelligence  we  assign  them  to 
cause.  But  how  do  we  conceive  of  cause  as 
producing  phenomena  ?  By  a  nisus,  an  effort,  or 
energy.  Is  this  nisus  itsell  a  phenomenon?  It 
is  when  it  is  observed,  Is  it  always  observed  ?  It 
is  not.  The  nisus  of  gravitation  we  do  not  ob- 
serve ;  we  observe  merely  the  facts  of  gravita- 
tion. The  nisus  of  heat  to  consume  we  do  not 
observe ;  we  observe  merely  the  facts  of  combus- 
tion. Where  then  do  we  observe  this  nisus? 
Only  in  will.  Really,  volition  is  the  nisus  or  ef- 
fort of  that  cause  which  we  call  will.  I  do  not 
wish  to  anticipate  subsequent  investigations,  but 
I  am  constrained  here  to  ask  every  one  to  ex- 
amine his  consciousness  in  relation  to  this  point. 
When  1  wish  to  do  anything  I  make  an  effort  — 
a  nisus  to  do  it ;  I  make  an  effort  to  raise  my 
arm,  and  I  raise  it.     This  effort  is  simply  the  vo- 


A   SELF-DETEUMININO   WILL.  191 

lition.  I  make  an  effort  to  lift  a  weight  with  my 
hand,  —  this  effort  is  simply  the  volition  to  lift  it, — 
and  immediately  antecedent  to  this  effort,  I  recog- 
nise only  my  will,  or  really  only  myself.  This 
effort  —  this  nisus —  this  volition — whatever  we 
call  it,  —  is  in  the  will  itself,  and  it  becomes  a 
phenomenon  to  us,  because  we  are  causes  that 
know  ourselves.  Every  ?iisus,  or  effort,  or  voli- 
tion, which  we  may  make,  is  in  our  consciousness  : 
causes,  which  are  not  self-conscious,  of  course  do 
not  reveal  this  nisus  to  themselves,  and  they  can- 
not reveal  it  to  us  because  it  is  in  the  very  bosom 
of  the  cause  itself.  What  we  observe  in  relation 
to  all^  causes —  not  ourselves,  whether  they  be 
self-conscious  or  not,  is  not  the  nisus,  but  the  se- 
quents  of  the  nisus.  Thus  in  men  we  do  not  ob- 
serve the  volition  or  nisus  in  their  wills,  but  the 
phenomena  which  form  the  sequents  of  the  nisus. 
And  in  physical  causes,  we  do  not  observe  the 
nisus  of  these  causes,  but  only  the  phenomena 
which  form  the  sequents  of  this  nisus.  But  when 
each  one  comes  to  himself,  it  is  all  different.  He 
penetrates  himself — knows  himself.  He  is  him- 
self the  cause  —  he,  himself,  makes  the  nisus,  and 
is  conscious  of  it ;  and  this  nisus  to  him  becomes 
an  effect  —  a  phenomenon,  the  first  phenomenon 
by  which  he  reveals  himself,  but  a  phenomenon 


193        EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

by  which  lie  reveals  himself  only  to  himself.  It 
is  by  the  sequents  of  this  nisus, —  the  effects  pro- 
duced in  the  external  visible  world,  —  that  he  re- 
veals himself  to  others. 

Sometimes  the  nisus  or  volition  expends  itself 
in  the  will,  and  gives  no  external  phenomena.  I 
may  make  an  effort  to  raise  my  arm,  but  my  arm 
may  be  bound  or  paralyzed,  and  consequently  the 
effort  is  in  vain,  and  is  not  known  without.  How 
energetic  are  the  efforts  made  by  the  will  during 
a  fit  of  the  night-mare  !  we  struggle  to  resist  some 
dreadful  force ;  we  strive  to  run  away  from  dan- 
ger —  but  all  in  vain. 

It  is  possible  for  me  to  make  an  effort  to  re- 
move a  mountain  :  I  may  place  my  hand  against 
its  side,  and  tug,  and  strive  :  the  nisus  or  voli- 
tion is  the  most  energetic  that  I  can  make, but,  save 
the  straining  of  my  muscles,  no  external  expression 
of  the  energy  of  my  will  is  given  ;  I  am  resisted 
by  a  greater  power  than  myself. 

The  most  original  movement  of  every  cause  is, 
then,  this  nisus  in  the  bosom  of  the  cause  itself, 
and  in  man,  as  a  cause,  the  most  original  move- 
ment is  this  nisus  likewise,  which  in  him  we  call 
volition.  To  deny  such  a  Jiisus  would  be  to  deny 
the  activity,  efficiency,  and  energy  of  cause.  This 
nisus,  by  its  very  conception  and  definition,  ad- 


A   SELF-DETERMINING    WILL.  193 

admits  of  no  antecedent,  phenomenon,  or  move- 
ment :  it  is  in  the  substance  of  the  cause ;  its 
first  going  forth  to  effects.  A  first  movement  or 
nisus  of  cause  is  just  as  necessary  a  conception 
as  first  cause  itself.  There  is  no  conception  to 
oppose  to  this,  but  that  of  every  cause  having  its 
first  movement  determined  by  some  other  cause 
out  of  itself — a  conception  which  runs  back  in 
endless  retrogression  without  arriving  at  a  first 
cause,  and  is,  indeed,  the  annihilation  of  all  cause. 

The  assumption  of  Edwards,  therefore,  that  if 
will  determine  its  own  volitions,  it  must  deter- 
mine them  by  an  act  of  volition,  is  unsupported 
alike  by  the  facts  of  consciousness  and  a  sound 
logic, —  while  all  the  absurdities  of  an  infinite  se- 
ries of  causation  of  acts  really  fasten  upon  his 
own  theory,  and  destroy  it  by  the  very  weapons 
with  which  it  assails  the  opposite  system. 

In  the  third  place,  —  Edwards  virtually  allows 
the  self-determining  power  of  will. 

Will  he  defines  as  the  desire,  the  affections,  or 
the  sensibility.  There  is  no  personal  activity  out 
of  the  affections  or  sensitivity.  Volition  is  as  the 
most  agreeable,  and  is  itself  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable.  But  what  is  the  cause  of  volition  ? 
He  affirms  that  it  cannot  be  will,  assuming  that 
to  make  will  the  cause  of  its  own  volitions,  in- 
17 


194         EXAMINATION   OF   AUGVMKNTS   AGAINST 

volvcs  the  absurdity  of  willing  volitions  or  choos- 
iii"  choices  ;  but  at  the  same  lime  he  affirms  the 
cause  to  be  the  state  of  the  affections  or  will,  in 
correlation  with  the  nature  and  circumstances  of 
objects.     .But  all  natural  causes  are  in  correlation 
with  certain  objects,  —  as,  for  example,  heat  is  in 
correlation  with  combustibles  ;  that  is,  these  nat- 
ural causes  act  only  under  the  condition  of  meet- 
ing with  objects  so  constituted  as  to  be  suscepti- 
ble of  being  acted  upon  by  them.     So,  likewise, 
according  to  Edwards's  representation,  we  may- 
say  that  the  cause  of  volition  is  the  nature  and 
state  of  the  affections  or  the  will,  acting  under  the 
condition  of  objects  correlated  to  it.     The  sense 
of  the  most  agreeable  or  choice  cannot  indeed  be 
awakened,  unless  there  be  an  object  presented 
which  shall  appear  the  most  agreeable  ;  but  then 
its  appearing  most  agreeable,  and  its  awakening 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  depends  not  only 
upon  "  what  appears  in  the  object  viewed,  but 
also  in  the  manner  of  the  view,  and  the  state  and 
circumstances  of  the  mind  that  views."    (p.  22.) 
Now  "  the  state  and   circumstances  of  the  mind 
that  viewrs,  and  the  manner  of  its  view,"  is  simply 
the  mind  acting  from  its  inherent  nature  and  un- 
der its  proper  conditions,  and  is  a  representation 
which  answers  to  every  natural  cause  with  which 


K  SELF-DETERMINING   WILL.  105 

we  are  acquainted  :  the  state  of  the  mind,  there- 
fore, implying  of  course  its  inherent  nature,  may 
with  as  much  propriety  be  taken  as  the  cause  of 
volition,  on  Edwards's  own  principles,  as  the  na- 
ture and  state  of  heat  may  be  taken  as  the  cause 
of  combustion  :  but  by  "  the  state  of  mind,"  Ed- 
wards means,  evidently,  the  state  of  the  will  or 
the  affections.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  he  makes 
the  state  of  the  will  or  the  affections  the  cause  of 
volition  ;  but  as  the  state  of  the  will  or  the  affec- 
tions means  nothing  more  in  reference  to  will  than 
the  state  of  any  other  cause  means  in  reference  to 
that  cause,  —  and  as  the  state  of  a  cause,  imply- 
ing of  course  its  inherent  nature  or  constitution, 
means  nothing  more  than  its  character  and  quali- 
ties considered  as  a  cause,  —  therefore  he  virtu- 
ally and  really  makes  will  the  cause  of  its  own  vo- 
litions, as  much  as  any  natural  cause  is  the  cause 
of  its  invariable  scquents. 

Edwards,  in  contemplating  and  urging  the  ab- 
surdity of  determining  a  volition  by  a  volition, 
overlooked  that,  according  to  our  most  common 
and  necessary  conceptions  of  cause,  the  first 
movement  or  action  of  cause  must  be  determined 
by  the  cause  itself,  and  that  to  deny  this,  is  in  fact 
to  deny  cause.  If  cause  have  not  within  itself  a 
nisus  to  produce  phenomena,  then  wherein  is  it  a 


19G       EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

cause  ?  He  overlooked,  too,  that  in  assigning  as 
the  cause  or  motive  of  volition,  the  state  of  the 
will,  he  really  gave  the  will  a  self-determining 
power,  and  granted  the  very  point  he  laboured  to 
overthrow . 

The  point  in  dispute,  therefore,  between  us  and 
Edwards,  is  not,  after  all,  the  self-determining 
power  of  the  will.  If  will  be  a  cause,  it  will  be 
self-determining  ;  for  all  cause  is  self-determining, 
or,  in  other  words,  is  in  its  inherent  nature  active, 
and  the  ground  of  phenomena. 

But  the  real  point  in  dispute  is  this  :  "  Is  the 
will  necessarily  determined,  or  not?  • 

The  inherent  nature  of  cause  may  be  so  consti- 
tuted and  fixed,  that  the  nisus  by  which  it  deter- 
mines itself  to  produce  phenomena,shalltake  place 
according  to  invariable  and  necessary  laws.  This 
we  believe  to  be  true  with  respect  to  all  physical 
causes.  Heat,  electricity,  galvanism,  magnetism, 
gravitation,  mechanical  forces  in  general,  and  the 
powers  at  work  in  chemical  affinities, produce  their 
phenomena  according  to  fixed,  and,  with  respect 
to  the  powers  themselves,  necessary  laws.  We 
do  not  conceive  it  possible  for  these  powers  to 
produce  any  other  phenomena,  under  given  cir- 
cumstances, than  those  which  they  actually  pro- 
duce.    When   a  burning  coal  is  thrown  into  a 


A   CONTINGENT    WILL.  197 

mass  of  dry  gunpowder,  an  explosion  must  take 
place. 

Now,  is  it  true  likewise  that  the  cause  which 
we  call  will,  must,  under  given  circumstances,  ne- 
cessarily produce  such  and  such  phenomena? 
Must  its  nisus,  its  self-determining  energy,  or  its 
volition,  follow  a  uniform  and  inevitable  law? 
Edwards  answers  yes.  Will  is  but  the  sensitivity, 
and  the  inherent  nature  of  the  will  is  fixed,  so  that 
its  sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  which  is  its  most 
original  nisus  or  its  volition,  follows  certain  neces- 
sary laws,  —  necessary  in  relation  to  itself.  If  we 
know  the  state  of  any  particular  will,  and  its  cor- 
relation to  every  variety  of  object,  we  may  know, 
with  the  utmost  certainty,  what  its  volition  will  be 
at  a  given  time,  and  under  given  circumstance?. 
Moral  necessity  and  physical  necessity  differ  only 
in  the  terms,  —  not  in  the  nature  of  the  connexion 
between  the  terms.  Volition  is  as  necessary  as 
any  physical  phenomenon. 

Now,  if  the  will  and  the  affections  or  sensitivity 
are  one,  then,  as  a  mere  psychological  fact,  we 
must  grant  that  volition  is  necessary ;  for  nothing 
can  be  plainer  than  that  the  desires  and  affections 
necessarily  follow  the  correlation  of  the  sensitivity 
and  its  objects.  But  if  we  can  distinguish  in  the 
consciousness,  the  will  as  a  personal  activity,  from 
17* 


198       EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

the  sensitivity,  —  if  we  can  distinguish  volition  from 
the  strongest  desire  <>r  the  sense  <>f  the  most  agree- 
able,—  then  it  will  not  follow,  because  the  one  is 
necessary,  the  other  is  necessary  likewise,  unless 
a  necessary  connexion  between  the  two  be  also 
an  observed  fact  of  consciousness.  This  will  be 
inquired  into  in  another  part  of  our  undertaking. 
What  we  are  now  mainly  concerned  with,  is  Ed- 
wards's argument  against  the  conception  of  a  will 
not  necessarily  determined.  This  he  calls  a  con- 
tingent determination  of  will.  We  adopt  the 
word  contingent ;  it  is  important  in  marking  a 
distinction. 

Edwards,  in  his  argument  against  a  contingent 
determination,  mistakes  and  begs  the  question  un- 
der discussion. 

1.  He  mistakes  the  question.  Contingency  is 
treated  of  throughout  as  if  identical  with  chance 
or  no  cause.  "  Any  thing  is  said  to  be  contingent, 
or  to  come  to  pass  by  chance  or  accident,  in  the 
original  meaning  of  such  words,  when  its  connex- 
ion with  its  causes  or  antecedents,  according  to 
the  established  course  of  things,  is  not  discerned  ; 
and  so  is  what  we  have  no  means  of  foreseeing. 
And  especially  is  any  thing  said  to  be  contingent 
or  accidental,  with  regard  to  us,  when  it  comes 
to  pass  without  our  foreknowledge,  and  beside 


vv     or  the       nr 

'UFIVERS 

A   CONTINGENT   WILL.    \,  C  199 

our  design  and  scope.  But  the  word  contingent 
is  used  abundantly  in  a  very  different  sense ;  not 
for  that  whose  connexion  with  the  series  of  things 
we  cannot  discern  so  as  to  foresee  the  event,  but 
for  something  which  has  absolutely  no  previous 
ground  or  reason  with  which  its  existence  has  any 
fixed  and  certain  connexion."    (p.  31.) 

Thus,  according  to  Edwards,  not  only  is  con- 
tingent used  in  the  same  sense  as  chance  and  ac- 
cident, in  the  ordinary  and  familiar  acceptation 
of  these  words,  but  it  is  also  gravely  employed  to 
represent  certain  phenomena,  as  without  any 
ground,  or  reason,  or  cause  of  their  existence ; 
and  it  is  under  this  last  point  of  view  that  he  op- 
poses it  as  applied  to  the  determination  of  the 
will.  In  part  2,  sec.  3,  he  elaborately  discusses 
the  question  —  "  whether  any  event  whatsoever, 
and  volition  in  particular,  can  come  to  pass  with- 
out a  cause  of  its  existence  ;"  and  in  sec.  4,  — 
-  whether  volition  can  arise  without  a  cause, 
through  the  activity  of  the  nature  of  the  soul." 

If,  in  calling  volitions  contingent,  —  if,  in  repre- 
senting the  determination  of  the  will  as  contin- 
gent, we  intended  to  represent  a  class  of  phe- 
nomena as  existing  without  "  any  previous  ground 
or  reason  with  which  their  existence  has  a  fixed 
and  certain  connexion,"  —  as  existing  without  any 


n(l       r\  AMIN.YTION    OF   AUGUMBNTB   AGAINST 

cause  whatever,  and  then  fore  as  existing  by 
chancc,  or  as  really  self-existent,  and  therefore 
not  demanding  any  previous  ground  for  their  ex- 
istence,—  it  seems  to  me  that  no  elaborate  argu- 
ment would  be  required  to  expose  the  absurdity 
of  our  position.  That  "  every  phenomenon  must 
have  a  cause,"  is  unquestionably  one  of  those 
primitive  truths  which  neither  require  nor  admit 
of  a  demonstration,  because  they  precede  all  de- 
monstration, and  must  be  assumed  as  the  basis  of 
all  demonstration. 

By  a  contingent  will,  I  do  not  mean  a  will 
which  is  not  a  cause.  By  contingent  volitions,  I 
do  not  mean  volitions  which  exist  without  a  cause. 
By  a  contingent  will,  I  mean  a  will  which  is  not 
a  necessitated  will,  but  what  I  conceive  only  and 
truly  to  be  a  free  will.  By  contingent  volitions, 
I  mean  volitions  belonging  to  a  contingent  or  free 
will.  I  do  not  oppose  contingency  to  cause,  but  to 
necessity.  Let  it  be  supposed  that  we  have  a 
clear  idea  of  necessity,  then  whatever  is  not  ne- 
cessary I  call  contingent. 

Now  an  argument  against  contingency  of  will 
on  the  assumption  that  we  intend,  under  this  title, 
to  represent  volitions  as  existing  without  a  cause, 
is  irrelevant,  since  we  mean  no  such  thing. 

But  an  argument  attempting  to  prove  that  con- 


A   CONTINGENT   WILL.  201 

tingcncy  is  identical  with  chance,  or  no  cause,  is  a 
fair  argument ;  but  then  it  must  be  remembered 
that  such  an  argument  really  goes  to  prove  that 
nothing  but  necessity  is  possible,  —  for  we  mean 
by  contingency  that  which  is  opposed  to  ne- 
cessity. 

The  argument  must  therefore  turn  upon  these 
two  points :  First,  is  contingency  a  possible  con- 
ception, or  is  it  in  itself  contradictory  and  absurd  ? 
This  is  the  main  question  ;  for  if  it  be  decided  that 
contingency  is  a  contradictory  and  absurd  con- 
ception, then  we  are  shut  up  to  a  universal  and 
an  absolute  necessity,  and  no  place  remains  for 
inquiry  respecting  a  contingent  will.  But  if  it  be 
decided  to  be  a  possible  and  rational  conception, 
then  the  second  point  will  be,  to  determine  wheth- 
er the  will  be  contingent  or  necessary. 

The  first  point  is  the  only  one  which  I  shall  dis- 
cuss in  this  place.  The  second  properly  belongs 
to  the  psychological  investigations  which  are  to 
follow.  But  I  proceed  to  remark,  2.  that  Ed- 
wards, in  his  argument  against  a  contingent  will, 
really  begs  the  question  in  dispute.  In  the  first 
place,  he  represents  the  will  as  necessarily  deter- 
mined. This  is  brought  out  in  a  direct  and  posi- 
tive argument  contained  in  the  first  part  of  his 
treatise.     Here  necessity  is  made  universal  and 


202        EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

absolute.  Then,  in  the  second  place,  when  he 
comes  particularly  to  discuss  contingency,  he  as- 
sumes that  it  means  no  cause,  and  that  necessity 
is  inseparable  from  the  idea  of  cause.  Now  this 
is  plainly  a  begging  of  the  question,  as  well  as  a 
mistaking  of  it  ;  for  when  we  are  inquiring  wheth- 
er there  be  any  thing  contingent,  that  is,  any  thing 
opposed  to  necessity,  he  begins  his  argument  by 
affirming  all  cause  to  be  necessary,  and  contin- 
gency as  implying  no  cause.  If  all  cause  be  ne- 
cessary, and  contingency  imply  no  cause,  there 
is  no  occasion  for  inquiry  after  contingency  ;  for 
it  is  already  settled  that  there  can  be  no  contin- 
gency. The  very  points  we  are  after,  as  we  have 
seen,  are  these  two :  whether  contingency  be  pos- 
sible ;  and  whether  there  be  any  cause,  for  ex- 
ample, will,  which  is  contingent. 

If  Edwards  has  both  mistaken  and  begged  the 
question  respecting  a  contingent  will,  as  I  think 
clearly  appears,  then  of  course  he  has  logically 
determined  nothing  in  relation  to  it. 

But  whether  this  be  so  or  not,  we  may  proceed 
now  to  inquire  whether  contingency  be  a  possible 
and  rational  conception,  or  whether  it  be  contra- 
dictory and  absurd. 

Necessity  and  contingency  are  then  two  ideas 
opposed  to   each  other.     They  at   least   cannot 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  203 

coexist  in  relation  to  the  same  subject.  That 
which  is  necessary  cannot  be  contingent  at  the 
same  time,  and  vice  versa.  Whether  contingency 
is  a  possible  conception  and  has  place  in  relation 
to  any  subject,  remains  to  be  determined. 

Let  us  seek  a  definition  of  these  opposing  ideas  : 
we  will  begin  with  necessity,  because  that  this 
idea  is  rational  and  admits  of  actual  application 
is  not  questioned.  The  only  point  in  question 
respecting  it,  is,  whether  it  be  universal,  embra- 
cing all  beings,  causes,  and  events. 

What  is  necessity  ?  Edwards  defines  necessity 
under  two  points  of  view  :  — 

1.  Viewed  in  relation  to  will. 

2.  Viewed  irrespective  of  will. 

The  first,  supposes  that  opposition  of  will  is 
possible,  but  insufficient ;  —  for  example  :  it  is  pos- 
sible for  me  to  place  myself  in  opposition  to  a 
rushing  torrent,  but  my  opposition  is  insufficient, 
and  the  progress  of  the  torrent  relatively  to  me 
is  necessary. 

The  second  does  not  take  will  into  considera- 
tion at  all,  and  applies  to  subjects  where  opposi- 
tion of  will  is  not  supposable  ;  for  example,  log- 
ical necessity,  a  is  b,  and  c  is  a,  therefore  c 
is  b  :  mathematical  necessity,  2  x  2=4.  The 
centre  of  a  circle  is  a  point  equally  distant  from 


204         EXAMINATION   OP   AUUUMKNTS   AGAINST 

every  point  in  the  circumference  :  metaphysical 
necessity,  the  existence  of  a  first  cause,  of  time,  of 
space.  Edwards  comprehends  this  second  kind  of 
necessity  under  the  general  designation  of  meta- 
physical or  philosophical.  This  second  kind  of 
necessity  undoubtedly  is  absolute.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  conceive  of  these  subjects  differently  from 
what  they  are.  We  cannot  conceive  of  no  space  ; 
no  time ;  or  that  2X2  =  5,  and  so  of  the  rest. 

Necessity  under  both  points  of  view  he  distin- 
guishes into  particular  and  general. 

Relative  necessity,  as  particular,  is  a  necessity 
relative  to  individual  will  ;  as  general,  relative  to 
all  will. 

Metaphysical  necessity,  as  particular,  is  a  neces- 
sity irrespective  of  individual  will ;  as  general, 
irrespective  of  all  will. 

Relative  necessity  is  relative  to  the  will  in  the 
connexion  between  volition  and  its  sequents. 
When  a  volition  of  individual  will  takes  place, 
without  the  sequent  aimed  at,  because  a  greater 
force  is  opposed  to  it,  then  the  sequent  of  this 
greater  force  is  necessary  with  a  particular  rela- 
tive necessity.  When  the  greater  force  is  great- 
er than  all  supposable  will,  then  its  sequents  take 
place  by  a  general  relative  necessity.  It  is  plain 
however,  that  under  all  supposable  will,  the  will 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  205 

of  God  cannot  be  included,  as  there  can  be  no 
greater  force  than  a  divine  volition. 

Metaphysical  necessity,  when  particular,  ex- 
cludes the  opposition  of  individual  will.  Under 
this  Edwards  brings  the  connexion  of  motive  and 
volition.  The  opposition  of  will,  he  contends,  is 
excluded  from  this  connexion,  because  will  can 
act  only  by  volition,  and  motive  is  the  cause  of 
volition.  Volition  is  necessary  by  a  particular 
metaphysical  necessity,  because  the  will  of  the  in- 
dividual cannot  be  opposed  to  it ;  but  not  with  a 
general  metaphysical  necessity,  because  other  wills 
may  be  opposed  to  it. 

Metaphysical  necessity,  when  general,  excludes 
the  opposition  of  all  will  —  even  of  infinite  will. 
That  2X2=  4 — that  the  centre  of  a  circle  is  a 
point  equally  distant  from  every  point  in  the  cir- 
cumference— the  existence  of  time  and  space  — 
are  all  true  and  real,  independently  of  all  will. 
Will  hath  not  constituted  them,  nor  can  will  destroy 
them.  It  would  imply  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
them  different  from  what  they  are.  According  to 
Edwards,  too,  the  divine  volitions  are  necessary 
with  a  general  metaphysical  necessity,  because,  as 
these  volitions  are  caused  by  motives,  and  infinite 
will,  as  well  as  finite  will,  must  act  by  volitions, 
the  opposition  of  infinite  will  itself  is  excluded  in 

the  production  of  infinite  volitions. 
18 


200         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

Now  what  is  the  simple  idea  of  necessity  con- 
tained in  these  two  points  of  view,  with  their 
two-fold  distinction?  Necessity  is  that  which  is 
■nut  which  cannot  possibly  not  />e,  or  be  otherwise 
than  it  is, 

1.  An  event  necessary  by  a  relative  particular 
necessity,  is  an  event  which  is  and  cannot  possi- 
bly not  be  or  be  otherwise  by  the  opposition  of 
an  individual  will. 

2.  An  event  necessary  by  a  relative  general 
necessity,  is  an  event  which  cannot  possibly  not 
be,  or  be  otherwise  by  the  opposition  of  all  finite 
will.  In  these  cases,  opposition  of  will  of  course 
is  supposable. 

3.  An  event  is  necessary  by  a  metaphysical 
particular  necessity,  when  it  is,  and  admits  of  no 
possible  opposition  from  the  individual  will. 

4.  An  event  is  necessary  by  a  metaphysical 
general  necessity,  when  it  is,  and  cannot  possibly 
admit  of  opposition  even  from  infinite  will. 

All  this,  however,  in  the  last  analysis  on  Ed- 
wards's system,  becomes  absolute  necessity.  The 
infinite  will  is  necessarily  determined  by  a  meta- 
physical general  necessity.  All  events  are  neces- 
sarily determined  by  the  infinite  will.  Hence,  all 
events  are  necessarily  determined  by  a  metaphys- 
ical general  necessity.  Particular  and  relative 
necessity  are  merely  the  absolute  and  general  ne- 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  207 

cessity  viewed  in  the  particular  individual  and 
relation:  —  the  terms  characterize  only  the  man- 
ner of  our  view.  The  opposition  of  the  particular 
will  being  predetermined  by  the  infinite  will,  which 
comprehends  all,  is  to  the  precise  limit  of  its  force 
absolutely  necessary  ;  and  the  opposite  force  which 
overcomes  the  opposition  of  the  particular  will, 
produces  its  phenomena  necessarily  not  only  in 
reference  to  the  particular  will,  but  also  in  refer- 
ence to  the  infinite  will  which  necessarily  prede- 
termines it. 

Having  thus  settled  the  definition  of  necessity, 
and  that  too,  on  Edwards's  own  grounds,  we  are 
next  to  inquire,  what  is  the  opposite  idea  of  con- 
tingency, and  whether  it  has  place  as  a  rational 
idea  ? 

Necessity  is  that  which  is,  and  which  cannot 
possibly  not  be,  or  be  otherwise  than  it  is.  Con- 
tingency then,  as  the  opposite  idea,  must  be  tJiat 
which  is,  or  may  be,  and  which  possibly  might 
not  be,  or  might  be  otherwise  than  it  is.  Now, 
contingency  cannot  have  place  with  respect  to 
anything  which  is  independent  of  will ;  —  time  and 
space; — mathematical  and  metaphysical  truths, 
for  example,  that  all  right  angles  are  equal,  thai 
every  phenomenon  supposes  a  cause,  cannot  be 
contingent,  for  they  are  seen  to  be  real  and  true 


'-i<H  r.XAMIJVATIO.N    OF   ARGUME.\TS   AGAINST 

in  themselves.  They  do  not  arise  from  will,  nor 
is  it  conceivable  that  will  can  alter  them,  for  it  is 
not  conceivable  that  they  admit  of  change  from 
any  source.  If  the  idea  of  contingency  have  place 
as  a  rational  idea,  it  must  be  with  respect  to  caus- 
es, being,  and  phenomena,  which  depend  upon  will. 
The  whole  creation  is  the  effect  of  divine  volition. 
"  God  said,  let  there  be  light,  and  there  was  light :" 
thus  did  the  whole  creation  come  to  be. 

Now  every  one  will  grant,  that  the  creation 
does  not  seem  necessary  as  time  and  space  :  and 
intuitive  truths  with  their  logical  deductions,  seem 
necessary.  We  cannot  conceive  of  these  as  hav- 
ing not  been,  or  as  ceasing  to  be  ;  but  we  can 
conceive  of  the  creation  as  not  having  been,  and 
as  ceasing  to  be.  No  space  is  an  impossible  con- 
ception ;  but  no  body,  or  void  space,  is  a  possible 
conception  ;  and  as  the  existence  of  body  may  be 
annihilated  in  thought,  so,  likewise,  the  particular 
forms  and  relations  of  body  may  be  modified  in 
thought,  indefinitely,  different  from  their  actual 
form.  Now,  if  we  wish  to  express  in  one  word 
this  difference  between  space  and  body,  or  in 
general  this  difference  between  that  which  exists 
independently  of  will,  and  that  which  exists  pure- 
ly as  the  effect  of  will,  we  call  the  first  neces- 
sary ;  the  second,  contingent.  The  first  we  can- 
not conceive  to  be  different  from  what  it  is.     The 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  209 

second  we  can  conceive  to  be  different  from  what 
it  is.  What  is  true  of  the  creation  considered  as 
a  collection  of  beings  and  things,  is  true  likewise 
of  all  the  events  taking  place  in  this  creation.  All 
these  events  are  either  directly  or  mediately  the 
effects  of  will,  divine  or  human.  Now  wre  can 
conceive  of  these  as  not  being  at  all,  or  as  being 
modified  indefinitely,  different  from  what  they 
are; — and  under  this  conception  we  call  them 
contingent. 

No  one  I  think  will  deny  that  we  do  as  just  re- 
presented, conceive  of  the  possibility  of  the  events 
and  creations  of  will,  either  as  having  no  being,  or 
as  being  different  from  what  they  are.  This  con- 
ception is  common  to  all  men.  What  is  the  meaning 
of  this  conception  ?  Is  it  a  chimera  ?  It  must  be 
a  chimera,  if  the  system  of  Edwards  be  true  ;  for 
according  to  this,  there  really  is  no  possibility  that 
any  event  of  will  might  have  had  no  being  at  all,  or 
might  have  been  different  from  what  it  is.  Will 
is  determined  by  motives  antecedent  to  itself. 
And  this  applies  to  the  divine  will,  likewise,  which 
is  determined  by  an  infinite  and  necessary  wis- 
dom. The  conception,  therefore,  of  the  possibili- 
ty of  that  which  is,  being  different  from  what  it 
is,  must  on  this  system  be  chimerical.  But  al- 
though the  system  would  force  us  to  this  conclu- 
18* 


210        EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

sion,  the  conception  still  reigns  in  our  minds,  and 
does  not  seem  to  us  chimerical  ;  —  the  deduction 
from  the  system  Btrangefy  conflicts  with  our  natu- 
ral and  spontaneous  judgements.  There  are  few 
men  who  would  not  be  startled  by  the  dogma  that 
all  things  and  all  events,  even  the  constantly  occur- 
ing  volitions  of  their  minds,  are  absolutely  necessary, 
as  necessary  as  a  metaphysical  axiom  or  a  mathe- 
matical truth,  —  necessary  with  a  necessity  which 
leaves  no  possibility  of  their  being  otherwise  than 
they  actually  arc.  There  arc  few  perhaps  of  the 
theological  abettors  of  Edwards's  system,  who 
would  not  also  be  startled  by  it.  I  suppose  that 
these  would  generally  attempt  to  evade  the  broad 
conclusion,  by  contending  that  the  universal  ne- 
cessity here  represented,  being  merely  a  meta- 
physical necessity,  does  not  affect  the  sequents 
of  volition  ;  that  if  a  man  can  do  as  he  pleases, 
he  has  a  natural  liberty  and  ability  which  relieves 
him  from  the  chain  of  metaphysical  necessity.  I 
have  already  shown  how  utterly  futile  this  at- 
tempted distinction  is  —  how  completely  the  met- 
aphysical necessity  embraces  the  so  called  natu- 
ral liberty  and  ability.  If  nothing  better  than  this 
can  be  resorted  to,  then  we  have  no  alternative 
left  but  to  exclaim  with  Shelley,  "  Necessity,  thou 
mother  of  the  world!''     But  why  the  reluctance 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  211 

to  escape  from  this  universal  necessity  ?  Do  the 
abettors  of  this  system  admit  that  there  is  some- 
thing opposed  to  necessity  ?  But  what  is  this 
something  opposed  to  necessity  ?  Do  they  affirm 
that  choice  is  opposed  to  necessity  ?  But  how 
opposed  —  is  choice  contingent?  Do  they  admit 
the  possibility  that  any  choice  which  is,  might  not 
have  been  at  all,  or  might  have  been  different 
from  what  it  is  ? 

We  surely  do  not  distinguish  choice  from  ne- 
cessity by  merely  calling  it  choice,  or  an  act  of 
the  will.  If  will  is  not  necessitated,  we  wish  to 
know  under  what  condition  it  exists.  Volition  is 
plainly  under  necessity  on  Edwards's  system,  just 
as  every  other  event  is  under  necessity.  And  the 
connexion  between  \ olition  and  its  sequents  is 
just  as  necessary  as  the  connexion  between  voli- 
tion and  its  motives.  Explain, —  why  do  you  en- 
deavour to  evade  the  conclusion  of  this  system 
when  you  come  to  volition  ?  why  do  you  claim 
liberty  here  ?  Do  you  likewise  have  a  natural 
and  spontaneous  judgement  against  a  necessitated 
will  ?  It  is  evident  that  while  Edwards  and  his 
followers  embrace  the  doctrine  of  necessity  in  its 
cardinal  principles,  they  shrink  from  its  applica- 
tion to  will.  They  first  establish  the  doctrine  of 
necessity    universally   and    absolutely,   and   then 


1*12        EXAMINATION  OF   ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

claim  for  will  an  exception  from  the  general  law, — 
not  by  logically  and  psychologically  pointing  out 
the  grounds  and  nature  of  the  exception,  but  by 
simply  appealing  to  the  spontaneous  and  natural 
judgements  of  men,  that  they  are  tree  when  they 
do  as  they  please  :  but  no  definition  of  freedom 
is  given  which  distinguishes  it  from  necessity  :  — 
nor  is  the  natural  and  spontaneous  judgement 
against  necessity  of  volition  explained  and  shown 
not  be  a  mere  illusion. 

There  is  an  idea  opposed  to  necessity,  says  this 
spontaneous  judgement  —  and  the  will  comes  un- 
der the  idea  opposed  to  necessity.  But  what  is 
this  idea  opposed  to  necessity,  and  how  does  the 
will  come  under  it  1  Edwards  and  his  followers 
have  not  answered  these  questions — their  at- 
tempt at  a  solution  is  self-contradictory  and  void. 

Is  there  any  other  idea  opposed  to  necessity 
than  that  of  contingency,  viz.  —  that  which  is  or 
may  be,  and  possibly  might  not  be,  or  might  be 
otherwise  than  it  is  ?  That  2  x  2  =  4  is  a  truth 
which  cannot  possibly  not  be,  or  be  otherwise 
than  it  is.  But  this  book  which  I  hold  in  my 
hand,  I  can  conceive  of  as  not  being  at  all,  or  be- 
ing different  from  what  it  is,  without  implying  any 
contradiction,  according  to  this  spontaneous  judge- 
ment. 


A.  CONTINGENT  WILL.  ^13 

The  distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  I 
cannot  conceive  of  as  not  existing,  or  as  being  al- 
tered so  as  to  transpose  the  terms,  making  that 
right  which  now  is  wrong,  and  that  wrong  which 
now  is  right.  But  the  volition  which  I  now  put 
forth  to  move  this  pen  over  the  paper,  I  can  con- 
ceive of  as  not  existing,  or  as  existing  under  a 
different  mode,  as  a  volition  to  write  words  differ- 
ent from  those  which  I  am  writing.  That  this 
idea  of  contingency  is  not  chimerical,  seems  set- 
tled by  this,  that  all  men  naturally  have  it,  and 
entertain  it  as  a  most  rational  idea.  Indeed  even 
those  who  hold  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  do  ei- 
ther adopt  this  idea  in  relation  to  will  by  a  self- 
contradiction,  and  under  a  false  position,  as  the 
abettors  of  the  scheme  which  I  am  opposing  for 
example,  or  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of  life,  they 
act  upon  it.  All  the  institutions  of  society,  all  go- 
vernment and  law,  all  our  feelings  of  remorse 
and  compunction,  all  praise  and  blame,  and  all 
language  itself,  seem  based  upon  it.  The  idea  of 
contingency  as  above  explained,  is  somehow  con- 
nected with  will,  and  all  the  creations  and  changes 
arising  from  will. 

That  the  will  actually  does  come  under  this 
idea  of  contingency,  must  be  shown  psychologi- 
cally if  shown  at  all.     An  investigation  to  this  ef- 


214         EXAMINATION  OF  AKGLMLNTS  AGAINST 

feet  must  be  reserved  therefore  for  another  oc- 
casion, in  this  place,  I  shall  simply  inquire,  how 
the  will  may  be  conceived  as  coining  under  the 
idea  of  contingency  I 

The  contingency  of  any  phenomenon  or  event 
must  depend  upon  the  nature  of  its  cause.  A 
contingent  phenomenon  or  event  is  one  which 
may  be  conceived  of,  as  one  that  might  not  have 
been  at  all,  or  might  have  been  different  from 
what  it  is ;  but  wherein  lies  the  possibility  that  it 
might  not  have  been  at  all,  or  might  have  been 
different  from  what  it  is  ?  This  possibility  cannot 
lie  in  itself,  for  an  effect  can  determine  nothing 
in  relation  to  its  own  existence.  Neither  can  it 
lie  in  anything  which  is  not  its  cause,  for  this  can 
determine  nothing  in  relation  to  its  existence. 
The  cause  therefore  which  actually  gives  it  exist- 
ence, and  existence  under  its  particular  form,  can 
alone  contain  the  possibility  of  its  not  having  ex- 
isted at  all,  or  of  its  having  existed  under  a  dif- 
ferent form.  But  what  is  the  nature  of  such  a 
cause  ?  It  is  a  cause  which  in  determining  a 
particular  event,  has  at  the  very  moment  of  doing 
so,  the  power  of  determining  an  opposite  event. 
It  is  a  cause  not  chained  to  any  class  of  effects  by 
its  correlation  to  a  certain  class  of  objects  • — as 
fire,  for  example,  is  chained  to  combustion  by  its 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL.  215 

correlation  to  a  certain  class  of  objects  which  we 
thence  call  combustibles.  It  is  a  cause  which  must 
have  this  peculiarity  in  opposition  to  all  other  cau- 
ses, that  it  forbears  of  itself  to  produce  an  effect 
which  it  may  produce,  and  of  any  given  number 
of  effects  alike  within  its  power,  it  may  take  any 
one  of  them  in  opposition  to  all  the  others  ;  and 
at  the  very  moment  it  takes  one  effect,  it  has  the 
power  of  taking  any  other.  It  is  a  cause  contin- 
gent and  not  necessitated.  The  contingency  of 
the  event,  therefore,  arises  from  the  contingency 
of  the  cause.  Now  every  cause  must  be  a  ne- 
cessary or  not  necessary  cause.  A  necessary 
cause  is  one  which  cannot  be  conceived  of  as 
having  power  to  act  differently  from  its  actual  de- 
velopements  —  fire  must  burn  —  gravitation  must 
draw  bodies  towards  the  earth's  centre.  If  there 
be  any  cause  opposed  to  this,  it  can  be  only  the 
contingent  cause  above  defined,  for  there  is  no 
third  conception.  We  must  choose  therefore  be- 
tween a  universal  and  absolute  necessity,  and  the 
existence  of  contingent  causes.  If  we  take  ne- 
cessity to  be  universal  and  absolute,  then  we 
must  take  all  the  consequences,  likewise,  as  de- 
duced in  part  II.  There  is  no  possible  escape 
from  this.  As  then  all  causes  must  be  either  ne- 
cessary or  contingent,  we  bring  will  under  the 


21()         EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

idea  of  contingency,  by  regarding  it  as  a  contin- 
gent cause  —  "a  power  to  do,  or  not  to  do,"*  — 
or  a  faculty  of  determining  "to  do,  or  not  to  do 
something  which  we  conceive  to  be  in  our  pow- 
er." f 

We  may  here  inquire  wherein  lies  the  necessi- 
ty of  a  cause  opposed  to  a  contingent  cause  ?  Its 
necessity  lies  in  its  nature,  also.  What  is  this 
nature  ?  It  is  a  nature  in  fixed  correlation  with 
certain  objects,  so  that  it  is  inconceivable  that  its 
phenomena  might  be  different  from  those  which 
long  and  established  observation  have  assigned  to 
it.  It  is  inconceivable  that  fire  might  not  burn 
when  thrown  amid  combustibles ;  it  is  inconceiv- 
able that  water  might  not  freeze  at  the  freezing 
temperature.  But  is  this  necessity  a  necessity 
per  se,  or  a  determined  necessity  ?  It  is  a  de- 
termined necessity  —  determined  by  the  creative 
will.  If  the  creative  will  be  under  the  law  of  ne- 
cessity, then  of  course  every  cause  determined  by 
will  becomes  an  absolute  necessity. 

The  only  necessity  per  se  is  found  in  that  infi- 
nite and  necessary  wisdom  in  which  Edwards 
places  the  determining  motives  of  the  divine  will. 
All  intuitive  truths  and  their  logical  deductions 
are  necessary  per  se.     But  the  divine  will  is  ne- 

*  Cousin.  t  Dr.  Reid. 


A  CONTINGENT   WILL.  217 

ccssary  with  a  determined  necessity  on  Edwards's 
system,  —  and  so  of  all  other  wills  and  all  other 
causes,  dependent  upon  will  —  the  divine  will  be- 
ing the  first  will  determined.  We  must  recollect, 
however,  that  on  Edwards's  theory  of  causation, 
a  cause  is  always  determined  out  of  itself ;  and 
that  consequently  there  can  be  no  cause  necessa- 
ry per  sc  ;  and  yet  at  the  same  time  there  is  by 
this  theory,  an  absolute  necessity  throughout  all 
causality. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  result  of  making  will  a 
contingent  cause.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  the 
divine  will  as  the  first  and  supreme  contingent 
cause.  Then  consequently  in  the  second  place, 
all  causes  ordained  by  the  divine  will,  considered 
as  effects,  are  contingent.  They  might  not  have 
been.  They  might  cease  to  be.  They  might  be 
different  from  what  they  are.  But  in  the  third 
place,  these  causes  considered  as  causes,  are  not 
all  contingent.  Only  will  is  contingent.  Physical 
causes  are  necessary  with  a  determined  necessity. 
They  are  necessary  as  fixed  by  the  divine  will. 
They  are  necessary  with  a  relative  necessity  — 
relatively  to  the  divine  will.  They  put  forth  their 
nisus,  and  produce  phenomena  by  a  fixed  and 
invariable  law,  established  by  the  divine  will.  But 
will  is  of  the  nature,  being  made  after  the  image 
19 


218         EXAMINATION    OF  ARCH  Ml. NT-  AGAINST 

of  the  divine  will.  The  divine  will  is  infinite 
power,  and  can  do  everything  possible  to  cause. 
The  created  will  is  finite  power,  and  can  do  only 
what  is  within  its  given  capacity.  Its  volitions  or 
its  efforts,  or  its  tnsus  to  do,  are  limited  only  by 
the  extent  of  its  intelligence.  It  may  make  an 
effort,  or  volition,  or  nisus,  to  do  anything  of 
which  it  can  conceive — but  the  actual  produc- 
tion of  phenomena  out  of  itself,  must  depend  up- 
on the  instrumental  and  physical  connexion  which 
the  divine  will  has  established  between  it  and  the 
world,  external  to  itself.  Of  all  the  volitions  or 
msus  within  its  capacity,  it  is  not  necessitated  to 
any  one,  but  may  make  any  one,  at  any  time  ; 
and  at  the  time  it  makes  any  one  nisus  or  voli- 
tion, it  has  the  power  of  making  any  other. 

It  is  plain,  moreover,  that  will  is  efficient,  es- 
sential, and  first  cause.  Whatever  other  causes 
exist,  are  determined  and  fixed  by  will,  and  are 
therefore  properly  called  secondary  or  instrumen- 
tal causes.  And  as  we  ourselves  are  will,  we 
must  first  of  all,  and  most  naturally  and  most 
truly  gain  our  idea  of  cause  from  ourselves.  We 
cannot  penetrate  these  second  causes  —  we  ob- 
serve only  their  phenomena ;  but  we  know  our- 
selves in  the  very  first  nisus  of  causation. 

To  reason  therefore  from  these  secondary  cau- 
ses to  ourselves,  is  indeed  reversing  the  natural 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  219 

and  true  order  on  this  subject.  Now  what  is  the 
ground  of  all  this  clamour  against  contingency  ; 
Do  you  say  it  represents  phenomena  as  existing 
without  cause  ?  We  deny  it.  We  oppose  con- 
tingency not  to  cause,  but  to  necessity.  Do  you 
say  it  is  contrary  to  the  phenomena  of  physical 
causation,  —  we  reply  that  you  have  no  right  to 
reason  from  physical  causes  to  that  cause  which 
is  yourself.  For  in  general  you  have  no  right  to 
reason  from  the  laws  and  properties  of  matter  to 
those  of  mind.  Do  you  affirm  that  contingency 
is  an  absurd  and  pernicious  doctrine  —  then  turn 
and  look  at  the  doctrine  of  an  absolute  necessity 
in  all  its  bearings  and  consequences,  and  where 
lies  the  balance  of  absurdity  and  pernicious  con- 
sequences? But  we  deny  that  there  is  anything 
absurd  and  pernicious  in  contingency  as  above 
explained.  That  it  is  not  pernicious,  but  that  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  the  basis  of  moral  and  religious 
responsibility,  will  clearly  appear  in  the  course 
of  our  inquiries. 

After  what  has  already  been  said  in  the  prece- 
ding pages,  it  perhaps  is  unnecessary  to  make  any 
further  reply  to  its  alleged  absurdity. 

There  is  one  form  under  which  this  allegation 
comes  up,  however,  which  is  at  first  sight  so  plau- 
sible, that  I  shall  be  pardoned  for  prolonging  this 


220         i;\AMI\ATION  OF  AUM'.MENTS   AGAINST 

discussion  in  order  to  dispose  of  it.  It  is  as  follows: 
That  in  assigning  contingency  to  will,  we  do  not 
account  for  a  volition  being  in  one  direction  ra- 
ther than  in  another.  The  will,  it  is  urged,  under 
the  idea  of  contingency,  is  indifferent  to  any  par- 
ticular volition.  How  then  can  we  explain  the 
fact  that  it  does  pass  out  of  this  state  of  indiffer- 
ency  to  a  choice  or  volition  ? 

In  answer  to  this,  I  remark  :  —  It  has  already 
been  made  clear,  that  selection  and  particular  de- 
termination belong  to  every  cause.  In  physical 
causes,  this  selection  and  particular  determination 
lies  in  the  correlation  of  the  nature  of  the  cause 
with  certain  objects  ;  and  this  selection  and  par- 
ticular determination  are  necessary  by  a  necessi- 
ty determined  out  of  the  cause  itself —  that  is, 
they  are  determined  by  the  creative  will,  which 
gave  origin  to  the  physical  and  secondary  causes. 
Now  Edwards  affirms  that  the  particular  selec- 
tion and  determination  of  will  take  place  in  the 
same  way.  The  nature  of  the  will  is  correlated 
to  certain  objects,  and  this  nature,  being  fixed  by 
the  creative  will,  which  gave  origin  to  the  secon- 
dary dependent  will,  the  selection  and  particular 
determination  of  will,  is  necessary  with  a  necessi- 
ty determined  out  of  itself.  But  to  a  necessitated 
will,  we  have  nothing  to  oppose  except  a  will  whose 


A  CONTINGENT   WILL.  221 

volitions  are  not  determined  by  the  correlation  of 
its  nature  with  certain  objects  —  a  will,  indeed, 
which  has  not  its  nature  correlated  to  any  ob- 
jects, but  a  will  indifferent;  for  if  its  nature  were 
correlated  to  objects,  its  particular  selection  and 
determination  would  be  influenced  by  this,  and 
consequently  its  action  would  become  necessary, 
and  that  too  by  a  necessity  out  of  itself,  and  fix- 
ed by  the  infinite  will.  In  order  to  escape  an 
absolute  and  universal  necessity,  therefore,  we 
must  conceive  of  a  will  forming  volitions  particu- 
lar and  determinate,  or  in  other  words,  making  a 
nisus  towards  particular  objects,  without  any  cor- 
relation of  its  nature  with  the  objects.  Is  this 
conception  a  possible  and  rational  conception?  It 
is  not  a  possible  conception  if  will  and  the  sensi- 
tivity, or  the  affections  are  identical  —  for  the 
very  definition  of  will  then  becomes  that  of  a  pow- 
er in  correlation  with  objects,  and  necessarily  af- 
fected by  them. 

But  now  let  us  conceive  of  the  will  as  simply 
and  purely  an  activity  or  cause,  and  distinct  from 
the  sensitivity  or  auctions  —  a  cause  capable  of 
producing  changes  or  phenomena  in  relation  to  a 
great  variety  of  objects,  and  conscious  that  it  is 
thus  capable,  but  conscious  also  that  it  is  not 
drawn  by  any  necessary  affinity  to  any  one  of 
19* 


223        EXAMINATION  <>r  ABOUMSHTfl  AGAINST 

them.  Is  this  a  possible  and  rational  conception  ' 
It  is  indeed  the  conception  of  a  cause  different 
from  all  other  causes ;  and  on  this  conception 
there  arc  but  two  kinds  of  causes.  The  physi- 
cal, which  arc  necessarily  determined  by  the  cor- 
relation of  their  nature  with  certain  objects,  and 
will,  which  is  a  pure  activity  not  thus  determin- 
ed, and  therefore  not  necessitated,  but  contingent. 

Now  I  may  take  this  as  a  rational  conception, 
unless  its  palpable  absurdity  can  be  pointed  out, 
cr  it  can  be  proved  to  involve  some  contradic- 
tion. 

Docs  the  objector  allege,  as  a  palpable  absurd- 
ity, that  there  is,  after  all,  nothing  to  account  for 
the  particular  determination  ?  I  answer  that  the 
particular  determination  is  accounted  for  in  the 
very  quality  or  attribute  of  the  cause.  In  the  case 
of  a  physical  cause,  the  particular  determination 
is  accounted  for  in  the  quality  of  the  cause,  which 
quality  is  to  be  necessarily  correlated  to  the  ob- 
ject. In  the  case  of  will,  the  particular  determi- 
nation is  accounted  for  in  the  quality  of  the  cause, 
which  quality  is  to  have  the  power  to  make  the 
particular  determination  without  being  necessarily 
correlated  to  the  object.  A  physical  cause  is  a 
cause  fixed,  determined,  and  necessitated.  The 
will  is  a  cause  contingent  and  free.     A  physical 


A    CONTINGKNT    WILL.  223 

cause  is  a  cause  instrumental  of  a  first  cause  :  — 
the  will  is  first  cause  itself.  The  infinite  will  is 
the  first  cause  inhabiting  eternity,  filling  immensity, 
and  unlimited  in  its  energy.  The  human  will  is 
first  cause  appearing  in  time,  confined  to  place, 
and  finite  in  its  energy  ;  but  it  is  the  same  in  kind, 
because  made  in  the  likeness  of  the  infinite  will  ; 
as  first  cause  it  is  self-moved,  it  makes  its  nisus  of 
itself,  and  of  itself  it  forbears  to  make  it ;  and 
within  the  sphere  of  its  activity,  and  in  relation  to 
its  objects,  it  has  the  power  of  selecting  by  a  mere 
arbitrary  act,  any  particular  object.  It  is  a  cause, 
all  whose  acts,  as  well  as  any  particular  act,  con- 
sidered as  phenomena  demanding  a  cause,  are 
accounted  for  in  itself  alone.  This  does  not  make 
the  created  will  independent  of  the  uncreated. 
The  very  fact  of  its  being  a  created  will,  settles 
its  dependence.  The  power  which  created  it,  has 
likewise  limited  it,  and  could  annihilate  it.  The 
power  which  created  it,  has  ordained  and  fixed 
the  instrumentalities  by  which  volitions  become 
productive  of  effects.  The  man  may  make  the 
volition  or  nisiiS,  to  remove  a  mountain,  but  his 
arm  fails  to  carry  out  the  nisus.  His  volitions 
are  produced  freely  of  himself;  they  are  unre- 
strained within  the  capacity  of  will  given  him,  but 
he   meets  on  every  side   those    physical   causes 


834         EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

which  arc  mightier  than  himself,  and  which,  in- 
strumental of  the  divine  will,  make  the  created 
will  aware  of  its  feebleness  and  dependence. 

But  although  the  will  is  au  activity  or  cause  thus 
contingent,  arbitrary,  free,  and  indifferent,  it  is  an 
activity  or  cause  united  with  sensitivity  and  rea- 
son ;  and  forming  the  unity  of  the  soul.  Will,  rea- 
son, and,  the  sensitivity  or  the  affections,  consti- 
tute mind,  or  spirit,  or  soul.  Although  the  will  is 
arbitrary  and  contingent,  yet  it  does  not  follow 
that  it  must  act  without  regard  to  reason  or 
feeling. 

I  have  yet  to  make  my  appeal  to  consciousness  ; 
I  am  now  only  giving  a  scheme  of  psychology  in 
order  to  prove  the  possibility  of  a  contingent  will, 
that  we  have  nothing  else  to  oppose  to  an  abso- 
lute and  universal  necessity. 

According  to  this  scheme,  wre  take  the  will  as 
the  executive  of  the  soul  or  the  doer.  It  is  a  doer 
having  life  and  power  in  itself,  not  necessarily  de- 
termined in  any  of  its  acts,  but  a  power  to  do  or 
not  to  do.  Reason  we  take  as  the  lawgiver.  It 
is  the  "  source  and  substance  "  of  pure,  immutable, 
eternal,  and  necessary  truth.  This  teaches  and 
commands  the  executive  will  what  ought  to  be 
done.  The  sensitivity  or  the  affections,  or  the 
desire,  is  the  seat  of  enjoyment :  it  is  the  capacity 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  225 

of  pleasure  and  pain.  Objects,  in  general,  hold 
to  the  sensitivity  the  relation  of  the  agreeable 
or  the  disagreeable,  are  in  correlation  with  it ; 
and,  according  to  the  degree  of  this  correlation, 
are  the  emotions  and  passions  awakened. 

Next  let  the  will  be  taken  as  the  chief  characte- 
ristic of  personality,  or  more  strictly,  as  the  per- 
sonality itself.  By  the  personality.  I  mean  the 
me,  or  myself.  The  personality  —  the  me  —  the 
will,  a  self-moving  cause,  directs  itself  by  an  act 
of  attention  to  the  reason,  and  receives  the  laws 
of  its  action.  The  perception  of  these  laws  is 
attended  with  the  conviction  of  their  rectitude  and 
imperative  obligation  ;  at  the  same  time,  there  is 
the  consciousness  of  power  to  obey  or  to  disobey 
them. 

Again,  let  the  will  be  supposed  to  direct  itself 
in  an  act  of  attention  to  the  pleasurable  emotions 
connected  with  the  presence  of  certain  objects  ; 
and  the  painful  emotions  connected  with  the 
presence  of  other  objects  ;  and  then  the  desire  of 
pleasure,  and  the  wish  to  avoid  pain,  become  rules 
of  action.  There  is  here  again  the  consciousness 
of  power  to  resist  or  to  comply  with  the  solicita- 
tions of  desire.  The  will  may  direct  itself  to 
those  objects  which  yield  pleasure,  or  may  reject 
them,  and  direct  itself  towards  those  objects  which 
yield  only  pain  and  disgust. 


22G         EXAMINATION   OF   AKOIMKNTS    AC.  VINST 

We  may  suppose  again  two  conditions  of  the 
reason  and  sensitivity  relatively  to  each  other:  a 
condition  of  agreement,  and  a  condition  of  disa- 
greement. If  the  affections  incline  to  those  ob- 
jects which  the  reason  approves,  then  we  have 
the  first  condition.  If  the  affections  are  repelled 
in  dislike  by  those  objects  which  reason  approves, 
then  we  have  the  second  condition.  On  the  first 
condition,  the  will,  in  obeying  reason,  gratifies  the 
sensitivity,  and  vice  versa.  On  the  second,  in 
obeying  the  reason,  it  resists  the  sensitivity,  and 
vice  versa. 

Now  if  the  will  were  always  governed  by  the 
highest  reason,  without  the  possibility  of  resist- 
ance, it  would  be  a  necessitated  will  ;  and  if  it 
were  always  governed  by  the  strongest  desire, 
without  the  possibility  of  resistance,  it  would  be 
a  necessitated  will ;  as  much  so  as  in  the  system 
of  Edwards,  where  the  strongest  desire  is  identi- 
fied with  volition. 

The  only  escape  from  necessity,  therefore,  is 
in  the  conception  of  a  will  as  above  defined  —  a 
conscious,  self-moving  power,  which  may  obey 
reason  in  opposition  to  passion,  or  passion  in  op- 
position to  reason,  or  obey  both  in  their  harmoni- 
ous union  ;  and  lastly,  which  may  act  in  the  indif- 
ference of  all,  that  is,  act  without  reference  either 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL.  227 

to  reason  or  passion.  Now  when  the  will  obeys 
the  laws  of  the  reason,  shall  it  be  asked,  what  is 
the  cause  of  the  act  of  obedience  ?  The  will  is 
the  cause  of  its  own  act ;  a  cause  per  se,  a  cause 
self-conscious  and  self-moving ;  it  obeys  the  rea- 
son by  its  own  nisus.  When  the  will  obeys  the 
strongest  desire,  shall  we  ask,  what  is  the  cause 
of  the  act  of  obedience  ?  Here  again,  the  will  is 
the  cause  of  its  own  act.  Are  we  called  upon  to 
ascend  higher?  We  shall  at  last  come  to  such  a 
self-moving  and  contingent  power,  or  we  must  re- 
sign all  to  an  absolute  necessity.  Suppose,  that 
when  the  will  obeys  the  reason,  we  attempt  to  ex- 
plain it  by  saying,  that  obedience  to  the  reason 
awakens  the  strongest  desire,  or  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable  ;  we  may  then  ask,  why  the  will 
obeys  the  strongest  desire  ?  and  then  we  may  at- 
tempt to  explain  this  again  by  saying,  that  to  obey 
the  strongest  desire  seems  most  reasonable.  We 
may  evidently,  with  as  much  propriety,  account 
for  obedience  to  passion,  by  referring  to  reason  ; 
as  account  for  obedience  to  reason,  by  referring 
to  passion.  If  the  act  of  the  will  which  goes  in 
the  direction  of  the  reason,  finds  its  cause  in  the 
sensitivity  ;  then  the  act  of  the  will  which  goes  in 
the  direction  of  the  sensitivity,  may  find  its  cause 
in  the  reason.     But  this  is  only  moving  in  a  circle, 


228         EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

and  is  no  advance  whatever.  Why  does  the  will 
obey  the  reason  ?  because  it  is  must  agreeable  : 
but  why  does  the  will  obe)  because  it  is  most 
agreeable  '.  because  to  obey  the  most  agreeable 
ins  most  reasonable. 

Acts  of  the  will  may  be  conceived  of  as  ana- 
logous to  intuitive  or  first  truths.  First  truths 
require  no  demonstration ;  they  admit  of  none ; 
they  form  the  basis  of  all  demonstration.  Acts 
of  the  will  are  first  movements  of  primary 
causes,  and  as  such  neither  require  nor  admit 
of  antecedent  causes,  to  explain  their  action. 
Will  is  the  source  and  basis  of  all  other  cause. 
It  explains  all  other  cause,  but  in  itself  admits 
of  no  explanation.  It  presents  the  primary  and 
all-comprehending  fact  of  power.  In  God,  will 
is  infinite,  primary  cause,  and  uncreated  :  in  man, 
it  is  finite,  primary  cause,  constituted  by  God's 
creative  act,  but  not  necessitated,  for  if  necessi- 
tated it  would  not  be  will,  it  would  not  be  power 
after  the  likeness  of  the  divine  power ;  it  would 
be  mere  physical  or  secondary  cause,  and  com- 
prehended in  the  chain  of  natural  antecedents 
and  sequents. 

God's  will  explains  creation  as  an  existent  fact; 
mairs  will  explains  all  his  volitions.  When  we 
proceed    to  inquire   after   the   characteristics  of 


A    CONTINGENT   WILL.  229 

creation,  we  bring  in  the  idea  of  infinite  wisdom 
and  goodness.  But  when  we  inquire  why  God's 
will  obeyed  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  we 
must  either  represent  his  will  as  necessitated  by 
infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  and  take  with  this 
all  the  consequences  of  an  absolute  necessity;  or 
we  must  be  content  to  stop  short,  with  will  itself 
as  a  first  cause,  not  necessary,  but  contingent, 
which,  explaining  all  effects,  neither  requires  nor 
admits  of  any  explanation  itself. 

When  we  proceed  to  inquire  after  the  charac- 
teristics of  human  volition,  we  bring  in  the  idea  of 
right  and  wrong ;  we  look  at  the  relations  of  the 
reason  and  the  sensitivity.  But  when  we  inquire 
xrlnj  the  will  now  obeys  reason,  and  now  passjon ; 
and  why  this  passion,  or  that  passion ;  we  must 
either  represent  the  will  as  necessitated,  and  take 
all  the  consequences  of  a  necessitated  will,  or  we 
must  stop  short  here  likewise,  with  the  will  itself 
as  a  first  cause,  not  necessary,  but  contingent', 
which,  in  explaining  its  own  volitions,  neither  re- 
quires nor  admits  of  any  explanation  itself,  other 
than  as  a  finite  and  dependent  will  it  requires  to 
be  referred  to  the  infinite  will  in  order  to  account 
for  the  fact  of  its  existence. 

Edwards,  while  he  burdens  the  question  of  the 

will's  determination  with  monstrous  consequen- 
20 


230         EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

ccs,  relieves  it  of  do  one  difficulty.  He  lays  down, 
indeed,  a  uniform  law  of  determination  ;  but  there 
is  a  last  inquiry  which  he  doea  not  presume  to  an- 
swer. The  determination  of  the  will,  or  the  voli- 
tion, is  always  as  the  most  agreeable,  and  is  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable.  But  while  the  will 
is  granted  to  be  one  simple  power  or  capacity, 
there  arise  from  it  an  indefinite  variety  of  voli- 
tions ;  and  volitions  at  one  time  directly  opposed 
to  volitions  at  another  time.  The  question  now 
arises,  how  this  one  simple  capacity  of  volition 
comes  to  produce  such  various  volitions  ?  It  is 
said  in  reply,  that  whatever  may  be  the  volition, 
it  is  at  the  time  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  : 
but  that  it  is  always  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able, respects  only  its  relation  to  the  will  itself; 
the  volition,  intrinsically  considered,  is  at  one 
time  right,  at  another  wrong;  at  one  time  ra- 
tional, at  another  foolish.  The  volition  really  va- 
ries, although,  relatively  to  the  will,  it  always  puts 
on  the  characteristic  of  the  most  agreeable.  The 
question  therefore  returns,  how  this  simple  capa- 
city determines  such  a  variety  of  volitions,  always 
however  representing  them  to  itself  as  the  most 
agreeable  ?  There  are  three  ways  of  answering 
this.  First,  we  may  suppose  the  state  of  the  will 
or  sensitivity  to  remain  unchanged,  and   the  dif- 


A   CONTINGENT    WILL.  231 

ferent  volitions  to  be  effected  by  the  different  ar- 
rangements and  conditions  of  the  objects  relatively 
to  it.  Secondly,  we  may  suppose  the  arrangements 
and  conditions  of  the  objects  to  remain  unchanged, 
and  the  different  volitions  to  be  effected  by  changes 
in  the  state  of  the  sensitivity,  or  will,  relatively  to 
the  objects.  Or,  thirdly,  we  may  suppose  both 
the  state  of  the  will,  and  the  arrangements  and 
conditions  of  the  objects  to  be  subject  to  changes, 
singly  and  mutually,  and  thus  giving  rise  to  the 
different  volitions.  But  our  questionings  are  not 
yet  at  an  end.  On  the  first  supposition,  the  ques- 
tion comes  up,  how  the  different  arrangements 
and  conditions  of  the  objects  are  brought  about? 
On  the  second  supposition,  how  the  changes  in 
the  state  of  the  sensitivity  are  effected  ?  On  the 
third  supposition,  how  the  changes  in  both,  singly 
and  mutually,  are  effected  ?  If  it  could  be  said, 
that  the  sensitivity  changes  itself  relatively  to  the 
objects,  then  we  should  ask  again,  why  the  sensi- 
tivity chooses  at  one  time,  as  most  agreeable  to 
itself,  that  which  is  right  and  rational,  and  at  an- 
other time,  that  which  is  wrong  and  foolish  ?  Or, 
if  it  could  be  said,  that  the  objects  have  the  power 
of  changing  their  own  arrangements  and  condi- 
tions, then  also  we  must  ask,  why  at  one  time  the 
objects  arrange  themselves  to  make  the  right  and 


232         EXAMINATION   OF   AIUUMENTS   AGAINST 

rational  appear  most  agreeable,  and  at  another 
time,  the  wrong  and  foolish? 

These  last  questions  are  the  very  questions 
which  Edwards  does  not  presume  to  answer. 
The  motive  by  which  he  accounts  for  the  existence 
of  the  volition,  is  formed  of  the  correlation  of  the 
state  of  the  will,  and  the  nature  and  circumstances 
of  the  object.  But  when  the  correlation  is  such  as 
to  give  the  volition  in  the  direction  of  the  right 
and  the  rational,  in  opposition  to  the  wrong  and 
the  foolish,  —  we  ask  why  does  the  correlation 
give  the  volition  in  this  direction.  If  it  be  said 
that  the  volition  in  this  direction  appears  most 
agreeable,  the  answer  is  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
question ;  for  the  question  amounts  simply  to 
this:  —  why  the  correlation  is  such  as  to  make 
the  one  agreeable  rather  than  the  other  ?  The  voli- 
tion which  is  itself  only  the  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able, cannot  be  explained  by  affirming  that  it  is 
always  as  the  most  agreeable.  The  point  to  be 
explained  is,  why  the  mind  changes  its  state  in 
relation  to  the  objects  ;  or  why  the  objects  change 
their  relations  to  the  mind,  so  as  to  produce  this 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable  in  one  direction  rather 
than  in  another  ?  The  difficulty  is  precisely  of 
the  same  nature  which  is  supposed  to  exist  in  the 
case  of  a  contingent  will.     The  will  noic  goes  in 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  233 

the  direction  of  reason,  and  now  in  the  direction 
of  passion,  —  but  why  ?  We  say,  because  as  will, 
it  has  the  power  of  thus  varying  its  movement. 
The  change  is  accounted  for  by  merely  referring 
to  the  will. 

According  to  Edwards,  the  correlation  of  will 
and  its  objects,  now  gives  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable,  or  volition,  in  the  direction  of  the  rea- 
son ;  and  now  in  the  direction  of  passion  —  but 
why  .'  —  Why  does  the  reason  now  appear  most 
agreeable,  —  and  now  the  indulgences  of  im- 
pure desire  ?  I  choose  this  because  it  is  most 
agreeable,  says  Edwards,  which  is  equivalent  to 
saying, —  I  have  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  in 
reference  to  this,  because  it  is  most  agreeable  ;  — 
but  how  do  you  know  it  is  the  most  agreeable  ? 
because  I  choose  it,  or  have  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable  in  reference  to  it.  It  is  plain,  therefore, 
that  on  Edwards's  system,  as  well  as  on  that  op- 
posed to  it,  the  particular  direction  of  volition,  and 
the  constant  changes  of  volition,  must  be  referred 
simply  to  the  cause  of  volition,  without  giving  any 
other  explanation  of  the  different  determinations 
of  this  cause,  except  referring  them  to  the  nature 
of  the  cause  itself.  It  is  possible,  indeed,  to  refer 
the  changes  in  the  correlation  to  some  cause 
which  governs  the  correlation  of  the  will  anil  its 
20* 


984  EXAMINATION   OF   AUGUMKNTS    AGAINST 

objects  ;  but  then  t!ic  question  must  arise  in  rela- 
tion to  this  cause,  why  it  determines  the  correla- 
tion in  one  direction  at  one  time,  and  in  another 
direction   at   another   time  ?     And   this  could  be 
answered  only  by  referring  it  to  itself  as  having 
the  capacity  of  these  various  determinations  as 
a  power  to   do  or  not  to   do,   and  a   power  to 
determine  in  a  given  direction,  or  in  the  opposite 
direction  ;  or  by  referring  it  to  still  another  ante- 
cedent cause.     Now  let  us  suppose  this  last  ante- 
cedent to  be  the  infinite  will  :  then  the  question 
would  be,  why  the  infinite  will  determines  the 
sensitivity,  or  will  of  his  creatures  at  one  time  to 
wisdom,  and  at  another  to  folly  ?    And  what  an- 
swer could   be  given  ?     Shall  it  be  said  that  it 
seems  most  agreeable  to  him  ?     But  why  docs  it 
seem  most  agreeable  to  him  ?     Is  it  because  the 
particular  determination  is  the  most  reasonable, 
that  it  seems  most  agreeable  ?    But  why  does  he 
determine  always  according  to  the  most  reason- 
able ?     Is  it  because  to  determine  according  to 
the  most  reasonable,  seems  most  agreeable  ?  Now, 
inasmuch  as  according  to  Edwards,  the  volition 
and  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  are  the  same  ; 
to  say  that  God  wills  as  he  does  will,  because  it 
is  most  agreeable  to  him,  is  to  say  that  he  wills 
because  he  wills ;  and  to  sav  that  he  wills  as  he 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  235 

does  will,  because  it  seems  most  reasonable  to 
him.  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  because  he  wills 
according  to  the  most  reasonable  only  because  it 
is  the  most  agreeable. 

To  represent  the  volitions,  or  choices,  either  in 
the  human  or  divine  will,  as  determined  by  mo- 
tives, removes  therefore  no  difficulty  which  is 
supposed  to  pertain  to  contingent  self-determina- 
tion. 

Let  us  compare  the  two  theories  particularly, 
although  at  the  hazard  of  some  repetition. 

Contingent  self-determination  represents  the 
will  as  a  cause  making  its  nisus  or  volitions  of 
itself,  and  determining  their  direction  of  itself — 
now  obeying  reason,  and  now  obeying  passion. 
If  it  be  asked  why  it  determines  in  a  particular 
direction?  —  if  this  particular  direction  in  which  it 
determines  be  that  of  the  reason  ?  —  then  it  may  be 
said,  that  it  determines  in  this  direction  because 
it  is  reasonable; — if  this  particular  direction  be 
that  of  passion,  as  opposed  to  reason,  then  it  may 
be  said  that  it  determines  in  this  direction,  because 
it  is  pleasing.  But  if  it  be  asked  why  the  will 
goes  in  the  direction  of  reason,  rather  than  in  that 
of  passion,  as  opposed  to  reason  ?  — we  cannot  say 
that  it  is  most  reasonable  to  obey  reason  and  not 
passion  ;  because  the  one  is  all  reason,  and  the 


23G        EXAMINATION   OF  AROUKENTB    A.OAIN8T 

oilier  is  all  passion,  and  <>f  course  they  cannot  be 
compared  under  the  reasonable  ;  and  no  more 
can  they  be  compared  under  the  pleasing,  — when, 
by  the  pleasing,  we  understand,  the  gratification  of 
desire,  as  opposed  to  reason.  To  obey  reason 
because  it  is  reasonable,  is  nothing  more  than  the 
statement  of  the  fact  that  the  will  does  obey  rea- 
son. To  obey  desire  because  it  is  desirable,  is 
nothing  more  than  the  statement  of  the  fact  that 
the  will  does  obey  desire.  The  will  goes  in  one 
direction  rather  than  in  another  by  an  act  of  self- 
determination,  which  neither  admits  of,  nor  indeed 
requires  any  other  explanation  than  this,  that  the 
will  has  power  to  do  one  or  the  other,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  this  power,  it  does  one  rather  than  the 
other. 

To  this  stands  contrasted  the  system  of  Ed- 
wards ;  and  what  is  this  system  ?  That  the  will  is 
determined  by  the  strongest  motive; — and  what 
is  the  strongest  motive  ?  The  greatest  apparent 
good,  or  the  most  agreeable  :  —  what  constitutes 
the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  the  most  agreeable  ? 
The  correlation  of  will  or  sensitivity  and  the  ob- 
ject. But  why  does  the  correlation  make  one 
object  appear  more  agreeable  than  another ;  or 
make  the  same  object  at  one  time  appear  agree- 
able, at  another   time  disagreeable  ?     Now  this 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  237 

question  is  equivalent  to  the  question,  —  why  does 
the  will  go  in  the  direction  of  one  object  rather 
than  of  another  ;  or  go  in  the  direction  of  a  given 
object  at  one  time,  and  in  opposition  to  it  at  an- 
other time  ?  For  the  will  to  determine  itself  to- 
ward an  object  in  one  system,  answers  to  the  will 
having  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  towards 
an  object  in  Edwards's  system.  If  Edwards 
should  attempt  to  give  an  answer  without  going 
beyond  the  motive,  he  could  only  say  that  the 
sensitivity  has  the  power  of  being  affected  with 
the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  or  of  the  most 
disagreeable  ;  and  that  in  the  exercise  of  this  pow- 
er it  is  affected  with  the  one  rather  than  with  the 
other.  He  could  not  say  that  to  obey  reason 
appears  more  agreeable  than  to  obey  passion  as 
opposed  to  reason,  for  the  obedience  of  the  will 
on  his  system,  is  nothing  more  than  a  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable.  Nor  could  he  say  it  is  more 
reasonable  to  obey  reason,  for  reason  cannot  be 
compared  with  its  opposite,  under  the  idea  of 
itself;  and  if  he  could  say  this,  it  amounts  to  no 
more  than  this,  on  his  system,  that  it  is  most  agree- 
able to  obey  the  reasonable;  —  that  is,  the  rea- 
sonable is  obeyed  only  as  the  most  agreeable  : 
but  obedience  of  will  being  nothing  more  than  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  to  say  it  is  obeyed 


"238  EXAMINATION    OF    ARGUMENTS    AGAINST 

because  most  .agreeable,  is  merely  to  say  that  if 
awakens  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  j  that  is, 
it  is  obej  -  j  cd. 

To  refer  the  motive  to  the  divine  determina- 
tion makes  volition  necessary  to  the  man,  and 
throws  the  difficulty  in  question,  if  it  is  to  be  con- 
sidered a  difficulty,  only  farther  back. 

If  God's  will  determines  in  the  direction  of  the 
reasonable  because  it  is  most  agreeable,  then  we 
ask,  why  is  it  the  most  agreeable  ?  If  the  re- 
ply be,  because  it  is  most  reasonable,  then  we 
are  only  moving  in  a  circle  ;  but  if  the  agreea- 
ble be  taken  as  an  ultimate  fact,  then  inasmuch  as 
to  will  is  only  to  have  the  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable,  it  follows  that  God  has  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable  towards  an  object  only  because  it  is 
most  agreeable  to  him,  or  awakens  this  sense  in 
him;  and  thus  the  question  why  God  wills  in  one 
direction  rather  than  in  another,  or  what  is  the 
cause  of  his  determination,  is  not  answered  by 
Edwards,  unless  he  says  with  us  that  the  will  in 
itself  as  a  power  to  do  or  not  to  do,  or  to  do  one 
thing,  or  its  opposite,  is  a  sufficient  explanation, 
and  the  only  possible  explanation  ;  — or  unless  he 
refers  the  divine  will  to  an  antecedent  cause,  and 
this  again  to  another  antecedent  cause,  in  an  end- 
less series  —  and  thus  introduce  the  two-fold  er- 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  239 

ror  of  an  endless  series,  and  an  absolute  neces- 
sity. 

All  possible  volitions,  according  to  the  scheme  of 
psychology  I  have  above  given, must  be  either  in  the 
direction  of  the  reason  or  of  the  sensitivity,  cr  in 
the  indifferency  of  both.  If  the  volition  be  in  the 
direction  of  the  reason,  it  takes  the  characteristics 
of  rational,  good,  &c.  If  in  the  direction  of  the 
sensitivity,  it  takes  its  characteristic  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  particular  desire  which  it  obeys  :  —  it 
is  generous,  benevolent,  kind,  &c.  —  or  it  is  ma- 
licious, envious,  unkind,  vicious,  &c.  What  moves 
the  will  to  go  in  the  direction  of  the  reason  ? 
Nothing  moves  it ;  it  is  a  cause  per  se  ;  it  goes  in 
that  direction  because  it  has  power  to  go  in  that 
direction.  What  moves  the  will  to  go  in  the  di- 
rection of  the  sensitivity?  Nothing  moves  it;  it 
is  a  cause  per  se ;  it  goes  in  that  direction  be- 
cause it  has  power  to  go  in  that  direction. 

There  are  in  the  intelligence  or  reason,  as  uni- 
ted with  the  will  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind, 
necessary  convictions  of  the  true,  the  just,  the 
right.  There  are  in  the  sensitivity,  as  united  in 
the  same  constitution,  necessary  affections  of  tiie 
agreeable  and  the  disagreeable  in  reference  to 
various  objects.     The  will  as  the  power  which  by 


240         i:\.\MINATION   OF   ABGUMEHTS    AGAINST 

its  nisus  j)roduccs  changes  or  phenomena,  is  con- 
scious of  ability  to  go  in  either  of  these  directions, 
or  in  opposition  to  both.  Now  when  it  makes 
its  nisus  or  volition  in  reference  to  the  true,  the 
just,  the  good  i  should  we  attempt  to  explain  this 
nisus  by  saying  that  the  true,  the  just,  the  good, 
atl'eet  the  sensitivity  agreeably,  this  would  only 
amount  to  saying  that  the  nisus  is  made  towards 
the  true,  not  as  the  true,  but  only  as  the  agreea- 
ble ;  and  then  we  would  introduce  the  law  that 
the  nisus  is  always  made  in  the  direction  of  the 
agreeable.  But  then  again  we  might  seek  to  ex- 
plain why  the  nisus  is  always  made  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  agreeable.  Is  it  of  an  antecedent  ne- 
cessity ?  Then  wo  have  an  absolute  and  univer- 
sal necessity.  Is  it  because  to  go  in  the  direction 
of  the  agreeable  seems  most  rational  ?  Then  it 
follows  that  the  nisus  is  made  towards  the  agree- 
able not  as  the  agreeable,  but  only  as  the  ration- 
al ;  and  then  we  would  introduce  the  law  that  the 
nisus  is  always  made  in  the  direction  of  the  ra- 
tional. But  then  again  we  might  seek  to  explain 
why  this  nisus  is  always  made  in  the  direction  of 
the  rational.  Is  it  of  an  antecedent  necessity  ? 
Then  here  likewise  we  have  an  absolute  and  uni- 
versal necessity.  Is  it  because  to  go  in  the  di- 
rection of  the   rational   seems  most   agreeable  ? 


A   CONTINGENT    WILL.  241 

Then  wc  are  winding  back  in  a  circle  to  our  first 
position. 

How  shall  we  escape  from  these  difficulties  ? 
Shall  wre  adopt  the  psychology  of  Edwards,  and 
make  the  will  and  the  sensitivity  one  ?  Then  as 
the  volition  is  always  the  strongest  affection  of  the 
agreeable,  if  the  sensitivity  be  necessary,  voli- 
tions are  necessary,  and  we  are  plunged  head- 
long again  into  an  absolute  and  universal  necessity. 
If  the  sensitivity  be  not  necessary,  then  we  have 
shown  fully,  above,  that  we  have  to  account  for 
its  various  determinations  just  as  we  are  suppos- 
ed to  be  called  upon  to  account  for  the  various 
determinations  of  the  will  when  considered  as  a 
power  distinct  from  the  sensitivity: — we  are  met 
with  the  questions,  why  does  the  sensitivity  rep- 
resent this  object  as  more  agreeable  than  that 
object  ?  —  or  the  same  object  as  agreeable  at  one 
time,  and  disagreeable  at  another  ?  Or  if  these 
various  determinations  are  resolved  into  an  an- 
tecedent necessity  comprehending  them,  then  we 
go  up  to  the  antecedent  cause  in  which  this  ne- 
cessity resides,  and  question  it  in  like  manner. 

But  one  thing  remains,  and  that  is  to  consider 
the  will  as  primary  cause,  contingent  in  opposi- 
tion to  being  necessitated  —  a  cause  having  in  it- 
self the  power  of  making  these  various  volitions  or 
21 


242       KWMIN.VTION  OF    \  K<- 1  MI'.NTS   AGAINST 

;iis us,  and  neither  asking  nor  allowing  of  any  ex- 
planation of  its  acts,  or  their  particular  direction, 
save  its  own  peculiarity  and  energy  as  will. 

The  question  respecting  the  indifferency  of  will 
must  now  be  considered.  The  term  indifferency 
comes  up  in  consequence  of  considering  the  will 
as  distinct  from  the  sensitivity.  It  is  not  desire 
or  feeling  —  it  is  a  power  indifferent  to  the  agrec- 
ableness  or  disagreeableness  of  objects. 

It  is  also  a  power  distinct  from  the  reason  ;  it 
is  not  conviction  or  belief —  it  is  a  power  indif- 
ferent to  the  true  and  the  right,  to  the  false  and 
the  wrong,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
determined  by  conviction  and  belief,  by  the  true 
and  the  right,  or  by  the  false  and  the  wrong. 
The  conception  of  will  in  its  utmost  simplicity  is 
the  conception  of  pure  power,  self-moving,  and 
self-conscious  —  containing  within  itself  the  ground 
and  the  possibility  of  creation  and  of  modification. 
In  God  it  is  infinite,  eternal,  uncreated  power  ; 
and  every  nisus  in  his  will  is  really  creative  or 
modifying,  according  to  its  self-directed  aim.  In 
man  it  is  constituted,  dependent,  limited,  and  ac- 
countable. 

Now  in  direct  connexion  with  power,  we  have 
the  conception  of  law  or  rule,  or  what  power 
ought  to  do.     This  law  or  rule  is  revealed  in  the 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL. 


reason.  In  man  as  pure,  and  we  conclude  in  God 
likewise,  as  the  archetype  of  all  spirit,  there  is 
given  a  sensitivity  or  a  capacity  to  be  affected 
agreeably  by,  and  to  be  drawn  towards  the  ob- 
jects approved  and  commanded  by  the  reason. 
If  this  sensitivity  does  not  move  in  harmony  with 
the  reason,  it  is  corrupted.  Now  will  is  placed 
in  a  triunity  with  these  two  other  powers.  We 
can  distinguish  but  not  separate  it  from  them.  A 
will  without  reason  would  be  a  power  without 
eyes,  or  light.  A  will  without  sensitivity  would 
be  a  power  stern  and  isolated;  — just  as  a  reason 
and  sensitivity  without  will,  would  be  without  ef- 
ficiency, or  capacity  of  giving  real  manifesta- 
tions. 

The  completeness  and  perfection  of  each,  lies 
in  a  union  with  all ;  but  then  each  in  its  proper 
movements  is  in  some  sense  independent  and  free 
of  the  others.  The  convictions,  beliefs,  or  per- 
ceptions of  reason  are  not  made,  nor  can  they  be 
unmade  by  the  energy  of  the  will.  Nor  has  the 
will  any  direct  command  over  the  sensitivitv. 
And  yet  the  will  can  excite  and  direct  both  the 
reason  and  the  sensitivity,  by  calling  up  objects 
and  occasions.  The  sensitivity  does  not  govern 
the  reason,  and  yet  it  supplies  conditions  which 
are  necessary  to  its  manifestations. 


244       EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AOAINST 

The  reason  does  not  govern  the  sensitivity,  and 
yet  the  latter  would  have  no  definite  perception, 
and  of  course  its  highest  sensibilities  would  lie 
dormant  without  the  reason. 

So  also  the  reason  and  the  sensitivity  do  not 
determine  the  acts  of  the  will.  The  will  has  ef- 
ficiency, or  creative  and  modifying  power  in  it- 
self—  self-moved,  self-directed.  But  then  without 
reason  and  sensitivity,  the  will  would  be  without 
objects,  without  designs,  without  rules,  —  a  solita- 
ry power,  conscious  of  ability  to  do,  but  not  know- 
ing what  to  do. 

It  addition  to  the  above,  the  will  has  this  high 
and  distinguishing  peculiarity.  That  it  alone  is 
free  —  that  it  alone  is  opposed  to  necessity.  Rea- 
son must  perceive,  must  believe.  Sensitivity  must 
feel  when  its  objects  are  presented ;  but  will, 
when  the  reason  has  given  its  light  and  uttered 
its  commands,  —  and  when  the  sensitivity  has 
awakened  all  its  passions  and  emotions,  is  not 
compelled  to  obey.  It  is  as  conscious  of  power 
not  to  do,  as  of  power  to  do.  It  may  be  called  a 
power  arbitrary  and  contingent ;  but  this  means 
only  that  it  is  a  power  which  absolutely  puts  forth 
its  own  nisus,  and  is  free. 

It  follows  from  this,  that  the  will  can  act  irre- 
spective of  both  reason  and  sensitivity,  if  an  ob- 


A   CONTINGENT   WILL.  245 

ject  of  action,  bearing  no  relation  to  reason  or 
sensitivity,  be  possible.  It  is  plain  that  an  object 
bearing  no  such  relation,  must  be  very  trifling. 
If  a  case  in  illustration  could  not  be  called  up,  it 
would  not  argue  anything  against  the  indifferency 
of  will  ;  —  it  would  only  prove  that  all  objects  of 
action  actually  existing,  bear  some  relation  to 
reason  and  sensitivity.  There  is  a  case,  how- 
ever, frequently  called  up,  and  much  disputed, 
which  deserves  some  attention,  and  which  it  ap- 
pears to  me,  offers  the  illustration  required.  Let 
it  be  required  to  select  one  of  the  squares  of  the 
chess-board.  In  selecting  one  of  the  squares, 
does  the  will  act  irrespective  of  reason  and  sen- 
sitivity, or  not  ?  Those  who  hold  that  the  will  is 
necessarily  determined,  must  make  out  some  con- 
nexion between  the  act  of  selection,  and  the  rea- 
son and  sensitivity.  It  is  affirmed  that  there  is  a 
general  motive  which  determines  the  whole  pro- 
cess, viz :  the  aim  or  desire  to  illustrate,  if  possi- 
ble, the  question  in  dispute.  The  motive  is,  to 
prove  that  the  will  can  act  without  a  motive. 

I  reply  to  this,  that  this  is  undoubtedly  the  mo- 
tive of  bringing  the  chess-board  before  the  eye, 
and  in  making  all  the  preparations  for  a  selection  ; 
— but  now  the  last  question  is,  which  square  shall  I 
select  ?  The  illustration  will  have  the  same  force 
21* 


846         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS  AGAIN- f 

whichever  square  is  selected,  and  there  is  no 
motive  that  can  be  drawn  cither  from  the  reason 
or  the  sensitivity  for  taking  one  square  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  other:  under  the  absence  of  all  such 
motives,  and  affording  each  time  the  same  at- 
tempt at  illustration,  I  can  vary  the  selection 
sixty-four  times :  in  making  this  selection,  there- 
fore, it  appears  to  me,  there  is  an  entire  indiffer- 
ency  as  to  which,  particular  square  is  selected ; 
—  there  is  no  command  of  the  reason  directing  to 
one  square  rather  than  another  ;  —  there  is  no  af- 
fection of  the  sensitivity  towards  one  square  ra- 
ther than  another,  as  most  agreeable  —  and  yet 
the  will  does  select  one  of  the  squares. 

It  will  be  proper,  in  this  place,  to  consider  the 
following  argument  of  Edwards  against  indiffer- 
ence of  will :  "Choice  may  be  immediately  after 
a  state  of  indifference,  but  cannot  co-exist  with  it: 
even  the  very  beginning  of  it  is  not  in  a  state  of 
indifference.  And,,  therefore,  if  this  be  liberty,  no 
act  of  the  will,  in  any  degree,  is  ever  performed 
in  a  state  of  liberty,  or  in  the  time  of  liberty.  Vo- 
lition and  liberty  are  so  far  from  agreeing  to- 
gether, and  being  essential  one  to  another,  that 
they  are  contrary  one  to  another,  and  one  ex- 
cludes and  destroys  the  other,  as  much  as  motion 
and  rest,  light  and  darkness,  or  life  and  deaths 
(p.  73.) 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  247 

Edwards  reasons  according  to  his  own  psycho- 
logy: If  the  will  and  the  sensitivity  are  one,  the  will 
cannot  well  be  conceived  of  as  in  a  state  of  indiffe- 
rence, and  if  it  could  be  conceived  of  as  in  a  state 
of  indifference  before  it  exercises  volition,  inasmuch 
as,  according  to  his  system  again,  volition  is  the 
sense  of  the  most  agreeable,  the  moment  volition 
begins,  indifference  ceases;  and  hence,  if  liberty 
consist  in  indifference,  liberty  must  cease  when 
volition  takes  place,  just  as  rest  ceases  with  motion. 

But  according  to  the  system  of  psychology, 
which  we  adopt,  and  which  I  shall  verify  here- 
after, the  will  is  not  one  with  the  sensitivity, 
but  is  clearly  distinguishable  from  it: — the  sen- 
sitivity is  the  capacity  of  feeling  ;  the  will  is  the 
causality  of  the  soul: — a  movement  of  the  sensi- 
tivity, under  the  quality  of  indifference,  is  self- 
contradictory;  and  a  movement  of  the  will  being 
a  mere  nisus  of  cause,  under  the  quality  of  any 
sense  and  feeling  whatever,  would  be  self-contra- 
dictory likewise;  it  would  be  confounding  that 
which  we  had  already  distinguished.  From  Ed- 
wards's very  definition  of  will  it  cannot  be  indiffe- 
rent ;  from  our  very  definition  of  will  it  cannot 
be  otherwise  than  indifferent.  When  it  deter- 
mines exclusively  of  both  reason  and  sensitivity, 
it  of  course  must  retain,  in  the  action,  the  indiffc- 


248  i:\VMI\ATION    OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

rencc  which  it  possessed  before  the  action  ;  but 
this  is  no  less  true  when  it  determines  in  the  di- 
rection cither  of  reason  or  sensitivity.  When  the 
determination  is  in  the  direction  of  the  reason, 
there  is  an  exercise  of  reason  in  connexion  with 
the  act,  and  all  the  interest  of  the  reason  is 
wakened  up,  but  the  will  considered  in  its  entire 
simplicity,  knows  only  the  nisus  of  power.  When 
the  determination  is  in  the  direction  of  the  sensi- 
tivity, there  is  a  play  of  emotions  and  passions, 
but  the  will  again  knows  only  the  nisus  of  power 
which  carries  it  in  this  direction. 

In  the  unity  of  the  soul  these  powers  are 
generally  found  acting  together.  It  may  be 
difficult  to  distinguish  them,  and  this,  in  con- 
nexion with  the  constantly  observed  fact  of  the 
fixed  correlation  between  physical  causes  and  the 
masses  which  they  operate  upon,  may  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  is  a  fixed  correlation  like- 
wise between  the  will  and  its  objects,  regarding 
the  will  as  the  sensitivity  ;  or  at  least,  that  there  is 
a  fixed  connexion  between  the  will  and  the  sensi- 
tivity, so  that  the  former  is  invariably  governed 
by  the  latter.  We  have  already  shown,  that  to 
identify  sensitivity  and  will  does  not  relieve  us 
from  the  difficulties  of  a  self-determined  and  con- 
tingent will,  unless  we  plunge  into  absolute  neces- 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL.  240 

sity  ;  and  that  to  make  the  sensitivity  govern  the 
will,  is  only  transferring  to  the  sensitivity  the  diffi- 
culties which  we  suppose,  to  encompass  the  will. 
In  our  psychological  investigations  it  will  appear 
how  clearly  distinguishable  those  powers  are,  and 
also  how  clearly  independent  and  sovereign  will 
is,  inasmuch  as  it  does  actually  determine  at  one 
time,  in  opposition  to  the  most  agreeable  ;  at  an- 
other, in  opposition  to  reason ;  and  at  another,  in 
opposition  to  both  conjoined.  In  the  unity  of  our 
being,  however,  we  perceive  that  will  is  designed 
to  obey  the  reason,  and  as  subordinated  to  rea- 
son, to  move  within  the  delights  of  the  sensitivi- 
ty; and  we  know  that  we  are  acting  unreason- 
ably and  senselessly  when  we  act  otherwise ;  but 
yet  unreasonably  and  senselessly  do  we  often 
act.  But  when  we  do  obey  reason,  although  we 
characterize  the  act  from  its  direction,  will  does 
not  lose  its  simplicity  and  become  reason ;  and 
when  we  do  obey  the  sensitivity,  will  does  not  be- 
come sensitivity  —  will  is  still  simply  cause,  and 
its  act  the  nisus  of  power:  thought,  and  con- 
viction, and  design,  hold  their  place  in  the  reason 
alone  :  emotion  and  passion  their  place  in  the 
sensitivity  alone. 


250         EXAMINATION   OF   AIUJUMJ'.NTS   AGAINST 


ARGUMENT 


THE   DIVINE   PRESCIENCE. 

Edwards's  argument  against  a  contingent,  self- 
determining  will,  drawn  from  the  divine  presci- 
ence, remains  to  be  considered. 

The  argument  is  introduced  as  follows  :  "  That 
the  acts  of  the  wills  of  moral  agents  are  not  con- 
tingent events,  in  such  a  sense  as  to  be  without 
all  necessity,  appears  by  God's  certain  foreknow- 
ledge of  such  events."  (sec.  xi.  p.  98.)  Edwards 
devotes  this  section  to  "  the  evidence  of  God's 
certain  foreknowledge  of  the  volitions  of  moral 
agents."  In  the  following  section,  (sec.  xii.  p. 
114,)  he  proceeds  formally  with  his  argument. 
Before  examining  this  argument,  let  us  look  at 
the  consequences  of  his  position. 

God  foresees  all  volitions ;  that  he  foresees 
them  makes  their  existence  necessary.  If  their 
existence  were  not  necessary,  he  could  not  fore- 
see them ;  or,  to  express  it  still  more  generally, 
foreknowledge  extends  to  all  events,  and  fore- 
knowledge proves  the  necessary  existence  of 
everything  to  which  it  extends.     It  follows  from 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL.  251 

this,  that  all  events  exist  with  an  absolute  neces- 
sity,—  all  physical  phenomena,  all  volitions,  and 
moral  phenomena,  whether  good  or  evil,  and  all 
the  divine  volitions,  for  God  cannot  but  foresee 
his  own  volitions.  In  no  part  of  his  work,  does 
Edwards  lay  down  more  summarily  and  deci- 
dedly, the  doctrine  of  absolute  and  universal  ne- 
cessity. We  have  already,  in  part  II.  of  this 
treatise,  deduced  the  consequences  of  this  doc- 
trine. If  then  we  are  placed  upon  the  alternative 
of  denying  the  divine  prescience  of  volitions,  or 
of  acknowledging  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  it 
would  practically  be  most  desirable  and  wisest  to 
take  the  first  part  of  the  alternative.  "  If  it  could 
be  demonstrated,"  remarks  Dugald  Stewart,  (vol. 
5.  app.  sec.  viii.)  u  which  in  my  opinion  has  not 
yet  been  done,  that  the  prescience  of  the  volitions 
of  moral  agents  is  incompatible  with  the  free  agen- 
cy of  man,  the  logical  inference  would  be,  not  in 
favour  of  the  scheme  of  necessity,  but  that  there 
are  some  events,  the  foreknowledge  of  which  im- 
plies an  impossibility.  Shall  we  venture  to  affirm, 
that  it  exceeds  the  power  of  God  to  permit  such 
a  train  of  contingent  events  to  take  place,  as  his 
own  foreknowledge  shall  not  extend  to  ?  Does 
not  such  a  proposition  detract  from  the  omnipo- 
tence of  God,  in  the  same  proportion  in  which  it 


252        EXAMINATION   OF  ASOBMBNTfl  AGAINST 

aims  to  exalt  his  omniscience  !"  If  the  divine 
foreknowledge  goes  to  establish  the  doctrine  of 
necessity,  there  is  nothing  left  that  it  is  worth 
while  to  contend  for;  all  mora]  and  theological 
interests  vanish  away.  But  let  us  examine  the 
argument  of  Edwards. 

This  argument  consists  of  three  parts  ;  we  shall 
consider  them  in  order. 

I.  Edwards  lays  down,  that  a  past  event  is  ne- 
cessary, "having  already  made  sure  of  existence;" 
but  divine  foreknowledge  is  such  an  event,  and  is 
therefore  necessary.  This  is  equivalent  to  the 
axiom,  that  whatever  is,  is.  He  next  affirms,  that 
whatever  is  "  indissolubly  connected  with  other 
things  that  are  necessary,  are  themselves  neces- 
sary ;"  but  events  infallibly  foreknown,  have  an 
indissoluble  connexion  with  the  foreknowledge. 
Hence,  the  volitions  infallibly  foreknown  by  God, 
have  an  indissoluble  connexion  with  his  foreknow- 
ledge, and  are  therefore  necessary. 

The  force  of  this  reasoning  turns  upon  the  con- 
nexion between  foreknowledge  and  the  events 
foreknown.  This  connexion  is  affinned  to  be 
"  indissoluble  ;"  that  is,  the  foreknowledge  is  cer- 
tainly connected  with  the  event.  But  this  only 
amounts  to  the  certainty  of  divine  foreknowledge, 
and  proves  nothing  as  to  the  nature  of  the  exist- 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL.  253 

ence  foreknown.  We  may  certainly  know  a  past 
or  present  event,  but  our  knowledge  of  its  exist- 
ence defines  nothing  as  to  the  manner  in  wliich  it 
came  to  exist.  I  look  out  of  my  window,  and  I 
see  a  man  walking  in  a  certain  direction  :  I  have 
a  positive  knowledge  of  this  event,  and  it  cannot 
but  be  that  the  man  is  walking ;  but  then  my 
knowledge  of  his  walking  has  no  influence  upon 
his  walking,  as  cause  or  necessary  antecedent ; 
and  the  question  whether  his  walking  be  contin- 
gent or  necessary  is  entirely  distinct,  and  relates 
to  the  cause  of  walking.  I  looked  out  of  my 
window  yesterday,  and  saw  a  man  walking  ;  and 
the  knowledge  of  that  event  I  now  retain,  so  that 
it  cannot  but  be  that  the  man  walked  yesterday : 
but  this  again  leaves  the  question  respecting  the 
mode  of  existence  untouched :  —  Did  the  man  walk 
of  necessity,  or  was  it  a  contingent  event  ?  Now 
let  me  suppose  myself  endowed  with  the  faculty 
of  prescience,  sufficiently  to  know  the  events  of 
to-morrow  ;  then  by  this  faculty  I  may  see  a  man 
walking  in  the  time  called  to-morrow,  just  as  by 
the  faculty  of  memory  I  see  a  man  walking  in  the 
time  called  yesterday.  The  knowledge,  whether 
it  relate  to  past,  present,  or  future,  as  a  knowledge 
in  relation  to  myself,  is  always  a  present  know- 
ledge ;  but  the  object  known  may  stand  in  various 
22 


^51  EXAMINATION    OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

relations  of  time,  place,  &c.  Now  in  relation  to 
the  future,  no  more  than  in  relation  to  the  past 
and  present,  does  the  act  of  knowledge  on  my 
part,  explain  anything  in  relation  to  the  mode  of 
\istcnce  of  the  object  of  knowledge.  Ed- 
wards remarks,  (p.  121.)  "All  certain  knowledge, 
whether  it  be  foreknowledge,  or  after-knowledge, 
or  concomitant  knowledge,  proves  the  thing  known 
now  to  be  necessary,  by  some  means  or  other  ;  or 
proves  that  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  now  be 
otherwise  than  true." 

Edwards  does  not  distinguish  between  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  mere  fact  of  existence,  and  the  ne- 
cessity by  which  anything  comes  to  exist.  Fore- 
knowledge, after-knowledge,  and  concomitant 
knowledge,  —  that  is,  the  present  knowledge  of 
events,  future,  past,  or  present, —  proves  of  course 
the  reality  of  the  events ;  that  they  will  be,  have 
been,  or  are :  or,  more  strictly  speaking,  the 
knowledge  of  an  event,  in  any  relation  of  time,  is 
the  affirmation  of  its  existence  in  that  relation ; 
but  the  knowledge  of  the  event  neither  proves  nor 
affirms  the  necessity  of  its  existence.  If  the  know- 
ledge of  the  event  were  the  cause  of  the  event,  or 
if  it  genetically  comprehended  it  in  its  own  exist- 
ence, then,  upon  strict  logical  principles,  the  neces- 
sity affirmed  of  the  knowledge  would  be  affirmed 
of  the  event  likewise. 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  255 

That  God  foreknows  all  volitions  is  granted ; 
that  as  he  foreknows  them,  they  will  be,  is  also 
granted  ;  his  foreknowledge  of  them  is  the  posi- 
tive affirmation  of  their  reality  in  time  future  ; 
but  by  supposition,  God's  foreknowledge  is  not 
their  cause,  and  does  not  generically  comprehend 
them  ;  they  are  caused  by  wills  acting  in  the  fu- 
ture. Hence  God's  foreseeing  how  the  wills  act- 
ing in  the  time  future,  will  put  forth  or  determine 
their  volitions,  does  not  take  away  from  these 
wills  the  contingency  and  freedom  belonging  to 
them,  any  more  than  our  witnessing  how  wills 
act  in  the  time  present,  takes  away  from  them 
their  contingency  and  freedom.  God  in  his  pre- 
science, is  the  spectator  of  the  future,  as  really  as 
we  are  the  spectators  of  the  present. 

Edwards's  reasoning  is  a  sort  of  puzzle,  like 
that  employed  sometimes  for  exercising  the  stu- 
dent of  logic  in  the  detection  of  fallacies :  for  ex- 
ample, a  man  in  a  given  place,  must  necessarily 
either  stay  in  that  place,  or  go  away  from  that 
place  ;  therefore,  whether  he  stays  or  goes  away, 
he  acts  necessarily.  Now  it  is  necessary,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  a  man  as  well  as  any  other 
body  should  be  in  some  place,  but  then  it  does 
not  follow  from  this,  that  his  determination, 
whether  to  stay  or  go,  is  a  necessary  determina- 


856        i EXAMINATION  or   LBSUMENTfl   &GAIN8T 

tion.  His  necessary  condition  as  a  body,  is  entire- 
ly distinct  from  the  question  respecting  the  ne- 
cessity or  contingency  of  his  volitions.  And  so 
also  in  respect  of  the  divine  foreknowledge :  all 
human  volitions  as  events  occurring  in  time,  arc 
subject  to  the  necessary  condition  of  being  fore- 
known by  that  Being,  "who  inhabiteth  eternity/* 
but  this  necessary  condition  of  their  existence 
neither  proves  nor  disproves  the  necessity  or  the 
contingency  of  their  particular  causation. 

II.  The  second  proposition  in  Edwards's  argu- 
ment is,  "  No  future  event  can  be  certainly  fore- 
known, whose  existence  is  contingent,  and  without 
all  necessity."  His  reasoning  in  support  of  this  is 
as  follows:  1.  "It  is  impossible  for  a  thing  to  be 
certainly  known  to  any  intellect  without  cviderice." 

2.  A  contingent  future  event  is  without  evidence. 

3.  Therefore,  a  contingent  future  event  is  not  a 
possible  object  of  knowledge.  I  dispute  both  pre- 
mises: That  which  is  known  by  evidence  or  proof 
is  mediate  knowledge,  —  that  is,  we  know  it 
through  something  which  is  immediate,  standing 
between  the  faculty  of  knowledge  and  the  object 
of  knowledge  in  question.  That  which  is  known 
intuitively  is  known  without  proof,  and  this  is  im- 
vi<  (Hate  knowledge.  In  this  way  all  axioms  or 
first  truths  and  all  facts  of  the  senses  are  known. 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  257 

Indeed  evidence  itself  implies  immediate  know- 
ledge, for  the  evidence  by  which  anything  is  known 
is  itself  immediate  knowledge.  To  a  Being,  there- 
fore, whose  knowledge  fills  duration,  future  and 
past  events  may  be  as  immediately  known  as  pre- 
sent events.  Indeed,  can  we  conceive  of  God 
otherwise  than  immediately  knowing  all  things? 
An  Infinite  and  Eternal  Intelligence  cannot  be 
thought  of  under  relations  of  time  and  space,  or 
as  arriving  at  knowledge  through  media  of  proof 
or  demonstration.  So  much  for  the  first  premise. 
The  second  is  equally  untenable :  "  A  contingent 
future  event  is  without  evidence,"  We  grant  with 
Edwards  that  it  is  not  self-evident,  implying  by 
that  the  evidence  arising  from  "  the  necessity  of 
its  nature,"  as  for  example,  2x2=4.  What  is 
self-evident,  as  we  have  already  shown,  does  not 
require  any  evidence  or  proof,  but  is  knowrn  im- 
mediately; and  a  future  contingent  event  may  be 
self-evident  as  a  fact  lying  before  the  divine 
mind,  rer.ching  into  futurity,  although  it  cannot  be 
self-evident  from  "  the  necessity  of  its  nature." 

But  Edwards  affirms,  that  "  neither  is  there  any 
proof  or  evidence  in  anything  else,  or  evidence  of 
connexion  with  something  else  that  is  evident ; 
for  this  is  also  contrary  to  the  supposition.  It  is 
supposed  that  there  is  now  nothing  existent  with 
22* 


268        EXAMINATION  OF  AXOVMBNTi  AGAINST 

which  the  future  existence  of  the  contingent  event 
is  connected.  For  such  a  connexion  destroys  its 
contingency  and  supposes  necessity."  (p.  116.) 
He  illustrates  his  meaning  by  the  following  exam- 
ple :  "Suppose  that  five  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  sixty  years  ago,  there  was  no  other  being  but 
the  Divine  Being, —  and  then  this  world,  or  some 
particular  body  or  spirit,  all  at  once  starts  out  of  no- 
thing into  being,  and  takes  on  itself  a  particular  na- 
ture and  form  —  all  in  absolute  contingence, — with- 
out any  concern  of  God,  or  any  other  cause  in  the 
matter,  —  without  any  manner  of  ground  or  reason 
of  its  existence,  —  or  any  dependence  upon,  or 
connexion  at  all  with  anything  foregoing ;  —  I 
say  that  if  this  be  supposed,  there  was  no  evi- 
dence of  that  event  beforehand.  There  was  no 
evidence  of  it  to  be  seen  in  the  thing  itself ;  for 
the  thing  itself  as  yet  was  not;  and  there  was  no 
evidence  of  it  to  be  seen  in  any  thing  else;  for 
evidence  in  something  else ;  is  connexion  with  some- 
thing else ;  but  such  connexion  is  contrary  to  the 
supposition."  (p.  11G.) 

The  amount  of  this  reasoning  is  this  :  That  inas- 
much as  a  contingent  event  exists  "  without  any 
concern  of  God,  or  any  other  cause  in  the  mattt  r, 
—  without  any  manner  of  ground  or  reason  of  its 
existence,  —  or  any  dependence  upon  or  connexion 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  259 

with  anything  foregoing"  —  there  is  really  no- 
thing by  which  it  can  be  proved  beforehand.  If 
Edwards  be  right  in  this  definition  of  a  contingent 
event,  viz.:  that  it  is  an  event  without  any  cause 
or  ground  of  its  existence,  and  "  that  there  is  no- 
thing now  existent  with  which  the  future  cxist- 
tence  of  the  contingent  event  is  connected,"  then 
this  reasoning  must  be  allowed  to  be  conclusive. 
But  I  do  not  accede  to  the  definition  :  Contingence 
1  repeat  again,  is  not  opposed  to  cause  but  to  ne- 
cessity. The  world  may  have  sprung  into  being  by 
absolute  contingence  more  than  five  thousand  years 
ago,  and  yet  have  sprung  into  being  at  the  com- 
mand of  God  himself,  and  its  existence  have  been 
foreseen  by  him  from  all  eternity.  The  contin- 
gence expresses  only  the  freedom  of  the  divine 
will,  creating  the  world  by  sovereign  choice,  and 
at  the  moment  of  creation,  conscious  of  power  to 
withhold  the  creative  visas, — creating  in  the  light 
of  his  infinite  wisdom,  but  from  no  compulsion  or 
necessity  of  motive  therein  found.  Under  this 
view  to  foresee  creation  was  nothing  different 
from  foreseeing  his  own  volitions. 

The  ground  on  which  human  volitions  can  be 
foreseen,  is  no  less  plain  and  reasonable.  In  the 
first  place,  future  contingent  volitions  are  never 
without  a  cause  and  sufficient  ground  of  their  ex- 


2G0         EXAMINATION    OF   ARGUMENTS    AGAINST 

istence,  the  individual  will  being  always  taken  as 
the  cause  and  sufficient  ground  of  the  individual 
volitions.  God  has  therefore  provided  for  the  pos- 
sible existence  of  volitions  other  than  his  own,  in 
the  creation  and  constitution  of  finite  free  will. 
Now,  in  relation  to  him,  it  is  not  required  to  con- 
ceive <>f  media  by  which  all  the  particular  voli- 
tions may  be  made  known  or  proved  to  his  mind, 
previous  to  their  actual  existence.  Whatever  he 
knows,  he  knows  by  direct  and  infinite  intuition  ; 
he  cannot  be  dependent  upon  any  media  for  his 
knowledge.  It  is  enough,  as  I  have  already  shown. 
to  assign  him  prescience,  in  order  to  bring  within 
his  positive  knowledge  all  future  contingent  voli- 
tions. He  knows  all  the  variety  and  the  full  ex- 
tent of  the  possible,  and  amid  the  possible  he  fore- 
sees the  actual  ;  and  he  foresees  not  only  that 
class  of  the  actual  which,  as  decreed  and  deter- 
mined by  himself,  is  relatively  necessary,  but  also 
that  class  of  the  actual  which  is  to  spring  up  under 
the  characteristic  of  contingency. 

And  herein,  I  would  remark,  lies  the  superiority 
of  the  divine  prescience  over  human  forecast, — 
in  that  the  former  penetrates  the  contingent  as 
accurately  as  the  necessary.  With  the  latter  it  is 
far  otherwise.  Human  forecast  or  calculation 
can  foresee  the  motions  of  the  planets,  eclipses  of 


A  CONTINGENT   WILL.  261 

the  sun  and  moon,  and  even  the  flight  of  the  com- 
ets, because  they  are  governed  by  necessary  laws  ; 
but  the  volitions  of  the  human  will  form  the  sub- 
ject of  only  probable  calculations. 

But  if  human  volitions,  as  contingent,  form  the 
subject  of  probable  calculations,  there  must  be  in 
opposition  to  Edwards  something  "that  is  evi- 
dent" and  "now  existent,  with  which  the  future 
existence  of  the  contingent  event  is  connected." 

There  are  three  kinds  of  certainty.  First,  ab- 
solute certainty.  This  is  the  certainty  which  lies 
in  necessary  and  eternal  principles  :  e.  g.  2  x  2=4  ; 
the  existence  of  space ;  every  body  must  be  in 
space  ;  every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause  ; 
the  being  of  God. 

Logical  certainty,  that  is,  the  connexion  be- 
tween premises  and  conclusion,  is  likewise  abso- 
lute. 

Secondly.  Physical  certainty.  This  is  the 
certainty  which  lies  in  the  connexion  between 
physical  causes  and  their  phenomena  :  e.  g.  grav- 
itation, heat,  chemical  affinities  in  general,  me- 
chanical forces. 

The  reason  conceives  of  these  causes  as  inhe- 
rently active  and  uniform  ;  and  hence,  wherever 
a  physical  cause  exists,  we  expect  its  proper  phe- 
nomena. 


262         EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

Now  we  do  not  call  the  operation  of  these  cau- 
ses absolutely  certain,  because  they  depend  ulti- 
mately upon  will,  —  the  will  of  God  ;  and  we  can 
conceive  that  the  same  will  which  ordained  them, 
can  change,  suspend,  or  even  annihilate  them  : 
they  have  no  intrinsic  necessity,  —  still,  as  causes 
given  in  time  and  space,  we  conceive  of  them 
generally  as  immutable.  If  in  any  case  they  be 
changed,  or  suspended,  we  are  compelled  to  re- 
cognise the  presence  of  that  will  which  ordained 
them.  Such  change  or  suspension  we  call  a  mir- 
acle ;  that  is,  a  surprise,  —  a  wonder,  —  because 
it  is  unlooked  for. 

When,  therefore,  we  affirm  any  thing  to  be 
physically  certain,  wre  mean  that  it  is  certain  in 
the  immutability  of  a  cause  acting  in  time  and 
space,  and  under  a  necessity  relatively  to  the  di- 
vine will ;  but  still  not  absolutely  certain,  because 
there  is  a  possibility  of  a  miracle.  But  when  we 
affirm  any  thing  to  be  absolutely  certain,  we  mean 
that  it  is  certain  as  comprehended  in  a  principle 
which  is  unalterable  in  its  very  nature,  and  is 
therefore  independent  of  will. 

Thirdly.  Moral  certainty,  is  the  certainty 
which  lies  between  the  connexion  of  motive  and 
will.  By  will  we  mean  a  self-conscious  and  in- 
telligent cause,  or  a  cause  in  unity  with  intelli- 


A    CO.NTLNGENT    WILL.  2G3 

gence.  It  is  also,  in  the  fullest  sense,  a  cause  per 
se ;  that  is,  it  contains  within  itself  proper  efficien- 
cy, and  determines  its  own  direction.  By  motives 
we  mean  the  reasons  according  to  which  the  will 
acts.  In  general,  all  activity  proceeds  according 
to  rules,  or  laws,  or  reasons  ;  for  they  have  the 
same  meaning  :  but  in  mere  material  masses,  the 
rule  is  not  contemplated  by  the  acting  force,  —  it 
is  contemplated  only  by  the  intelligence  which 
ordained  and  conditioned  the  force.  In  spirit,  on 
the  contrary,  the  activity  which  we  call  will  is 
self-conscious,  and  is  connected  with  a  perception 
of  the  reasons,  or  ends,  or  motives  of  action. 
These  motives  or  ends  of  action  are  of  two  kinds. 
First,  those  found  in  the  ideas  of  the  practical 
reason,  which  decides  what  is  fit  and  right.  These 
are  reasons  of  supreme  authority.  Secondly,  those 
found  in  the  understanding  and  sensitivity :  e.  g. 
the  immediately  useful  and  expedient,  and  the 
gratification  of  passion.  These  are  right  only 
when  subordinate  to  the  first. 

Now  these  reasons  and  motives  are  a  light  to  the 
will,  and  serve  to  direct  its  activities ;  and  the 
human  conscience,  which  is  but  the  reason,  has 
drawn  up  for  the  will  explicit  rules,  suited  to  all 
circumstances  and  relations,  which  are  called 
ethics,  or  the  rules. 


U01         EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

These  rules  the  will  is  not  compelled  or  neces- 
sitated to  obey.  In  every  volition  it  is  conscious 
of  a  power  to  do  or  not  to  do  ;  but  yet,  as  the  will 
forms  a  unity  with  the  intelligence,  we  take  for 
granted  that  it  will  obey  them,  unless  grounds  for 
an  opposite  conclusion  are  apparent.  But  the 
only  probable  ground  for  a  disobedience  of  these 
rules  lies  in  a  state  of  sinfulness,  —  a  corruption  of 
the  sensitivity,  —  or  a  disposition  to  violate  the 
harmony  and  fitness  of  the  spiritual  constitution. 
Hence  moral  certainty  can  exist  only  where  the 
harmony  of  the  spiritual  being  is  preserved.  For 
example  :  God  and  good  angels.  In  God  moral 
certainty  is  infinite.  His  dispositions  are  infi- 
nitely pure,  and  his  will  freely  determines  to  do 
right ;  it  is  not  compelled  or  necessitated,  for  then 
his  infinite  meritoriousness  would  cease.  Moral 
certainty  is  not  absolute,  because  will  being  a  pow- 
er to  do  or  not  to  do,  there  is  always  a  possibility, 
although  there  may  be  no  probability,  nay  an  in- 
finite improbability,  that  the  will  may  disobey  the 
laws  of  the  reason. 

In  the  case  of  angels  and  good  men,  the  moral 
certainty  is  such  as  to  be  attended  with  no  ap- 
prehension of  a  dereliction.  With  respect  to  such 
men  as  Joseph,  Daniel,  Paul,  Howard,  and  Wash- 
ington, we  can  calculate  with  a  very  high  and  sat- 


A    CONTINGENT   WILL.  265 

isfactory  moral  certainty,  of  the  manner  in  which 
they  will  act  in  any  given  circumstances  involv- 
ing the  influence  of  motives.  We  know  they  will 
obey  truth,  justice,  and  mercy,  —  that  is,  the  first 
class  of  motives ;  and  the  second  only  so  far  as 
they  are  authorized  by  the  first.  If  the  first  class 
of  motives  are  forsaken,  then  human  conduct  can 
be  calculated  only  according  to  the  influence  of 
the  second  class. 

Human  character,  however,  is  mixed  and  vari- 
ously compounded.  "We  might  make  a  scale  of  an 
indefinite  number  of  degrees,  from  the  highest 
point  of  moral  excellence  to  the  lowest  point  of 
moral  degradation,  and  then  our  predictions  of 
human  conduct  would  vary  with  every  degree. 

In  any  particular  case  where  we  are  called  up- 
on to  reason  from  the  connexion  of  motives  with 
the  will,  it  is  evident  we  must  determine  the  cha- 
racter of  the  individual  as  accurately  as  possible, 
in  order  to  know  the  probable  resultant  of  the  op- 
posite moral  forces  which  we  are  likely  to  find. 

We  have  remarked  that  moral  certainty  exists 
only  where  the  harmony  of  the  moral  constitution 
is  preserved.  Here  we  know  the  right  will  be 
obeyed.  It  may  be  remarked  in  addition  to  this, 
however,  that  moral  certainty  may  almost  be  said 
to  exist  in  the  case  of  the  lowest  moral  degrada- 
2:3 


206         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

tion,  where  the  right  is  altogether  forsaken.  Here 
the  rule  is,  "whatever  is  most  agreeable;"  and 
the  volition  is  indeed  merged  into  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable.  But  in  the  intermediate  state 
lies  the  wide  held  of  probability.  What  is  com- 
monly called  the  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and 
esteemed  of  most  importance  in  the  affairs  of  life 
is  not  the  knowledge  of  human  nature  as  it  ought 
to  be,  but  as  it  is  in  its  vast  variety  of  good  and 
evil.  We  gain  this  knowledge  from  observation 
and  history.  What  human  nature  ought  to  be,  we 
learn  from  reason. 

On  a  subject  of  so  much  importance,  and  where 
it  is  so  desirable  to  have  clear  and  definite  ideas, 
the  rhetorical  ungracefulncss  of  repetition  is  of  lit- 
tle moment,  when  this  repetition  serves  our  great 
end.  I  shall  be  pardoned,  therefore,  in  calling 
the  attention  of  the  reader  to  a  point  above  sug- 
gested, namely,  that  the  will  is  in  a  triunity  with 
reason  and  sensitivity,  and,  in  the  constitution  of 
our  being,  is  designed  to  derive  its  rules  and  in- 
ducements of  action  from  these.  Acts  which  are 
in  the  direction  of  neither  reason  nor  sensitivity, 
must  be  very  trifling  acts  ;  and  therefore  acts  of 
this  description,  although  possible,  we  may  con- 
clude are  very  rare.  In  calculating,  then,  future 
acts  of  will,  we  may,  like  the  mathematicians,  drop 


A   COXTINOIAT   WILL. 


infinitesimal  differences,  and  assume  that  all  acts 
of  the  will  are  in  the  direction  of  reason  or  sensi- 
tivity, or  of  both  in  their  harmony.    Although  the 
will  is  conscious  of  power  to  do,  out  of  the  direc- 
tion of  both  reason  and  sensitivity,  still,  in  the  tri- 
unity  in  which  it  exists,  it  submits  itself  to  the 
general  interests  of  the  being,  and  consults  the 
authority  of  conscience,  or  the  enjoyments  of  pas- 
sion.     Now   every   individual  has   acquired   for 
himself  habits  and  a  character  more  or  less  fixed. 
He  is  known  to  have  submitted  himself  from  day 
to  day,  and  in  a  great  variety  of  transactions,  to 
the  laws  of  the  conscience  ;  and  hence  we  con- 
clude that  he  has  formed  for  himself  a  fixed  pur- 
pose of  doing  right.     He  has  exhibited,  too,  on 
many  occasions,  noble,  generous,  and  pure  feel- 
ings ;  and  hence  we  conclude  that  his  sensitivity 
harmonizes  with  conscience.    Or  he  is  known  to 
have  violated  the  laws  of  the  conscience  from  day 
to  day,  and  in  a  great  variety  of  transactions  :  and 
hence  we  conclude  that  he  has  formed  for  himself 
a  fixed  purpose  of  doing  wrong.     He  has  exhibit- 
ed, too,  on  many  occasions,  low,  selfish,  and  im- 
pure feelings  ;  and  hence  we  conclude  that  his 
sensitivity  is  in  collision  with  conscience. 

In  both  cases  supposed,  and  in  like  manner  in 
all  supposable  cases,  there  is  plainly  a  basis  on 


2GS         r.XAMIXATION   OF   AIM.  DM  i:\l-     \(.\IN-[ 

which,  in  any  given  circumstances,  we  may  fore- 
see and  predict  volitions.  There  is  something 
"that  is  evident  and  now  existent  with  which  the 
future  existence  of  the  contingent  event  is  con- 
nected." On  the  one  hand  these  prediction 
crt  no  necessitating  influence  over  the  events 
themselves,  for  they  are  entirely  disconnected  with 
the  causation  of  the  events :  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  events  need  not  be  assumed  as  necessary  in  or- 
der to  become  the  objects  of  probable  calculations. 
If  they  were  necessary,  the  calculations  would  no 
longer  be  merely  probable  :  —  they  would,  on  the 
contrary,  take  the  precision  and  certainty  of  the 
calculation  of  eclipses  and  other  phenomena  based 
upon  necessary  laws.  But  these  calculations  can 
aim  only  at  moral  certainty,  because  they  are  made 
according  to  the  generally  known  and  received 
determinations  of  will  in  a  unity  with  reason  and 
sensitivity  ;  but  still  a  will  which  is  known  also  to 
have  the  power  to  depart  at  any  moment  from 
the  line  of  determination  which  it  has  established 
for  itself.  Thus  the  calculations  which  we  make 
respecting  the  conduct  of  one  man  in  given  cir- 
cumstances, based  on  his  known  integrity,  and 
the  calculations  which  we  make  respecting  anoth- 
er, based  on  his  known  dishonesty,  may  alike  dis- 
appoint us,  through  the  unexpected,  though  possi- 


A   CONTINGENT    WILL.  269 

ble  dereliction  of  the  first,  and  the  unexpected, 
though  possible  reformation  of  the  latter.  When 
we  reason  from  moral  effects  to  moral  causes,  or 
from  moral  causes  to  moral  effects,  we  cannot 
regard  the  operation  of  causes  as  positive  and 
uniform  under  the  same  law  of  necessity  which 
appertains  to  physical  causes,  because  in  moral 
causality  the  free  will  is  the  efficient  and  last  de- 
terminer. It  is  indeed  true  that  we  reason  here 
with  a  high  degree  of  probability,  with  a  proba- 
bility sufficient  to  regulate  wisely  and  harmoni- 
ously the  affairs  of  society  :  but  we  cannot  reason 
respecting  human  conduct,  as  we  reason  respect- 
ing the  phenomena  of  the  physical  world,  because 
it  is  possible  for  the  human  will  to  disappoint  calcula- 
tions based  upon  the  ordinary  influence  of  motives  : 
e.  g.  the  motive  does  not  hold  the  same  relation  to 
will  which  fire  holds  to  combustible  substance  ;  the 
fire  must  burn  ;  the  will  may  or  may  not  determine 
in  view  of  motive.  Hence  the  reason  why,  in 
common  parlance,  probable  evidence  has  received 
the  name  of  moral  evidence  :  moral  evidence  be- 
ing generally  probable,  all  probable  evidence  is 
called  moral. 

The  will  differs  from  physical  causes  in  being 
a  cause  per  se,  but  although  a  cause  per  se,  it  has 
laws  to  direct  its  volitions.     It  may  indeed  violate 
23* 


\!;<>         EXAMINATION   OS   ARCFOHBNTfl   AGAINST 

these  laws  and  become  a  most  arbitrary  and  in- 
constant law  unto  itself;  but  this  violation  of  law 
and  this  arbitrary  determination  do  not  arise  from 
it  necessarily  as  a  cause  p<  r  «  .  but  from  an  abuse 
of  its  liberty.  As  a  cause  in  unity  with  the  laws 
of  the  reason,  we  expect  it  to  be  uniform,  and  in  its 
harmonious  and  perfect  movements  it  is  uniform. 
Physical  causes  are  uniform  because  God  has  de- 
termined and  fixed  them  according  to  laws  derived 
from  infinite  wisdom. 

The  human  will  may  likewise  be  uniform  by 
obeying  the  laws  of  conscience,  but  the  departures 
may  also  be  indefinitely  numerous  and  various. 

To  sum  up  these  observations  in  general  state- 
ments, we  remark ;  — 

First:  The  connexion  on  which  we  base  pre- 
dictions of  human  volitions,  is  the  connexion  of 
will  with  reason  and  sensitivity  in  the  unity  of  the 
mind  or  spirit. 

Secondly  :  By  this  connexion,  the  will  is  seen 
to  be  designed  to  be  regulated  by  truth  and  right- 
eousness, and  by  feeling  subordinated  to  these. 

Thirdly  :  In  the  purity  of  the  soul,  the  will  is 
thus  regulated. 

Fourthly :  This  regulation,  however,  does  not 
take  place  by  the  necessary  governance  which 
reason  and  sensitivity  have  over  will,  but  by  a 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  271 

self-subjection  of  will  to  their  rules  and  induce- 
ments :  —  this  constitutes  meritoriousness,  —  the 
opposite  conduct  constitutes  ill  desert. 

Fifthly  :  Our  calculations  must  proceed  accord- 
ing to  the  degree  and  fixedness  of  this  self-subjec- 
tion to  reason  and  right  feeling  ;  or  where  this 
does  not  exist,  according  to  the  degree  and  fixed- 
ness of  the  habits  of  wrong  doing,  in  a  self- 
subjection  to  certain  passions  in  opposition  to 
reason. 

Sixthly  :  Our  calculations  will  be  more  or  less 
certain  according  to  the  extent  and  accuracy  of 
our  observations  upon  human  conduct. 

Seventhly  :  Our  calculations  can  never  be  at- 
tended with  absolute  certainty,  because  the  will 
being  contingent,  has  the  power  of  disappointing 
calculations  made  upon  the  longest  observed  uni- 
formity. 

Eighthly :  Our  expectations  respecting  the  de- 
terminations of  Deity  are  attended  with  the  high- 
est moral  certainty.  We  say  moral  certainty,  be- 
cause it  is  certainty  not  arising  from  necessity, 
and  in  that  sense  absolute  ;  but  certainty  arising 
from  the  free  choice  of  an  infinitely  pure  being. 
Thus,  when  God  is  affirmed  to  be  immutable,  and 
when  it  is  affirmed  to  be  impossible  for  him  to  lie, 
it  cannot  be  meant  that  he  has  not  the  power  to 


272        EXAMINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

change  or  to  determine  contrary  to  truth  ;  but 
that  there  is  an  infinite  moral  certainty  arising 
from  the  perfection  of  his  nature,  that  he  never 
will  depart  from  infinite  wisdom  and  rectitude. 

To  assign  God  any  other  immutability  would 
be  to  deprive  him  of  freedom. 

Ninthly  :  The  divine  foresight  of  human  voli- 
tions need  not  be  supposed  to  necessitate  them, 
any  more  than  human  foresight,  inasmuch  as  fore- 
seeing them,  has  no  necessary  connexion  in  any 
case  with  their  causation.  Again,  if  it  does  not 
appear  essential  to  the  divine  foresight  of  volitions 
that  they  should  be  necessary.  We  have  .seen 
that  future  contingent  volitions  may  be  calculated 
with  a  high  degree  of  certainty  even  by  men  ; 
and  now  supposing  that  the  divine  being  must 
proceed  in  the  same  way  to  calculate  them  through 
?nedia,  —  the  reach  and  accuracy  of  his  calcula- 
tions must  be  in  the  proportion  of  his  intelligence, 
and  how  far  short  of  a  certain  and  perfect  know- 
ledge of  all  future  contingent  volitions  can  infinite 
intelligence  be  supposed  to  fall  by  such  calcula- 
tions ? 

Tenthly :  But  we  may  not  suppose  that  the 
infinite  mind  is  compelled  to  resort  to  deduction, 
or  to  employ  media  for  arriving  at  any  particu- 
lar knowledge.     In  the   attribute  of  prescience, 


IN  VI 


273 


A   CONTINGENT  WILL. 

he  is  really  present  to  all  the  possible  and  actual 
of  the  future. 

III.  The  third  and  last  point  of  Edwards's  ar- 
gument is  as  follows  :  "To  suppose  the  future  vo- 
litions of  moral  agents,  not  to  be  necessary  events: 
or  which  is  the  same  thing,  events  which  it  is  not 
impossible  but  that  they  may  not  come  to  pass  ; 
and  yet  to  suppose  that  God  certainly  foreknows 
them,  and  knows  all  things,  is  to  suppose  God's 
knowledge  to  be  inconsistent  with  itself.  For  to 
say  that  God  certainly  and  without  all  conjec- 
ture, knows  that  a  thing  will  infallibly  be,  which 
at  the  same  time  he  knows  to  be  so  contingent, 
that  it  may  possibly  not  be,  is  to  suppose  his 
knowledge  inconsistent  with  itself;  or  that  one 
thing  he  knows  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  an- 
other thing  he  knows."  (page  117.) 

The  substance  of  this  reasoning  is  this.  That 
inasmuch  as  a  contingent  future  event  is  uncer- 
tain from  its  very  nature  and  definition,  it  cannot 
be  called  an  object  of  certain  knowledge,  to  any 
mind,  not  even  to  the  divine  mind,  without  a 
manifest  contradiction.  "  It  is  the  same  as  to 
say,  he  now  knows  a  proposition  to  be  of  certain 
infallible  truth,  Which  he  knows  to  be  of  contin- 
gent uncertain  truth.'' 

We  have  here  again  an  error  arising  from  not 


'-"  1         i:\.\MINATION  OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

making  a  proper  distinction,  which  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  —  the  distinction  between  the  cer- 
tainty of  a  future  volition  as  a  mere  fact  existent, 
and  the  manner  in  which  that  fact  came  to  exist. 

The  fact  of  volition  comes  to  exist  contingent- 
ly ;  that  is,  by  a  power  which  in  giving  it  exist- 
ence, is  under  no  law  of  necessity,  and  at  the 
moment  of  causation,  is  conscious  of  ability  to 
withhold  the  causative  nisus.  Now  all  volitions 
which  have  already  come  to  exist  in  this  way, 
have  both  a  certain  and  contingent  existence.  It  is 
certain  that  they  have  come  to  exist,  for  that  is  a 
matter  of  observation  ;  but  their  existence  is  also 
contingent,  because  they  came  to  exist,  not  by  ne- 
cessity as  a  mathematical  conclusion,  but  by  a 
cause  contingent  and  free,  and  which,  although 
actually  giving  existence  to  these  volitions,  had 
the  power  to  withhold  them. 

Certainty  and  contingency  are  not  opposed, 
and  exclusive  of  each  other  in  reference  to  what 
has  already  taken  place.  Are  they  opposed  and 
exclusive  of  each  other  in  reference  to  the  future  ? 
In  the  first  place,  we  may  reason  on  probable 
grounds.  Contingent  causes  have  already  pro- 
duced volitions  —  hence  they  may  produce  voli- 
tions in  the  future.     They  have  produced  voli- 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  275 

tions  in  obedience  to  laws  of  reason  and  sensitivi- 
ty—  hence  they  may  do  so  in  the  future.  They 
have  done  this  according  to  a  uniformity  self-im- 
posed, and  long  and  habitually  observed  —  hence 
this  uniformity  may  be  continued  in  the  future. 

A  future  contingent  event  may  therefore  have 
a  high  degree  of  probability,  and  even  a  moral 
certainty. 

But  to  a  being  endowed  with  prescience,  what 
prevents  a  positive  and  infallible  knowledge  of  a 
future   contingent   event  ?     His  mind  extends  to 
the  actual  in  the  future,  as  easily  as  to  the  actual 
in  the  past ;  but  the   actual  of  the  future  is  not 
only  that  which  comes  to  pass  by  his  own  deter- 
mination and  nisus,  and  therefore  necessarily  in 
its  relation  to  himself  as  cause,  but  also  that  which 
comes  to  pass  by  the  nisus  of  constituted  wills, 
contingent  and  free,  as  powers  to  do  or  not  to  do. 
There  is  no  opposition,  as  Edwards  supposes,  be- 
tween  the  infallible   divine  foreknowledge,  and 
the  contingency  of  the  event;  —  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge is  infallible  from  its  own  inherent  per- 
fection ;  and  of  course  there  can  be  no  doubt  but 
that  the  event  foreseen  will  come  to  pass ;  but 
then  it  is  foreseen  as  an  event   coming  to  pass 
contingently,  and  not  necessarily. 

The  error  we  have  just  noted,  appears  again  in 


278       EXAMINATION  <>r   kROUMSNTfl  AGAINST 

the  corollary  which  Edwards  immediately  deduces 
from  his  third  position.  "From  what  has  been 
observed,"  he  remarks,  "it  is  evident,  that  the  ab- 
solute dt  cr<<s  of  God  are  no  more  inconsistent 
with  human  liberty,  on  account  of  the  necessity 
of  the  event  which  follows  such  decrees,  than  the 
absolute  foreknowledge  of  God."  (page  118.)  The 
absolute  decrees  of  God  are  the  determinations 
of  his  will,  and  comprehend  the  events  to  which 
they  relate,  as  the  cause  comprehends  the  effect. 
Foreknowledge,  on  the  contrary,  has  no  causality 
in  relation  to  events  foreknown.  It  is  not  a  de- 
termination of  divine  will,  but  a  form  of  the  di- 
vine intelligence.  Hence  the  decrees  of  God  do 
actually  and  truly  necessitate  events  ;  while  the 
foreknowledge  of  God  extends  to  events  which 
are  not  necessary  but  contingent,  —  as  well  as  to 
those  which  are  pre-determined. 

Edwards  always  confounds  contingency  with 
chance  or  no  cause,  and  thus  makes  it  absurd  in 
its  very  definition.  He  also  always  confounds 
certainty  with  necessity,  and  thus  compels  us  to 
take  the  latter  universal  and  absolute,  or  to  plunge 
into  utter  uncertainty,  doubt,  and  disorder. 

Prescience  is  an  essential  attribute  of  Deity. 
Prescience  makes  the  events  foreknown,  certain  ; 
but  if  certain,  they  must  be  necessary.     And  on 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  277 

the  other  hand,  if  the  events  were  not  certain, 
they  could  not  be  foreknown,  —  for  that  which  is 
uncertain  cannot  be  the  object  of  positive  and  in- 
fallible knowledge  ;  but  if  they  are  certain  in  or- 
der to  be  foreknown,  then  they  must  be  neces- 
sary. 

Again:  contingence,  as  implying  no  cause,  puts 
all  future  events  supposed  to  come  under  it,  out 
of  all  possible  connexion  with  anything  preceding 
and  now  actually  existent,  and  consequently  al- 
lows of  no  basis  upon  which  they  can  be  calcula- 
ted and  foreseen.  Contingence,  also,  as  opposed 
to  necessity,  destroys  certainty,  and  excludes  the 
possibility  even  of  divine  prescience.  This  is  the 
course  of  Edwards's  reasoning. 

Now  if  we  have  reconciled  contingence  with 
both  cause  and  certainty,  and  have  opposed  it 
only  to  necessity,  thus  separating  cause  and  cer- 
tainty from  the  absolute  and  unvarying  dominion 
of  necessity,  then  this  reasoning  is  truly  and  legiti- 
mately set  aside. 

Necessity  lies  only  in  the  eternal  reason,  and 
the  sensitivity  connected  with  it  :  —  contingency 
lies  only  in  will.  But  the  future  acts  of  will  can 
be  calculated  from  its  known  union  with,  and 
self-subjection  to  the  reason  and  sensitivity. 

These  calculations  are  more  or  less  probable, 
24 


278        EXAMINATION  OF    \  IMMMENTS  AGAINST 

or  arc  certain  according  to  the  known  character 
of  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  these  calcula- 
tions. 

Of  God  wc  do  not  aflirm  merely  the  power  of 
calculating  future  contingent  events  upon  known 
data,  but  a  positive  prescience  of  all  events.  He 
sees  from  the  beginning  how  contingent  causes 
or  wills,  will  act.  He  sees  with  absolute  infal- 
libility and  certainty  —  and  the  events  to  him  are 
infallible  and  certain.  But  still  they  are  not  ne- 
cessary, because  the  causes  which  produce  them 
are  not  determined  and  necessitated  by  anything 
preceding.  They  are  causes  contingent  and  free, 
and  conscious  of  power  not  to  do  what  they  are 
actually  engaged  in  doing. 

I  am  persuaded  that  inattention  to  the  impor- 
tant distinction  of  the  certainty  implied  in  the 
divine  foreknowledge,  and  the  necessity  implied 
in  the  divine  predetermination  or  decree,  is  the 
great  source  of  fallacious  reasonings  and  conclu- 
sions respecting  the  divine  prescience.  When 
God  pre-detcrmines  or  decrees,  he  fixes  the  event 
by  a  necessity  relative  to  himself  as  an  infinite 
and  irresistible  cause.  It  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  it  is  decreed,  while  his  decree  remains.  But 
when  he  foreknows  an  event,  he  presents  us 
merelv  a  form  of  his  infinite  intelligence,  exert- 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  279 

ing  no  causative,  and  consequently  no  necessitat- 
ing influence  whatever.  The  volitions  which  I 
am  now  conscious  of  exercising,  are  just  what 
they  are,  whether  they  have  been  foreseen  or 
not  —  and  as  they  now  do  actually  exist,  they 
have  certainty  ;  and  yet  they  are  contingent,  be- 
cause I  am  conscious  that  I  have  power  not  to 
exercise  them.  They  are,  but  they  might  not 
have  been.  Now  let  the  intelligence  of  God  be  so 
perfect,  as  five  thousand  years  ago,  to  have  fore- 
seen the  volitions  which  I  am  now  exercising  ;  it 
is  plain  that  this  foresight  does  not  destroy  the 
contingency  of  the  volitions,  nor  does  the  contin- 
gency render  the  foresight  absurd.  The  supposi- 
tion is  both  rational  and  possible. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  consider  the  re- 
maining corollaries  of  Edwards,  as  the  applica- 
tion of  the  above  reasoning  to  them  will  be  ob- 
vious. 

Before  closing  this  part  of  the  treatise  in  hand, 
I  deem  it  expedient  to  lay  down  something  like 
a  scale  of  certainty.  In  doing  this,  I  shall  have 
to  repeat  some  things.  But  it  is  by  repetition, 
and  by  placing  the  same  things  in  new  positions, 
that  we  often  best  attain  perspicuity,  and  succeed 
in  rendering  philosophical  ideas  familiar. 

First ;    Let  us  consider  minutely  the   distinc- 


>"         EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

tion  between  certainty  and  necessity.  Necessity 
relates  to  truths  and  events  considered  in  them- 
selves. Certainty  relates  to  our  apprehension  or 
conviction  of  them.  Hence  necessity  is  not  cer- 
tainty itself,  but  a  ground  of  certainty.  Absolute 
certainty  relates  only  to  truths  or  to  being. 

First  or  intuitive  truths,  and  logical  conclusions 
drawn  from  them,  are  necessary  with  an  absolute 
necessity.  They  do  not  admit  of  negative  suppo- 
sitions, and  are  irrespective  of  will.  The  being 
of  God,  and  time,  and  space,  are  necessary  with 
an  absolute  necessity. 

Relative  necessity  relates  to  logical  conclusions 
and  events  or  phenomena.  Logical  conclusions 
are  always  necessary  relatively  to  the  premises, 
but  cannot  be  absolutely  necessary  unless  the 
premises  from  which  they  are  derived,  are  abso- 
lutely necessary. 

All  phenomena  and  events  are  necessary  with 
only  a  relative  necessity ;  for  in  depending  up- 
on causes,  they  all  ultimately  depend  upon  will. 
Considered  therefore  in  themselves,  they  are 
contingent ;  for  the  will  which  produced  them, 
either  immediately  or  by  second  or  dependent 
causes,  is  not  necessitated,  but  free  and  contin- 
gent—  and  therefore  their  non-existence  is  sup- 
posable.     But  they  are   necessary  relatively  to 


A   CONTINGENT   WILL.  281 

will.  The  divine  will,  which  gave  birth  to  cre- 
ation, is  infinite  ;  when  therefore  the  nisus  of  this 
will  was  made,  creation  was  the  necessary  result. 
The  Deity  is  under  no  necessity  of  willing ;  but 
when  he  does  will,  the  effect  is  said  necessarily 
to  follow  —  meaning  by  this,  that  the  nisus  of  the 
divine  will  is  essential  power,  and  that  there  is 
no  other  power  that  can  prevent  its  taking  effect. 

Created  will  is  under  no  necessity  of  willing  ; 
but  when  it  does  will  or  make  its  nisus,  effects 
necessarily  follow,  according  to  the  connexion  es- 
tablished by  the  will  of  Deity,  between  the  nisus 
of  created  will  and  surrounding  objects.  Where 
a  nisus  of  created  will  is  made,  and  effects  do  not 
follow,  it  arises  from  the  necessarily  greater  force 
of  a  resisting  power,  established  by  Deity  likewise ; 
so  that  whatever  follows  the  nisus  of  created  will, 
whether  it  be  a  phenomenon  without,  or  the  mere 
experience  of  a  greater  resisting  force,  it  follows 
by  a  necessity  relative  to  the  divine  will. 

When  we  come  to  consider  will  in  relation  to 
its  own  volitions,  we  have  no  more  necessity, 
either  absolute  or  relative  ;  we  have  contingency 
and  absolute  freedom. 

Now  certainty  we  have  affirmed  to  relate  to 
our  knowledge  or  conviction  of  truths  and  events. 

Necessity  is  one  ground  of  certainty,  both  abso- 
24* 


282         EXAMINATION   OF   ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

lute  and  relative.  We  have  a  certain  knowledge 
or  conviction  of  that  which  we  perceive  to  be  ne- 
cessary  id  its  own  nature,  or  of  which  a  negative 
is  not  supposable  ;  and  this,  as  based  upon  an  ab- 
solute necessity,  may  be  called  an  absolute  cer- 
tainty. 

The  established  connexion  between  causes  and 
effects,  is  another  ground  of  certainty.  Causes 
are  of  two  kinds  ;  first  causes,  or  causes  per  sc,  or 
contingent  and  free  causes,  or  will ;  and  second 
or  physical  causes,  which  are  necessary  with  a 
relative  necessity. 

First  causes  are  of  two  degrees,  the  infinite  and 
the  finite. 

Now  we  are  certain,  that  whatever  God  wills, 
will  take  place.  This  may  likewise  be  called  an 
absolute  certainty,  because  the  connexion  between 
divine  volitions  and  effects  is  absolutely  necessary. 
It  is  not  supposable  that  God  should  will  in  vain, 
for  that  would  contradict  his  admitted  infinity. 

The  connexion  between  the  volitions  of  created 
will  and  effects,  and  the  connexion  between  phys- 
ical causes  and  effects,  supposing  each  of  course 
to  be  in  its  proper  relations  and  circumstances,  is 
a  connexion  of  relative  necessity  ;  that  is,  relative 
to  the  divine  will.  Now  the  certainty  of  our  know- 
ledge or  conviction  that  an  event  will  take  place, 


A    CONTINGENT   WILL.  283 

depending  upon  volition  or  upon  a  physical  cause,  is 
plainly  different  from  the  certain  knowledge  of  a 
necessary  truth,  or  the  certain  conviction  that  an 
event  which  infinite  power  wills,  will  take  place. 
The  will  which  established  the  connexion,  may  at 
any  moment   suspend  or  change  the  connexion. 
I  believe  that  when  I  will  to  move  my  hand  over 
this  paper,  it  will  move,  supposing  of  course  the 
continued  healthiness  of  the  limb ;  but  it  is  possi- 
ble for  God  so  to  alter  the   constitution  of  my 
being,  that  my  will  shall  have  no  more  connexion 
with  my  hands  than  it  now  has  with  the  circula- 
tion of  the  blood.     I  believe  also  that  if  I  throw 
this  paper  into  the  fire,  it  will  burn;  but  it  is  pos- 
sible for  God  so  to  alter  the  constitution  of  this 
paper  or  of  fire,  that  the  paper  will  not  burn  ;  and 
yet  I  have  a  certain  belief  that  my  hand  will  con- 
tinue to  obey  volition,  and  that  paper  will  burn 
in  the  fire.     This  certainly  is  not  an  absolute  cer- 
tainty, but  a  conditional  certainty :  events  will  thus 
continue  to  take  place  on  condition  the  divine  will 
does   not  change  the  condition  of  things.     This 
conditional  certainty  is  likewise  called  a  physical 
certainty,  because  the    events   contemplated  in- 
clude  besides  the   phenomena  of  consciousness, 
which  are  not  so  commonly  noticed,  the  events 
or  phenomena  of  the  physical  world,  or  nature. 


284  i:\AMI.\ATION    Off   ARGUMENTS    AGAINST 

But  we  must  next  look  at  will  itself  in  rela- 
tion to  its  volitions :  Here  all  is  contingency  and 
freedom, — here  is  no  necessity.  Is  there  any 
ground  of  certain  knowledge  respecting  future 
volitions? 

If  will  as  a  cause  per  Be,  were  isolated  and  in 
no  relation  whatever,  there  could  not  be  any 
ground  of  any  knowledge  whatever,  respecting 
future  volitions.  But  will  is  not  thus  isolated. 
On  the  contrary,  it  forms  a  unity  with  the  sensi- 
tivity and  the  reason.  Reason  reveals  what  ought 
to  be  done,  on  the  basis  of  necessary  and  un- 
changeable truth.  The  sensitivity  reveals  what 
is  most  desirable  or  pleasurable,  on  the  ground  of 
personal  experience.  Now  although  it  is  granted 
that  will  can  act  without  deriving  a  reason  or  in- 
ducement of  action  from  the  reason  and  the  sen- 
sitivity, still  the  instances  in  which  it  does  so  act, 
are  so  rare  and  trifling,  that  they  may  be  thrown 
out  of  the  account.  We  may  therefore  safely 
assume  as  a  general  law,  that  the  will  determines 
according  to  reasons  and  inducements  drawn  from 
the  reason  and  the  sensitivity.  This  law  is  not 
by  its  very  definition,  and  by  the  very  nature  of 
the  subject  to  which  it  relates,  a  necessary  law  — 
but  a  law  revealed  in  our  consciousness  as  one  to 
which  the  will,  in  the  exercise  of  its  freedom, 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  285 

docs  submit  itself.  In  the  harmony  and  perfec- 
tion of  our  being,  the  reason  and  the  sensitivity 
perfectly  accord.  In  obeying  the  one  or  the 
other,  the  will  obeys  both.  With  regard  to  per- 
fect beings,  therefore,  we  can  calculate  with  cer- 
tainty as  to  their  volitions  under  any  given  cir- 
cumstances. Whatever  is  commanded  by  reason, 
whatever  appears  attractive  to  the  pure  sensitivi- 
ty, will  be  obeyed  and  followed. 

But  what  kind  of  certainty  is  this  ?  It  is  not 
absolute  certainty,  because  it  is  supposable  that 
the  will  which  obeys  may  not  obey,  for  it  has 
power  not  to  obey.  Nor  is  it  jrfiysical  certainty, 
for  it  does  not  relate  to  a  physical  cause,  nor  to 
the  connexion  between  volition  and  its  effects,  but 
to  the  connexion  between  will  and  its  volitions. 
Nor  again  can  we,  strictly  speaking,  call  it  a  con- 
ditional certainty ;  because  the  will,  as  a  power 
per  se,  is  under  no  conditions  as  to  the  production 
of  its  volitions.  To  say  that  the  volitions  will  be 
in  accordance  with  the  reason  and  pure  sensitivi- 
ty, if  the  will  continue  to  obey  the  reason  and 
pure  sensitivity,  is  merely  saying  that  the  volitions 
will  be  right  if  the  willing  power  put  forth  right 
volitions.  What  kind  of  certainty  is  it,  then  ?  I 
reply,  it  is  a  certainty  altogether  peculiar.  —  a 
certainty  based  upon  the  relative  state  of  the  rea- 


286       j:\ami.\atio.\  of  aim.i  mi:m-  AOAINB1 

son  and  the  sensitivity,  and  their  unity  with  the 
will :  and  as  the  commands  of  reason  in  relation 
to  conduct  have  received  the  name  of  moral  * 
laws,  simply  because  they  have  this  relation, — 
and  as  the  sensitivity,  when  harmonizing  with  the 
reason,  is  thence  called  morally  pure,  because  at- 
tracting to  the  same  conduct  which  the  reason 
commands,  —  this  certainty  may  fitly  be  called 
?noral  certainty.  The  name,  however,  does  not 
mark  degree.  Does  this  certainty  possess  de- 
grees ?  It  does.  With  respect  to  the  volitions  of 
God,  we  have  the  highest  degree  of  moral  cer- 
tainty, —  an  infinite  moral  certainty.  He,  in- 
deed, in  his  infinite  will,  has  the  power  of  pro- 
ducing any  volitions  whatever ;  but  from  his  infi- 
nite excellency,  consisting  in  the  harmony  of  infi- 
nite reason  with  the  divine  affections  of  infinite 
benevolence,  truth,  and  justice,  we  are  certain 
that  his  volitions  will  always  be  right,  good,  and 
wise.  Besides,  he  has  assured  us  of  his  fixed  de- 
termination to  maintain  justice,  truth,  and  love  : 
and  he  has  given  us  this  assurance  as  perfectly 
knowing  himself  in  the  whole  eternity  of  his  being. 
Let  no  one  attempt  to  confound  this  perfect  mor- 
al certainty  with  necessity,  for  the  distinction  is 

*  Lat.  moralis,  from  mos,  —  i.  c.  custom  or  ordinary  conduct. 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  287 

plain.  If  God's  will  were  affirmed  to  be  neces- 
sarily determined  in  the  direction  of  truth,  right- 
eousness, and  love,  it  would  be  an  affirmation  re- 
specting the  manner  of  the  determination  of  the 
divine  will:  viz.  —  that  the  divine  determination 
takes  place,  not  in  contingency  and  freedom,  not 
with  the  power  of  making  an  opposite  determina- 
tion, but  in  absolute  necessity.  But  if  it  be  affirm- 
ed that  God's  will,  will  certainly  go  in  the  direc- 
tion of  truth,  righteousness,  and  love,  the  affirma- 
tion respects  our  knowledge  and  conviction  of  the 
character  of  the  divine  volitions  in  the  whole 
eternity  of  his  being.  We  may  indeed  proceed 
to  inquire  after  the  grounds  of  this  knowledge 
and  conviction;  and  if  the  necessity  of  the  divine 
determinations  be  the  ground  of  this  knowledge 
and  conviction,  it  must  be  allowed  that  it  is  a  suf- 
ficient ground.  But  will  any  man  assume  that 
necessity  is  the  only  ground  of  certain  knowledge 
and  conviction  ?  If  necessity  be  universal,  em- 
bracing all  beings  and  events,  then  of  course  there 
is  no  place  for  this  question,  inasmuch  as  any  other 
ground  of  knowledge  than  necessity  is  not  sup- 
posable.  But  if,  at  least  for  the  sake  of  the  argu- 
ment, it  be  granted  that  there  may  be  other 
grounds  of  knowledge  than  necessity,  then  I  would 
ask  whether  the  infinite  excellence  of  the  divine  rea- 


288  i:\AMIN-.YTION   OF   ARGIMINT-    AGAINST 

son  and  sensitivity,  in  their  perfect  harmony,  does 
afford  to  us  aground  for  the  most  certain  and  sat- 
isfactory belief  that  the  divine  will  will  create  and 
mould  all  being  and  order  all  events  according  to 
infinite  wisdom  and  rectitude.     In  order  to  have 
full  confidence  that  God   will   forever  do  right, 
must  we  know  that  his  will  is  absolutely  necessi- 
tated by  his  reason  and  his  affections  ?    Can  we 
not  enjoy  this  confidence,  while  we  allow  him  ab- 
solute freedom  of  choice  ?    Can  we  not  believe 
that  the  Judge  of  all  the  Earth  will  do  right,  al- 
though in  his  free  and  omnipotent  will  he  have 
the  power  to  do  wrong  ?    And  especially  may  we 
not  believe  this,  when,  in  his  omniscience  and  his 
truth,  he  has  declared  that  his  purposes  will  for- 
ever be  righteous,  benevolent,  and  wise  ?     Does 
not  the  glory  and  excellency  of  God  appear  in 
this,  —  that  while   he  hath  unlimited  power,  he 
employs  that   power   by  his  free  choice,  only  to 
dispense  justice,  mercy,  and  grace  ?     And  does 
not  the  excellency  and  meritoriousness  of  a  crea- 
ture's faith  appear  in  this,  —  that  while   God  is 
known  to  be  so  mighty  and  so  absolute,  he  is  con- 
fided in  as  a  being  who  will   never  violate  any 
moral  principle  or  affection  ?    Suppose  God's  will 
to  be  necessitated  in  its  wise  and  good  volitions, 
—  the   sun   dispensing    heat    and    light,   and   by 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  289 

their  agency  unfolding  and  revealing  the  beauty 
of  creation,  seems  as  truly  excellent  and  worthy 
of  gratitude,  —  and  the  creature,  exercising  grati- 
tude towards  God  and  confiding  in  him,  holds  no 
other  relation  to  him  than  the  sunflower  to  the 
sun  —  by  a  necessity  of  its  nature,  ever  turning  its 
face  upwards  to  receive  the  influences  which  min- 
ister to  its  life  and  properties. 

The  moral  certainty  attending  the  volitions  of 
created  perfect  beings  is  the  same  in  kind  witii  that 
attending  the  volitions  of  the  Deity.  It  is  a  cer- 
tainty based  upon  the  relative  state  of  the  reason 
and  the  sensitivity,  and  their  unity  with  the  will. 
Wherever  the  reason  and  the  sensitivity  are  in 
harmony,  there  is  moral  certainty.  I  mean  by 
this,  that  in  calculating  the  character  of  future  vo- 
litions in  this  case,  we  have  not  to  calculate  the 
relative  energy  of  opposing  principles  : —  all  which 
is  now  existent  is,  in  the  constituted  unity  of  the 
soul,  naturally  connected  only  with  good  volitions. 
But  the  degree  of  the  moral  certainty  in  created 
beings,  when  compared  with  that  attending  the 
volitions  of  Deity,  is  only  in  the  proportion  of 
the  finite  to  the  infinite.  The  confidence  which 
we  repose  in  the  integrity  of  a  good  being,  does 
not  arise  from  the  conviction  that  his  volitions  are 
necessitated,  but  from  his  known  habit  of  obey- 
25 


990        EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS   AGAINST 

ing  truth  and  justice  ;  and  our  sense  of  his  meri- 
toriousness  does  not  arise  from  the  impossibility 
of  his  doing  wrong,  but  from  his  known  determina- 
tion and  habit  of  doing  right  while  having  the 
power  of  doing  wrong,  and  while  even  under 
temptations  of  doing  wrong. 

A  certainty  respecting  volitions,  if  based  upon 
the  necessity  of  the  volitions,  would  not  differ 
from  a  physical  certainty.  But  a  moral  certainty 
has  this  plain  distinction,  —  that  it  is  based  upon 
the  evidently  pure  dispositions  and  habits  of  the 
individual,  without  implying,  however,  any  neces- 
sity of  volitions. 

Moral  certainty,  then,  is  predicablc  only  of 
moral  perfection,  and  predicablc  in  degrees  ac- 
cording to  the  dignity  and  excellency  of  the 
being. 

But  now  let  us  suppose  any  disorder  to  take 
place  in  the  sensitivity  ;  that  is,  let  us  suppose  the 
sensitivity,  to  any  degree,  to  grow  into  opposition 
to  the  reason,  so  that  while  the  reason  commands 
in  one  direction,  the  sensitivity  gives  the  sense  of 
the  most  agreeable  in  the  opposite  direction, — 
and  then  our  calculations  respecting  future  voli- 
tions must  vary  accordingly.  Here  moral  cer- 
tainty exists  no  longer,  because  volitions  are  now 
to  be  calculated  in  connexion  with  opposing  prin- 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL,  291 

ciples :  calculations  now  attain  only  to  the  proba- 
ble, and  in  different  degrees. 

By  the  probable,  we  mean  that  which  has  not 
attained  to  certainty,  but  which  nevertheless  has 
grounds  on  which  it  claims  to  be  believed.  We 
call  it  probable  or  proveable,  because  it  both  has 
proof  and  is  still  under  conditions  of  proof,  that  is. 
admits  of  still  farther  proof.  That  which  is  cer- 
tain, has  all  the  proof  of  which  the  case  admits. 
A  mathematical  proposition  is  certain  on  the 
ground  of  necessity,  and  admits  of  no  higher  proof 
than  that  which  really  demonstrates  its  truth. 

The  divine  volitions  are  certain  on  the  ground 
of  the  divine  perfections,  and  admit  of  no  higher 
proof  than  what  is  found  in  the  divine  perfections. 

The  volitions  of  a  good  created  being  are  cer- 
tain on  the  ground  of  the  purity  of  such  a  being, 
and  admit  of  no  higher  proof  than  what  is  found 
in  this  purity. 

But  when  we  come  to  a  mixed  being,  that  is,  a 
being  of  reason,  and  of  a  sensitivity  corrupted  to- 
tally or  in  different  degrees,  then  we  have  place 
not  for  certainty,  but  for  probability.  As  our 
knowledge  of  the  future  volitions  of  such  a  being 
can  only  be  gathered  from  something  now  exist- 
ent, this  knowledge  will  depend  upon  our  know- 
ledge of  the  present  relative  state  of  his  reason 


893        EXAMINATION   OF   AROUMKNTS   AOAI.WT. 

and  sensitivity  ;  but  a  perfect  knowledge  of  this  is 
in  no  case  supposable,  —  so  that,  although  our  ac- 
tual knowledge  of  this  being  may  be  such  as  to 
afford  us  proof  of  what  his  volitions  may  be, 
yet,  inasmuch  as  our  knowledge  of  him  may  be 
increased  indefinitely  by  close  observation  and 
study,  so  likewise  will  the  proof  be  increased. 
According  to  the  definition  of  probability  above 
given,  therefore,  our  knowledge  of  the  future  vo- 
litions of  an  imperfect  being  can  only  amount  to 
probable  knowledge. 

The  direction  of  the  probabilities  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  preponderance  of  the  good  or  the 
bad  in  the  mixed  being  supposed.  If  the  sensi- 
tivity be  totally  corrupted,  the  probabilities  will 
generally  go  in  the  direction  of  the  corrupted 
sensitivity,  because  it  is  one  observed  general  fact 
in  relation  to  a  state  of  corruption,  that  the  enjoy- 
ments of  passion  are  preferred  to  the  duties  en- 
joined by  the  conscience.  But  the  state  of  the 
reason  itself  must  be  considered.  If  the  reason 
be  in  a  highly  developed  state,  and  the  convic- 
tions of  the  right  consequently  clear  and  strong, 
there  may  be  probabilities  of  volitions  in  opposition 
to  passion  which  cannot  exist  where  the  reason  is 
undeveloped  and  subject  to  the  errors  and  preju- 
dices of  custom  and  superstition.     The  difference 


A    CONTINGENT    WILL.  293 

is  that  which  is  commonly  known  under  the  terms 
"  enlightened  and  unenlightened  conscience." 

Where  the  sensitivity  is  not  totally  corrupted, 
the  direction  of  the  probabilities  must  depend 
upon  the  degree  of  corruption  and  the  degree  to 
which  the  reason  is  developed  or  undeveloped. 

With  a  given  state  of  the  sensitivity  and  the  rea- 
son,  the  direction  of  the  probabilities  will  depend 
also  very  much  upon  the  correlated,  or  upon  the 
opposing  objects  and  circumstances: — where  the 
objects  and  circumstances  agree  with  the  state  of 
the  sensitivity  and  the  reason,  or  to  speak  generally 
and  collectively,  with  "  the  state  of  the  mind,"  the 
probabilities  will  clearly  be  more  easily  determin- 
ed than  where  they  are  opposed  to  "  the  state  of 
the  mind." 

The  law  which  Edwards  lays  down  as  the  law 
of  volition  universally,  viz  :  that  M  the  volition  is 
as  the  greatest  apparent  good  :"  understanding  by 
the  term  "good,"  as  he  does,  simply,  that  which 
strikes  us  M  agreeably,"  is  indeed  a  general  rule, 
according  to  which  the  volitions  of  characters 
deeply  depraved  may  be  calculated.  This  law 
represents  the  individual  as  governed  wholly  by 
his  passions,  and  this  marks  the  worst  form  of 
character.  It  is  a  law  which  cannot  extend  to 
him  who  is  struggling  under  the  light  of  his  rea- 
25* 


2'.H         KXA.MINA.TION   OF   ARGVMT.NT-    AGAINST 

son  against  passion,  and  consequently  the  proba- 
bilities in  this  last  case  must  be  calculated  in  a 
different  way.  But  in  relation  to  the  former  it  is 
a  sufficient  rule. 

Probability,  as  well  as  certainty,  respects  only 
the  kind  and  degree  of  our  knowledge  of  any 
events,  and  not  the  causes  by  which  those  events 
are  produced  :  whether  these  causes  be  necessary 
or  contingent  is  another  question. 

One  great  error  in  reasoning  respecting  the 
character  of  causes,  in  connexion  with  the  calcu- 
lation of  probabilities,  is  the  assumption  that  uni- 
formity is  the  characteristic  of  necessary  causes 
only.  The  reasoning  maybe  stated  in  the  follow- 
ing syllogism : 

In  order  to  calculate  either  with  certainty  or 
probability  any  events  we  must  suppose  a  uniform 
law  of  causation  ;  but  uniformity  can  exist  only 
where  there  is  a  necessity  of  causation  ;  hence, 
our  calculations  suppose  a  necessity  of  causa- 
tion. 

This  is  another  instance  of  applying  to  the  will 
principles  which  were  first  obtained  from  the  ob- 
servation of  physical  causes,  and  which  really  be- 
long to  physical  causes  only.  With  respect  to 
physical  causes,  it  is  true  that  uniformity  appears 
to  be  a  characteristic  of  necessary  causes,  simply 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  295 

because  physical  causes  are  relatively  necessary 
causes:  —  but  with  respect  to  the  will,  it  is  not 
true  that  uniformity  appears  to  be  a  characteristic 
of  necessary  cause,  because  the  will  is  not  a  ne- 
cecessary  cause.  That  uniformity  therefore,  as 
in  the  case  of  physical  causes,  seems  to  become  a 
characteristic  of  necessary  cause,  does  not  arise 
from  the  nature  of  the  idea  of  cause,  but  from  the 
nature  of  the  particular  subject,  viz.,  physical 
cause.  Uniformity  in  logical  strictness,  does  not 
belong  to  cause  at  all,  but  to  law  or  rule.  Cause 
is  simply  efficiency  or  power  :  law  or  rule  defines 
the  direction,  aims,  and  modes  of  power :  cause 
explains  the  mere  existence  of  phenomena:  law 
explains  their  relations  and  characteristics :  law 
is  the  thought  and  design  of  the  reason.  Now  a 
cause  may  be  so  conditioned  as  to  be  incapable 
of  acting  except  in  obedience  to  law,  and  this  is 
the  case  of  all  physical  causes  which  act  accord- 
ing to  the  law  or  design  of  infinite  wisdom,  and 
thus  the  uniformity  which  we  are  accustomed  to 
attribute  to  these  causes  is  not  their  own,  but  be- 
longs to  the  law  under  which  they  necessarily  act. 
But  will  is  a  cause  which  is  not  so  conditioned  as 
to  be  incapable  of  acting  except  in  obedience  to 
law  ;  it  can  oppose  itself  to,  and  violate  law.  but 
still  it  is  a  cause  in  connexion  with  law,  the  law  found 


206        EXAMINATION  Of  AROl  KBMTf  AGAINST 

in  the  reason  and  sensitivity,  which  law  of  course 
has  the  characteristic  of  uniformity.  The  law  of 
the  reason  and  pure  sensitivity  is  uniform  —  it  is 
the  law  of  right  The  law  of  a  totally  corrupted 
sensitivity  is  likewise  a  uniform  law  ;  it  is  the  law 
of  passion  ;  a  law  to  do  whatever  is  most  pleasing 
to  the  sensitivity;  and  every  individual,  whatever 
may  be  the  degree  of  his  corruption,  forms  for 
himself  certain  rules  of  conduct,  and  as  the  very 
idea  of  rule  embraces  uniformity,  we  expect  in 
every  individual  more  or  less  uniformity  of  con- 
duct. Uniformity  of  physical  causation,  is  nothing 
but  the  design  of  the  supreme  reason  developed 
in  phenomena  of  nature.  Uniformity  of  volitions 
is  nothing  but  the  design  of  reason  and  pure  sensi- 
tivity, or  of  corrupted  passion  developed  in  human 
conduct.  The  uniformity  thus  not  being  the  cha- 
racteristic of  cause  as  such,  cannot  be  the  charac- 
teristic of  necessary  cause.  The  uniformity  of 
causation,  therefore,  argues  nothing  respecting  the 
nature  of  the  cause  ;  it  may  be  a  necessary  cause 
or  it  may  not.  There  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  con- 
ceiving of  uniformity  in  a  free  contingent  will, 
because  this  will  is  related  to  uniform  rules,  which 
in  the  unity  of  the  being  we  expect  to  be  obeyed 
but  which  we  also  know  do  not  necessitate  obe- 
dience.    In  physical  causes  we  have  the  uniform- 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  297 

ity  of  necessitated  causes.  In  will  we  have  the 
uniformity  of  a  free  intelligent  cause.  We  can 
conceive  of  perfect  freedom  and  yet  of  perfect 
order,  because  the  free  will  can  submit  itself  to 
the  light  of  the  reason.  Indeed,  all  the  order  and 
harmony  of  creation,  although  springing  from  the 
idea  of  the  reason,  has  been  constituted  by  the 
power  of  the  infinite  free  will.  It  is  an  order 
and  harmony  not  necessitated  but  chosen  by  a 
power  determining  itself.  It  is  altogether  an  as- 
sumption incapable  of  being  supported  that  free- 
dom is  identified  with  disorder. 


Of  the  words,  Foreknowledge  and  Prescience. 

These  wrords  are  metaphorical :  fore  and  pre 
do  not  qualify  knowledge  and  science  in  relation 
to  the  mind  which  has  the  knowledge  or  science ; 
but  the  time  in  which  the  knowledge  takes  place 
in  relation  to  the  time  in  which  the  object  of 
knowledge  is  found.  The  metaphor  consists  in 
giving  the  attribute  of  the  time  of  knowledge,  con- 
sidered relatively  to  the  time  of  the  object  of 
knowledge,  to  the  act  of  knowledge  itself.  Ban- 
ishing metaphor  for  the  sake  of  attaining  greater 
perspicuity,  let  us  say, 

First:  All  acts  of  knowing  are  present  acts  of 


298        EXAMINATION   OF  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST 

knowing, — there  is  no  fore  knowledge  and  no 
after  knowledge. 

Secondly:  The  objects  of  knowledge  may  be 
in  no  relation  to  time  and  space  whatever,  e.  g. 
pure  abstract  and  necessary  truth,  as  2  x  2  =  4 ; 
and  the  being  of  God.  Or  the  objects  of  know- 
ledge may  be  in  relations  of  time  and  space,  e.  g. 
all  physical  phenomena. 

Now  these  relations  of  time  and  space  are  va- 
rious ;  —  the  object  of  knowledge  may  be  in  time 
past,  or  time  present,  or  time  future;  and  it  may 
be  in  a  place  near,  or  in  a  place  distant.  And  the 
faculty  of  knowledge  may  be  of  a  capacity  to 
know  the  object  in  all  these  relations  under  cer- 
tain limitations,  or  under  no  limitations.  The 
faculty  of  knowledge  as  knowing  objects  in  all  re- 
lations of  time  and  space,  under  certain  limitations, 
is  the  faculty  as  given  in  man.  We  know  objects 
in  time  present,  and  past,  and  future;  and  we 
know  objects  both  near  and  distant ;  but  then  our 
knowledge  does  not  extend  to  all  events  in  any 
of  these  relations,  or  in  any  of  these  relations  to 
their  utmost  limit. 

The  faculty  of  knowledge  as  knowing  objects  in 
all  relations  of  time  and  space,  under  no  limita- 
tions, is  the  faculty  under  its  divine  and  infinite 
form.    Under  this  form  it  comprehends  the  present 


A  CONTINGENT  WILL.  290 

perfectly,  and  the  past  and  the  future  no  less 
than  the  present — and  it  reaches  through  all 
space.  God's  knowledge  is  an  eternal  now  — 
an  omnipresent  here  ;  that  is,  all  that  is  possible 
and  actual  in  eternity  and  space,  is  now  perfectly 
known  to  him.  Indeed  God's  knowledge  ought  not 
to  be  spoken  of  in  relation  to  time  and  space;  it 
is  infinite  and  absolute  knowledge,  from  eternity 
to  eternity  the  same  ;  it  is  unchangeable,  because 
it  is  perfect;  it  can  neither  be  increased  nor  di- 
minished. 

We  have  shown  before  that  the  perfection  of 
the  knowledge  does  not  settle  the  mode  of  causa- 
tion :  that  which  comes  to  pass  by  necessity,  and 
that  which  comes  to  pass  contingently,  are  alike 
known  to  God. 

CONCLUSION. 

I  here  finish  my  review  of  Edwards's  System, 
and  his  arguments  against  the  opposite  system.  I 
hope  I  have  not  thought  or  written  in  vain.  The 
review  I  have  aimed  to  conduct  fairly  and  hon- 
ourably, and  in  supreme  reverence  of  truth.  As 
to  style,  I  have  laboured  only  for  perspicuity,  and 
where  a  homely  expression  has  best  answered 
this  end,  I  have  not  hesitated  to  adopt  it-     The 


300  <  «>\<  LU8ION. 

nice  graces  of  rhetoric,  as  popularly  understood, 
cannot  be  attended  to  in  severe  reasoning.  To 
amble  on  a  flowery  surface  with  fancy,  when  we 
aiv  mining  in  the  depths  of  reason,  is  manifestly 
impossible. 

The  great  man  with  whose  work  I  have  been 
engaged,  I  honour  and  admire  for  his  intellec- 
tual might,  and  love  and  venerate  for  a  purity 
and  elevation  of  spirit,  which  places  him  among 
the  most  sainted  names  of  the  Christian  church. 
But  have  I  done  wrong  not  to  be  seduced  by  his 
genius,  nor  won  and  commanded  by  his  piety  to 
the  belief  of  his  philosophy?  I  have  not  done 
wrong  if  that  be  a  false  philosophy.  When  he  leads 
me  to  the  cross,  and  speaks  tome  of  salvation,  I  hear 
in  mute  attention  —  and  one  of  the  old  preachers 
of  the  martyr  age  seems  to  have  re-appeared.  But 
when  we  take  a  walk  in  the  academian  grove,  I 
view  him  in  a  different  character,  and  here  his 
voice  does  not  sound  to  me  so  sweet  as  Plato's. 

The  first  part  of  my  undertaking  is  accomplish- 
ed. When  I  again  trouble  the  public  with  my  lu- 
cubrations, I  shall  appear  not  as  a  reviewer,  but  in 
an  original  work,  which  in  its  turn  must  become 
the  subject  of  philosophical  criticism. 


■»'        /. 


Ill     III  I 

CD3S31b7M3 


RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 
University  of  California  Library 

or  to  the 

HERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

University  of  California 

'ichmond  Field  Station,  Bldg.  400 

1301  South  46th  Street 

Richmond,  CA  94804-4698 

MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 
"•e  your  library  materials,  you  may 
-  to  due  date  at  (510)  642-6233 


BELOW 


■  \i.   ULIAfXLLLI 


HI         II        I  I  III       II 

C  Q  3  5  3  1  b  ?  M  3 

RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 
University  of  California  Library 

or  to  the 

NORTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

University  of  California 

Richmond  Field  Station,  Bldg.  400 

1301  South  46th  Street 

Richmond,  CA  94804-4698 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

To  renew  or  recharge  your  library  materials,  you  may 

contact  NRLF  4  days  prior  to  due  date  at  (510)  642-6233 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


JUN  G  6  2008 


DD20   12M   7-06 


m 


WV 


